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ABSTRACT
Different disciplinary lenses condition the views on whether trade is generally seen as an op-
portunity for or threat to food security. Until now there is no consensus on the (empirical)
impact in the literature.
First, I analyse the impact of PTAs on food security across 93 low and middle income coun-
tries for 1990-2014. To take into account some of the multifaceted heterogeneity across PTAs,
a distinction is made between Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements (RTAs and BTAs, re-
spectively) as these are designed differently in the light of food policy. Findings indicate
that having a PTA in force, in contrast to having none, is associated with better food secu-
rity outcomes. However, an increase in the number of BTAs, which are more competitive, is
negatively, and an increase in the number of RTAs, which are more cooperative, is positively
associated with food security outcomes in low and middle income countries.
Second, I look into how RTAs and food security are associated across the three sub-regions
of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South East Asia. To take into account heterogene-
ity across the RTAs I operationalise provisions on food security and related provisions in the
agreement texts. I first test the impact of the aggregate provisions on food security for 67 low
and middle income countries which are member of at least one of the RTAs in the three sub-
regions, 1990-2014. Results indicate that the more food security related provisions a country
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has across its RTAs, the better it is a for food security outcomes. Then I test whether the state
of food security affects the design of a RTA. Estimates indicate that the more severe the state
of food insecurity within a country, the more food security related provisions the country has
across its RTAs.
In conclusion, RTAs are potentially an opportunity for food security - and the more food se-
curity and related concepts are addressed in the agreement text, the greater the opportunity.
In contrast, BTAs are potentially a threat to food security.
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This work is dedicated to those who are restricted from having sufficient and adequate food
to enjoy a healthy life style and well-being. It is also dedicated to the many people work-
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"It is in exchanging the gifts of the earth
that you shall find abundance and be satisfied.
Yet unless the exchange be in love and kindly justice,
it will but lead some to greed and others to hunger."
Kahlil Gibran (1923)
General Research Question
Food insecurity in terms of absolute figures of undernourished people as estimated by the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) has remained prevalent. About 98 per-
cent of the estimated 795 million undernourished people in 2014-16 live in developing1
countries (FAO 2015).2 While under five year old child mortality, another food insecurity
indicator, decreased globally by about 53 percent from 1990 to 2015, the mortality rate ac-
counts for still 76 deaths per 1000 live births in low income countries, which is approximately
11 times the average in high income countries.3 In most developing countries, more than
1Unless I make reference to a source which makes use of the terms ’developing’ and developed’, I prefer the
terms ’low and middle income’ over ’developing’ and ’high income’ over ’developed’, as these are, in my view,
more accurate.
2According to the 2015 estimates (based on modified method) of the FAO, as published in The State of Food
Insecurity in the World 2015, p. 8. See also FAO (2010) for previous estimates that indicate an increasing trend of
undernourishment since the mid 1990. See also Hickel (2016) for a discussion on FAO’s modified figures.
3See WHO, GHO data.
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half of the population live in rural areas and the majority’s individual income depends on
agriculture. Farmers, and particularly small-scale farmers, belong to the group where food
is most insecure.
Factors contributing to or countervailing food security outcomes are multiple and condi-
tioned by regional history, culture, economy, infrastructure, geo-political setting and cli-
mate. Based on the notion of self-sufficiency and the theoretical classical argument of wel-
fare gains though increased trade, regional trade cooperation and integration is often under-
stood as way of enhancing food security goals. In other words, the governance of interna-
tional trade in agricultural goods can be a contributing factor to the state of food security
across countries.
Trade in agricultural goods has been increasingly liberalised via amongst others multilat-
eral and preferential trade agreements (PTAs),4 in particular since the mid 1990s. However,
the impact of those trade agreements on food security has remained unclear in theory and
practice. The relationship between trade (liberalisation) and food security (right to food in
particular contexts) has been discussed across the literature through multiple disciplinary
and methodological lenses. The different lenses condition the views on whether trade is
generally seen as an opportunity or threat for food security in theory (normative debate).
The opportunity front is often grounded on primarily neo-classical economic theory which
demonstrates efficiency gains via liberalisation; ultimately leading to improved food secu-
rity. On the threat front, the different disciplines developed arguments by combining theory
with observations in practice. Accordingly, the trade regime is influenced by power realities
and the implications of this system are outlined in the dependency theory. In other words,
4Please note, that different from the WTO terminology, I use the wording preferential trade agreements as
an umbrella term for any trade agreement that is not a WTO agreement (but governed by WTO law in most
cases), and therefore preferential to the multilateral trading system (see Appendix B.1 for details and comparative
overview of terminology). See also Johns and Peritz (2015).
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the dependency theory depicts/includes amongst others the asymmetry argument of trade
relations. The implications of such an asymmetric trade regime are the macro conditions
which contribute to the individual violation of the human right to food of small scale farm-
ing families, as argued by human rights scholars and practitioners. The empirical literature
has extensively dealt with the implications of liberalisation on economics growth (yet, re-
mained inconclusive) but has neglected to further examine empirically the links between
trade agreements as such and its impacts on a coherent food security proxy across countries.
A more detailed review of the theoretical and empirical literature is outlined in Chapter 3.
This gap in the literature motivates my general overarching question: How are food security
and trade agreements associated? Before elaborating on my more specific research ques-
tion how are PTAs associated with food security, I describe the multilateral trade regime in
the light of food security and in relation to PTAs. I do so in order to set the general research
question in context and to highlight the relationship between PTAs and the WTO with regard
to the impact on food security.
The Trade Regime
The current multilateral trading system has its origin in trading rules named the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which were negotiated in the aftermath of World
War II and signed in 1947. These rules aiming trade liberalisation for goods "reflected closely
the original US vision of the broad-based elimination of quantitative restrictions, combined
with the progressive reduction of tariffs" of goods and applied in principal also to agricul-
tural trade (Lang 2011:28). The rules contained loopholes with the effect that by the end
of the 1970s the three major economies among all GATT Member States, the United States
(US), the European Union (EU) and Japan, had de facto excluded agricultural goods from the
GATT (Reichert 2009). Unconstrained by the multilateral commitments, states were able to
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increase export subsidies to promote their own agricultural market; and this was particularly
exploited by the EU, followed by the US and Japan (Kersten 2016).
Given the unsustainable agricultural subsidy race (or "farm wars" as coined by Wolfe (1998)),
hegemonic economies agreed5 that a coordinated approach of agricultural policy was needed
(Downes 2007; Reichert 2009) and launched negotiations under GATT, which took place
among GATT Member States between 1984 and 1994. This so-called Uruguay Round re-
sulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, incorporating
the principles of GATT (WTO Marrakesh Agreement). At the same time a first Agreement on
Agriculture was agreed upon its WTO members6. In their preambles, the WTO establishing
agreement (Marrakesh Agreement 1994) and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) make
reference to rising living standards and particularly to food security - a then already widely
diffused norm. Accordingly, "relations in the field of trade should be conducted with a view
to, inter alia, raising standards of living" (Marrakesh Agreement: Preamble).
In detail, under the AoA Member States agreed to three basic commitments: increased mar-
ket access for agricultural products via tarification of all border protection measures and
subsequent progressive lowering of tariffs (36 percent over 6 years for developed countries,
and 24 percent over 10 years for developing countries), cuts in domestic support of farming,7
and reduction in subsidies for agricultural exports if these existed in 1986-1990 (i.e., mainly
relevant for the EU, US and Japan). However, some of the domestic support reduction has
been purely cosmetic and/or modifications to previous support were made to be compati-
ble with the allowed exceptions (Swinnen, Olper, and Vandemoortele 2012; Meléndez-Ortiz,
5This was very much driven by the US, "which sought to limit EU subsidies to its agriculture sector (which has
exploded in the 1980s and were undermining American competitiveness and global market share), as well as to
gain better access to European markets" (Hopewell 2016: 68).
6As of now 162 states are member to the WTO.
7Domestic support is classified in three categories known as the Amber Box, the Blue Box (Amber Box with
conditions), and the Green box - the latter two are being exempt from obligatory reductions.
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Bellmann and Hepburn 2009; Banga 2015; Downes 2007; Reichert 2009).8 Furthermore,
there was little effect in effectively reducing the agricultural export subsidies of the US, EU
and Japan (Hopewell 2016).
Therefore in practice, the multilateral trading system has been arguably more favourable for
high income trading partners, in particular the EU, US and Japan, which continued to subsi-
dize their agricultural exports. Given this managed trade system in practice in contrast to a
declared trade system in line with economic principles, it can be argued that while the AoA
was intended to increase policy space for food security for its members, it did for high in-
come countries who took advantage of the loopholes within the law, but it restrained policy
space for the countries who were already struggling to fulfil their food security obligations
under international human rights law.
The following WTO round, the Doha (Development) Round, launched in 2001, has been
strained by a political power struggle between the EU and the US on the one side, and the
economies which learned their lesson from the implications of the previous round on the
other side - the low to mid income countries backed by rising economies such as Brazil, India
and partly China. The latter have formed groups within the WTO such as the group of 20 (G-
20), a Southern bargaining coalition on agriculture, and the Group of 33 (G-33), a coalition of
low and middle income countries with agricultural sensitivities (Margulis 2013). During the
from time to time sticky and stale, and until today un-concluded Doha Round, these com-
bined forces have been increasingly pressing for the liberal international economic order,
which the US rhetorically has claimed to be the principle for the multilateral trading sys-
tem, to be actually realised by asking it to be more universal and inclusive (Hopewell 2016).
8In case of the latter, Blue and Amber Box measures were replaced by Green Box measures which is evidenced
by the fact that a decrease in the non-green box category has been accompanied by an increase in the Green Box
category ("box shifting") (Swinnen, Olper, and Vandemoortele 2012; Meléndez-Ortiz, Bellmann and Hepburn
2009; Banga 2015).
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Thereby, ’agriculture’ remains one of the most sensitive, contentious and controversial issue
of negotiations (Reichert 2009; Grant 2003, Morrison and Sarris 2007), which also implies
negotiations surrounding food security.
On the one hand, the G-20 managed to strengthen their negotiation power by challenging
the high income countries’ price distorting subsidies in place by turning the rhetoric of free
trade and liberalization back on the US and EU (Hopewell 2016), and were then able, partly
with the support of the G-33, to push for new trade provisions to support food security by
protecting produce grown by resource-poor farmers (Margulis 2013).
On the other hand, under the auspices of the G-33, India led a proposal on public food secu-
rity purposes9, which aims to provide subsidised food to the poor and guarantee minimum
price support for farmer (Hopewell 2016), just before the 2013 Ministerial meetings in Bali.
The proposal was strongly contested by the US during that meeting (Hopewell 2016), and
has remained largely unresolved also in the following Ministerial conference in Nairobi end
of 2015. Some success was, however, achieved in Nairobi by the low and middle income
countries - or generally in terms of trade liberalisation principles. The Nairobi package (dec-
laration), includes the agreement that all developed member countries shall eliminate im-
mediately their remaining export subsidies (as usual with exceptions) and developing mem-
ber countries by the end of 2018.10
To summarise, despite the multilateral agreements texts on raising living standards includ-
ing food security, the implications of these in praxis have been to the disadvantage of low
9See G-33 Proposal on Some Elements of TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 for Early Agreement to Address Food Security
Issues, WTO Doc. JOB/AG/22, November 2012 and JOB/AG/25, December 2013; see also Committee for Agricul-
ture Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, Note from the WTO Secretariat, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/8,
January 2015.
10WTO Ministerial Conference Tenth Session, Ministerial Decision of 19/12/15, Export Competition, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(15)/45.
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and middle income countries. The attempts by relatively food insecure countries to inte-
grate concrete provisions on alleviating food security into the multilateral framework were
blocked by leading high income countries. While the multilateral framework might provide
the most efficient platform to tackle food insecurity due to power imbalances, any attempts
are blocked on the procedural level. The latter demonstrates further the asymmetric power
relations among WTO members due to economic inequalities.
Since the establishment of the WTO and its multilateral agreements, no other landmark
agreement has been reached on the multilateral level. The slow progress of the ongoing
Doha Round is often considered to be one contributing factor to the proliferation of PTAs,
which are governed by WTO law on the bilateral and plurilateral/regional level (see, e.g.,
Grant and Lambert 2008).
By law the PTAs are an exception to the WTO agreements. In detail, it is an exception to
the WTO key most-favourite-nation principle which is granted by Article XXIV of GATT and
the Enabling Clause, latter agreed upon in 1979 (For trade in services Article V of General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)). Under Article XXIV of GATT trading partners can
enter into preferential trade agreements if these liberalise "substantially all trade" between
them. The enabling clause provides a relaxation of the criteria set in Article XXIV allowing
for more flexibility with regards to granted preferences in particular for developing coun-
tries (Dür and Elsig 2015). PTAs are not checked for compliance as such (Pauwelyn 2009)
and there is no agreement on the interpretation of "substantially all trade" - with the effect
that all sorts of PTAs are concluded (Pauwelyn 2009). While it is required by Article XXIV of
GATT to include agriculture in the PTAs, there is substantial flexibility (Fulponi 2015), with
the effect that agriculture is most often treated differently in these agreements (Josling 2009)
including the protection for sensitive products (Fulponi 2015) of particular commercial in-
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terest (e.g., sugar for EU, rice for Japan, maize for US).
Given the stale negotiations on agriculture and food security on the multilateral level, PTAs
with substantial flexibility can potentially have a more direct effect on countries’ state of food
security - not only by increasing or redirecting agricultural trade flows but also by creating
common regulations, policies and/or institutions which promote food security.
The WTO counts as of February 2016 454 PTA notifications of which 267 are in force.11 The
new generation of PTAs is comprehensive and entails provisions beyond mere tariff and non-
tariff barrier reduction for trade in agricultural goods, which affect trade in agriculture, such
as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, rules of origin, foreign direct investment, services,
government procurement, and intellectual property rights. While these provisions are sub-
stantially heterogeneous across PTAs (Kim 2015; Baccini, Dür, Haftel 2015; Baier et al. 2015),
these tend to establish deeper integration in comparison with the WTO’s agreements (Grant
and Lambert 2008) according to some authors.
Nevertheless, agriculture - highly relevant for food security - remains the most excluded or
exceptionally treated in bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trade agreements. The reason
lies in the sensitive nature of the agricultural sector and its wider implications for national
security (Josling 2009) and food security. Unsurprisingly, agricultural trade remains the most
distorted in the world economy (Panagariya 2005), partly, because the domestic agricultural
sector is often supported and/or protected from international competitors. This refers espe-
cially to bilateral trade agreements (BTAs), which involve two trading partners in the same or
not same region, and which tend to be negotiated among often economically unequal trad-
ing partners with the apparent mandate to protect and support one’s own industry; resulting
11The WTO figures correspond to physical PTAs - counting goods, services and accessions together. The total
count is 419 if counted separately. See WTO facts and figures on ’regional trade agreements’ (WTO terminology).
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in ’competitive’ design of the agreement text. In contrast, regional trade agreements (RTAs),
which have at least three trading partners in the same geographical (sub-)region12, tend to
include provisions on common policy objectives with regards to agriculture and also food
security and are therefore considered to be more cooperative.
Specific Research Question
Given the above context of the multilateral trading regime and its inherent power imbalance,
I look particularly at the impact of PTAs on food security in low and middle income coun-
tries by taking into account the multilateral trading system. To reflect the question on how
are PTAs and food security associated in both directions, I then analyse whether the state of
food security potentially influences the text of RTAs of low and middle income countries in
Sub-saharan Africa, Latin America and South East Asia.
I answer the specific research question in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and link these as follows. To
set the rationale for a coherent food security variable, I discuss the food security concept in
detail. In this context I introduce the food security framework, which not only justifies the
choice of the food security variable, but also the control variables for the following analysis.
Accordingly, my three datasets are based on my own variable selection. Furthermore, I com-
pile my own trade agreement dataset by referring to five different sources in order to retain
detailed information on the trade agreements, which have not been operationalised before.
In detail, Chapter 2 discusses at the beginning how the terminology, conceptualization and
measurement of hunger has remained inconclusive across the literature. I then contextu-
alise the concept of food security within the applied terminology and develop a theory driven
conceptual framework which highlights the multifaceted and multidimensional character-
12At least three participating states can be set as a requirement for its definition (Josling 2009, Bese et al. 2009).
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istics of food security. The framework suggests to test the following: first, food insecurity is
a latent variable which can be measured via multifaceted observable indicators which proxy
food insecurity outcomes; and second, further multidimensional indicators co-vary with the
latent concept food security. These two propositions are tested with a confirmatory Struc-
tural Equations Approach for 114 low and mid income countries in 2010. The results indicate
that food insecurity can be modelled as a latent variable with proxies child mortality, child
stunting and wasting, anaemia among pregnant women, prevalence of undernourishment
and the progressive realisation of the right to food (via a Confirmatory Factor Analysis). Some
multidimensional indicators, such as food production, health expenditure, access to sanita-
tion and water, contribute to the explanation of the variation of the latent concept to some
degree but overall statistically not sufficiently (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes Model).
In conclusion, to model a latent variable for panel data is due to too many missings of the
required data, still not feasible. The framework suggests to then refer to one of the outcome-
utilization indicators such as child mortality. The rationale for selecting child mortality as
the ideal proxy of food security, as previously done in the literature is outlined in Chapter
3.13
In Chapter 3, I estimate the distinct impact of BTAs and RTAs on food security. Before do-
ing so, I provide a literature review on the debate whether trade is an opportunity or threat
to food security. In detail, I analyse the impact of PTAs on food security across 93 low and
middle income countries for 1990-2014 with a Fixed Effects and Dynamic Panel model by
controlling for economic, political, social and human rights variables. To take into account
some of the multifaceted heterogeneity across PTAs, a distinction is made between RTAs and
BTAs as these are designed differently in the light of food policy. As briefly mentioned above,
13The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the concept of food security in order to identify a workable depen-
dent variable for the following Chapters. At this stage, theories in the context of the concept only are introduced
and integrated into the framework. The framework is the main theoretical contribution, which facilitates and
justifies the selection of the dependent variable for Chapter 3 and 4.
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BTAs are often negotiated among asymmetric trading partners in a competitive manner and
result in a more ’competitive’ design. In contrast, RTAs often entail common policies or ob-
jectives on food security and related concepts, and are therefore in comparison more coop-
erative. Findings of the empirical analysis confirm that having a PTA in force, in contrast to
having none, is associated with better food security outcomes. However, an increase in the
number of BTAs is negatively, and an increase in the number of RTAs is positively associated
with food security outcomes in low and middle income countries.
In Chapter 4, I build on the impact findings of Chapter 3 and examine RTAs and their asso-
ciation with food security in more detail. After comparatively analysing commonalities and
differences of RTAs of three subregions, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South East
Asia, I operationalise a food security provision variable based on a comparative analysis of
agreement texts (count of provisions) which controls thereby for heterogeneity of RTAs in
the light of food security. To estimate what the impact of these provisions is on food security,
I regress food security outcomes on the provision variable for 67 RTA member countries in
1990-2014 with variations of a Dynamic Panel model. To assess factors of RTA design, I fit
the same data with a Count model which regresses the provision variable on food security
outcomes and employs an instrumental variable ’natural disaster’ to control for endogene-
ity. The results indicate that an increase in the number of provisions can lead to better food
security; and that the more severe the lack of food security, the more provisions related to
food security are incorporated in the design of the relevant RTA.
Chapter 5 concludes that RTAs are potentially an opportunity for food security - and the
more food security and related concepts are addressed in the text, the greater the oppor-
tunity. In contrast, BTAs are potentially a threat to food security. These results add to the
literature by indicating that trade agreements are not per se a threat or an opportunity for
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food security, but need to be further differentiated in light of food security relevant charac-
teristics.
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CHAPTER 2
HUNGER STATISTICS: HOW TO MEASURE
FOOD IN-SECURITY?
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Abstract Chapter 2
There is no consensus on the terminology, conceptualization and measurement of hunger
across the literature. This Chapter contextualises the concept of food security within the ap-
plied terminology and develops a theory driven conceptual framework which highlights the
multifaceted and multidimensional characteristics of food security. The framework, which
is more coherent, comprehensive and compact than the ones suggested in the literature so
far, presents two hypotheses. First, food insecurity is a latent variable which can be mea-
sured via multifaceted observable indicators which proxy food insecurity outcomes; second,
further multidimensional indicators co-vary with the latent concept food security. The two
propositions are tested with a confirmatory Structural Equations Approach for 114 low and
mid income countries in 2010. The results indicate that food insecurity can be modelled as
a latent variable with proxies child mortality, child stunting and wasting, anaemia among
pregnant women, prevalence of undernourishment and the progressive realisation of the
right to food (via a Confirmatory Factor Analysis). Some multidimensional indicators, such
as food production, health expenditure, access to sanitation and water, contribute to the ex-
planation of the variation of the latent concept to some degree but overall statistically not
sufficiently (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes Model).
Keywords: Food Security / Right to Food / Measuring Latent Variable / Structural Equation
Modelling
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
’For the first time in human history more than one billion people are hungry worldwide’
has been a common slogan in 2010, five years before reaching the 2015 deadline of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals. This slogan was backed with the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization’s 2010 estimates of undernourished people as published in the or-
ganization’s yearly ’State of Food Insecurity’ report. The 2013, and then 2015 estimates for
the 2010 figure have been successively lowered down to 838 million (2015 estimate for year
2015 is 793 million) just in time for the Millennium Development Goals deadline, partly due
to the revised estimation methods.1
This raises questions on terminology, conceptualisation and measurement of hunger. First,
terminology to depict hunger and/or related concepts has not only been diversely but also
incoherently applied within and across academic disciplines and beyond. Attempts to sys-
tematize the fuzzy terminology of and surrounding concepts of hunger has brought even
more contradiction and thereby confusion to the debate. Second, despite Sen’s work on the
theory of hunger since the 1980s (Sen 1981 and 1985), there is apart from some limited at-
tempts, no coherent, comprehensive and compact conceptual framework suggested in the
literature. Third, there is though consent amongst authors on the observation that the lack of
a common terminology and coherent conceptualisation might have contributed to a rather
dizzying array of measurement options (Jones et al. 2013).
The contribution of the Chapter is threefold. First, the applied terminology in the literature
is compared and contrasted to contextualise a common nominator - the concept of food
security. The evolution of the theoretical underpinnings of food security is sketched to de-
fine food security by four pillars, namely, availability, access, utilization and stability. To set
1 See for a critical discussion of FAO’s modified figures Hickel (2016).
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grounds for the operationalisation of food security, the general idea of different levels of indi-
cators, structural, process and outcome, is introduced thereafter. In the context of the pillars
and levels, the most commonly applied food security measures are reviewed. Second, based
on the theory of pillars, levels of indicators and indicators review, a conceptual framework,
which synthesises the pillars and levels into dimensions, is developed. This is the main the-
oretical contribution of this Chapter. The theory driven conceptual framework facilitates the
identification of indicators and presents two propositions: I) Food insecurity is a latent con-
cept and can be measured via observable multifaceted utilization outcome indicators; and
II) indicators of other dimensions contribute to the explanation of the latent variable food
security. Third, the two propositions are tested with a Structural Equations Approach. Whilst
the first hypothesis can be confirmed via Factor Analysis, a Multiple Indicators and Multiple
Cases Model fails to approach the underlying data statistically insufficiently; and therefore
the second hypothesis needs further analysis/testing.
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2.2 THE CONCEPT AND OPERATIONALISATION OF FOOD SECURITY
2.2.1 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND FOUR PILLARS
Terminology to depict hunger or related concepts is diversely applied (Jones et al. 2013).
Wording such as undernourishment, undernutrition, malnutrition, hunger and food insecu-
rity are often but not coherently referred to across the literature (Burchi and De Muro 2012).
For example the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in line with
Drèze and Sen (1989) describes undernourishment as a state of an insufficient intake of food
to meet dietary energy requirements resulting in insufficient energy, strength or some other
feature associated with nutritional sufficiency (lasting for at least one year) (Drèze and Sen
1989; FAO 2015).
According to Drèze and Sen (1989) undernutrition refers to a situation of a food shortage in
terms of quantity or variety; the latter can be described as one aspect of food quality. The
FAO (2015) adds that undernutrition can be the outcome of undernourishment but also the
outcome of a poor physical absorption and/or use of nutrients (micronutrient deficiency).
This includes "being underweight for one’s age, too short for one’s age (stunted), dangerously
thin for one’s height (wasted) and deficient in vitamins and minerals (micronutrient malnu-
trition)" (FAO 2015: p. 53). In addition to undernutrition and micronutrient deficiency mal-
nutrition also encompasses obesity (overnutrition). Whilst hunger is often described as the
physical discomfort caused by lack of food (Barrett 2010), the FAO (2015) defines hunger as
chronic undernourishment.
The World Food Programme (2009) sets food insecurity, hunger and undernutrition in rela-
tion to each other as nested concepts (see Figure 2.2.1).2 Accordingly, undernutrition is a
2 See for an illustration of overlapping concepts Figure 1 in Jones et al. (2013). The overlapping illustration is
partly contradictory to the here presented nested concepts in Figure 2.2.1 and Figure 2.2.2.
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physical manifestation of hunger and a subset of the latter. Hunger is a subset of food inse-
curity. However, this can contrast with the fact that one can be food insecure without being
hungry for example due to micronutrient deficiency.
Figure 2.2.1: Nested Concepts according to the World Food Programme
Source: World Food Programme (2009): p. 18.
Therefore, also given FAO’s understanding of hunger being chronic undernourishment and
undernourishment being one possible consequence of undernutrition (besides micronutri-
ent deficiency), the nested concepts idea is presented in an alternative overview more in line
with Drèze and Sen, and FAO’s outlining of the concepts (see Figure 2.2.2). Furthermore,
the re-nested overview presents well the commonly referred to triple burden of malnutri-
tion: micronutrient deficiency, undernourishment and obesity. Additionally, the term food
insecurity, which includes the concept of malnutrition, whereby arguably it might refer to
undernutrition only, is included as an overarching concept in the overview.
For the purpose of this Chapter, malnutrition is understood in the sense of undernutrition
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only (i.e., overnutrition is not considered). As food (in-)security is the focus in the remainder
of the Chapter, the concept is defined and described with more detail in the following. Food
security can be understood as a "continuum with food security and food insecurity3 posi-
tioned at opposing ends" (Jones et al. 2013: p. 482). Occasionally, a human rights approach
to food security is added on as this perspective provides further comprehensive elaboration
on food insecurity, which is relevant for the further analysis. In this sense the rationale is to
focus on the substantive interpretation of the right to food rather than on the legal implica-
tions of it.
Figure 2.2.2: Re-nested Concepts
Source: Own adaption.
Since the term of food security was introduced in the 1970s (Shaw 2007), its understanding
evolved over time. The most commonly referred to definition of food security was intro-
duced during the World Food Summit 1996 and slightly modified in 20014. Accordingly, food
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meet their dietary needs and food preferences for
3Please note that terms food in-security and food insecurity are used interchangeably.
4By adding the wording ’social’ (Clapp 2015).
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an active and healthy life. Accordingly, the four pillars of food security are 1) availability, 2)
access, 3) utilization and 4) stability.
The right to adequate food is an international human right and recognised in the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as part of the right to an adequate standard
of living (Article 25). While it is also referred to in several other instruments under inter-
national human rights law (for example, Article 24 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights
to the Child), it is most comprehensively dealt with in the 1966 International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In Article 11(1) of the ICESCR the right to
adequate food is recognised as part of an adequate standard of living and is further depicted
in Article 11(2) by the wording "fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger". The
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body of in-
dependent experts monitoring compliance with the ICESCR on behalf of the United Nations’
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), interprets Article 11 in their General Comment No.
12 and provides by doing so also further elaboration on the meaning of food security.
In summary, the right to (adequate) food provides legal entitlements to every individual, ei-
ther alone or in community with others, to have physical, social and economic access at
all times to sufficient, adequate (safe and nutritious) and culturally acceptable food that is
produced and consumed sustainably to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an ac-
tive and healthy life, preserving access to food and to the resources that are necessary for
the enjoyment of food security for future generations (FAO and OHCHR 2010; de Schutter
2014). The four pillars for the right to food are titled slightly differently than for the concept
of food security, namely 1) availability, 2) accessibility, 3) adequacy and acceptability, and 4)
sustainability. As these four pillars are very similar in substance, the wording could be used
interchangeably. However, the nuances in terminology are further elaborated upon under
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the relevant pillar.
In the following the concepts of food security and the right to food will be comparatively de-
scribed in the light of these four pillars to contrast but more so to highlight communality and
complementarity.
The first pillar, food availability, the understanding of food security in the 1970s (Jones et
al.2013; Maxwell 1996), describes the sufficient aggregate supply of food (per capita) through
forms of domestic production (minus exports), imports, food stocks and food aid within a
country or area (WFP 2009; Burchi and De Muro 2012; Simon 2012). According to the CESCR
availability in the context of the right to food "refers to the possibilities either for feeding
oneself directly from productive land or other natural resources, or for well-functioning dis-
tribution, processing and market systems that can move food from the site of production
to where it is needed in accordance with demand" (General Comment No. 12: para. 12).
Clearly, the overall economic condition of a country is one of the determining factors for net
availability of food. In the context of the right to food, Article 2 of the ICESCR, takes this into
account by setting the progressive achievement of the right to food in relation to the maxi-
mum of the states’ available resources.
In 1981 Sen drew attention to the second pillar (economic) access by highlighting the im-
portance of taking the economic conditions of people ’endowments’, the command over en-
titlements, and ’exchange entitlement’ into account (theory of entitlement). Food security
cannot be assessed by food availability only which is a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion (Burchi and De Muro 2012). Therefore, further variables on households’ endowments,
the bundle of resources people originally own (e.g., land, house, employment), and the ’ex-
change entitlements’, various alternative bundles that the person can acquire through the
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use of trade and production starting with each initial endowment (Drèze and Sen 1989) (e.g.,
information on wages in relations to food and other non-foods prices) need to be addition-
ally taken into account for the assessment of food security (Burchi and De Muro 2012). Sen’s
entitlement approach is the underlying theoretical concept for the second pillar.
In more detail, food access/accessibility refers to the households’ and/or individuals’ physi-
cal, economic and/or social-cultural ability to access to food. Physical access is determined
by amongst others infrastructure and information; economic access describes the house-
holds’ "financial ability to regularly acquire adequate amounts of food to meet their require-
ments" (Simon 2012: p. 6); social and/or cultural barriers to the access of food can be experi-
enced by simply belonging to a certain group of the population (e.g., women, disability, non-
nationals, indigenous, religious or ethnic groups) (Simon 2012). In the context of the right
to food, the latter dimension, has been further elaborated upon in the context of physical
accessibility by the CESCR (the Committee differentiates explicitly only between economic
and physical accessibility). In their General Comment No. 12, the Committee states that
"adequate food must be accessible to everyone, including physically vulnerable individuals,
such as infants and young children, elderly people, the physically disabled, the terminally ill
and persons with persistent medical problems, including the mentally ill", and "indigenous
population groups whose access to their ancestral lands may be threatened" (General Com-
ment No. 12: para. 13). One notable difference between food security and the right to food is
the wording. Accessibility emphasises the ability to access in contrast to the mere existence
of access. Given the definitions of access and accessibility, there is yet, no difference on the
substantial level.
The third pillar, utilization, refers to an individual’s "ability to select, take in and absorb the
nutrients in food" (WFP 2009: p. 18). Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze refer in this context, in
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their 1989 publication, to the capability of individuals "to avoid undernourishment and es-
cape deprivations associated with hunger" (Drèze and Sen 1989: p. 13). Accordingly, the
concentration needs to be on human capabilities and complementary "commodities that
have a substantial impact on nutrition and health" (Drèze and Sen 1989: p. 13) because dif-
ferent individuals may convert the same quantities of food in different nutritional outcomes
due to different combinations of conversion factors (Aurino 2013). The nutritional capability
of individuals depends amongst others on conversion factors on the micro level such as age,
gender, pregnancy, metabolic rates and general health; and complementary factors on the
macro level such as their access to drinking water, sanitation facilities, health care, medical
facilities, epidemiological protection, climate conditions, (formal and informal) elementary
education (Drèze and Sen 1989; Aurino 2013), storage and processing facilities (Aurino 2013;
The Economist Intelligence Unit 2015). Thereby, women have been identified to play a cru-
cial role in ensuring nutritional outcomes not only by their function as a care taker but also
by their physical state. For example, anaemia amongst pregnant women can not only lead to
higher maternal mortality risks, it can also have a consequence on the newborns nutritional
outcome in the longer term (Bhutta et al. 2008; Pangaribowo et al. 2013). With regards to
the right to food, the CESCR further clarifies that the available and accessible food needs to
be culturally and socially acceptable. Additionally, the quality of diet should be adequate to
"satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances" (General Comment
No. 12: para. 8).
The capability approach, the underlying theory of the utilization concept, is very much in
line with the human rights approach to focus on the most marginalised and disadvantaged
individuals in society (see, e.g., cross-cutting human rights principle of non-discrimination
in Article 2 of the ICESCR). The analysis of conversion factors and the achievement of food
security at the micro level, shifts the focus to the individual and in particular to a group of
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individuals who are disadvantaged by socio-economic or geographic factors, or are more
vulnerable due to their conversion factors (e.g. children, elderly, women) (Aurino 2013). The
focus on individuals food security outcomes, can provide some further insight into the intra-
household distribution of resources (Sen 1985; Devereux 2001; Haddad and Kanbur 1990;
Pitt 1990).
The fourth pillar, stability and sustainability, is the requirement that the three pillars, avail-
ability, access and utilisation, are stable and also sustainable over time. In other words the
fourth pillar incorporates the notion of long-term availability, permanency of access/acces-
sibility (General Comment No. 12: para. 7) and some aspects of utilization (Frankenberger
1992; Barrett 2010; Burchi and De Muro 2012; Aurino 2013).
Conclusively, the first three concepts are hierarchically interdependent. Availability is con-
ditional but not sufficient to ensure access. Access, in turn, is conditional but not sufficient
for utilization (Barrett 2010). The fourth pillar adds the time dimension to the hierarchical
interdependent three pillars. The complexity of the concept illustrates the challenges not
only of defining food security but also of operationalising the measurement of food security
(Jones et al. 2013).
2.2.2 INDICATORS AND THREE CONCEPTUAL LEVELS
One way of operationalising the measurement of the complex food security concept is to
make use of indicators. A food (in-)security indicator depicts a quantitative or a qualitative
variable which measures a simplified version of one or some aspect of food (in-)security. The
indicator is ideally measured over time and across countries allowing for comparison to re-
flect changes (Davis et al. 2012; OECD and DAC 2011). Besides food insecurity indicators,
right to food indicators, directly identified as such or entailing rights related aspects, will be
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introduced in the forthcoming subsection, and therefore also briefly described. Generally, a
human rights indicator is defined as capturing a "specific information on the state or condi-
tion of an object, event, activity or outcome that can be related to human rights norms and
standards; that addresses and reflects human rights principles and concerns; and that can be
used to assess and monitor the promotion and implementation of human rights" (OHCHR
2012: p. 16).
Indicators can be distinguished by conceptual levels depending on which spectrum of the
process these indicate. The commonly referred to conceptual levels are input, process (ac-
tivities), output (of these activities), outcome and impact. Input indicators refer to resources
allocated to processes within a larger project. Process indicators can be activities, designed
to meet a project’s objectives, with which the allocated resources are transformed into imme-
diate tangible or non-tangible results, the output indicators. Process and output indicators
describe the dynamics that lead to the outcome, which is closely linked to the final aims of
the project and quantified by outcome indicators. Impact indicators depict the longer-term
effects or higher-level goals to which the project aims to contribute to.
In the context of food security, Aurino (2014) differentiates between 1) input indicators and
country structural conditions (indicators for in-depth country assessment), 2) output indi-
cators of underlying determinants of country food security (indicators for action and mod-
elling) and 3) outcome indicators (core food security indicators for global monitoring). Lin-
telo et al. (2014) identify indicators which reflect a government’s commitment to reduce food
insecurity to keep these separate from outcomes, which, according to the authors, cannot be
controlled by governments. In this Chapter the original terminology of structural, process
and output, and outcome variables is kept. Structural indicators are further distinguished
into on the one hand legal framework, policy and programme, and on the other hand ’other
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underlying structural conditions’. Additionally, the idea of commitment indicators by Lintelo
et al. (2014) is integrated in the framework. All in all, the three levels are, similar to the pil-
lars, vertically interdependent. The structural indicators, condition the process indicators,
and the latter have an influence on the outcome indicators.
In the literature, an array of food (in-)security indicators is suggested and applied. These
metrics may focus on one particular combination of pillar and level (dimension), or opera-
tionalise concepts across dimensions (Jones et al. 2013).
2.2.3 REVIEW OF FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS
Authors across disciplines have conducted reviews of food (in-)security indicators (see, e.g.,
de Haen et al. 2001, Svedberg 2011, Masset 2011, Aurino 2013, Jones et al. 2013, Pangari-
bowo et al. 2013). After introducing a varying set of food (in-)security indicators and often
critiquing these, the authors compare the chosen indicators either merely descriptively or
also quantitatively via correlation analysis or comparative rankings of countries. This review
is distinct from the aforementioned examples, as it, rather than describing the indicators
substantively only, focuses on the underlying methodology of the measurement. Further,
the indicators are comparatively reviewed in light of the introduced pillars and levels, and
the potential applicability for statistical analysis. A critique of these indicators is beyond the
scope of this Chapter and is already well discussed in amongst others the here listed reviews
(de Haen et al. 2001; Svedberg 2011; Masset 2011; Aurino 2013; Jones et al. 2013; Pangari-
bowo et al. 2013).
Anthropometric indicators: The most obvious indicators for indicating food insecurity are
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anthropometric indicators such as stunting (height-for-age), underweight (weight-for-age),
and wasting (weight-for-height) (see also examples of undernourishment in subsection ’The-
oretical Foundations and Four Pillars’). Stunting is an indicator of the failure to reach the
growth potential and therefore it is often seen as an indicator for chronic hunger (Masset
2011). Some argue that the stunting indicator also reflects micronutrient deficiency (Walker
et al. 2007). Underweight can be due to long term failure to grow but also due to short term
weight loss and is, hence, not easily interpretable. Wasting is the consequence of acute star-
vation or disease, and portrays rather short term effects (Masset 2001).
These indicators are derived by comparing children under five years old (0-59 months) with
a reference population which is estimated by the World Health Organization (WHO) and last
reported in 2006 for children from different ethnicities and by gender (WHO Growth Refer-
ence Study Group 2006; Alkire et al. 2015). If children are below minus two standard de-
viations from median height-for-age, weight-for-age, or weight-for-height, of the reference
population, then they are counted as stunted, underweight or wasted, respectively.
Country-level data is from national surveys and harmonised by The United Nations Chil-
dren’s Rights and Emergency Relief Organization (UNICEF), WHO and World Bank (WB) (in
their harmonized global database on child growth and malnutrition), to make cross-country
comparison more feasible. It can be interpreted that anthropometric measures reflect not
only food intake conditioned by physical micro factors such as age and gender but also com-
plementary factors on the macro level such as, amongst others, access to sanitation and
health services (UNICEF 1990; Jones et al. 2013). Conclusively, anthropometric measures
make good utilization outcome indicators.
Biochemical indicators: Indicators which directly measure micronutrient deficiencies are
biochemical indicators (also named biomarkers). Biochemical indicators indicating the con-
centration of amongst others iron, vitamin A and iodine deficiency, across countries are
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compiled by the WHO’s Vitamin and Mineral Nutrition Information System (VMNIS)5. Yet,
compiled data is not all comparable across countries and lack of data coverage is an issue.
The indicator anaemia,6 which provides some indication on iron, vitamin A, folate vita-
min B12 deficiency amongst others might be the best indicator listed in terms of compa-
rability across countries and data availability; and is therefore focused on. The indicators
anaemia among children and anaemia among pregnant women measure the percentage of
children under age five (6-59 months) and pregnant women (15-49 years), respectively, hav-
ing anaemia. Anaemia is characterised by haemoglobin levels below 110 grams per litre at
sea level, which are based on haemoglobin distributions estimated via a Bayesian hierar-
chical mixture model by the Nutrition Impact Model Study Group (Anaemia) (Stevens et al.
2013). Sources of input data are national health, nutrition and household surveys, plus sum-
mary statistics amongst others from the WHO’s VMNIS. Conclusively, similar to anthropo-
metric indicators, biochemical indicators make great outcome utilization indicators.
Mortality rate: Another food insecurity indicator, referred to in the literature, is the mortality
rate amongst children which describes the probability per 1,000 that a newborn dies before
reaching year five (0-4 years). It is listed as one of the potential outcome indicators for the
right to food within the human rights indicator framework of the Office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner of Human Rights (2012), and is also included in the Global Hunger
Index described further below. Additionally, given the high correlation with anthropometric
and biochemical indicators, mortality rates are included in the review. Estimates are gener-
ated with a Bayesian B-spline bias-reduction model (Alkema and New 2014) by the United
Nations Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation with nationally representative
data sourced from vital registration systems, populations censuses, household surveys, and
sample registration systems (You et al. 2015). Similar to the indicators above, mortality rates
5For a complete list of VMNIS indicators see online: http://www.who.int/vmnis/indicators/en/.
6Anaemia is a condition in which the number of red blood cells is insufficient (WHO 2011).
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reflect besides individual outcomes complementary factors on the macro level. Further-
more, child mortality rates possibly indicate fatal consequences of food insecurity and cap-
ture thereby, if so, long-term outcomes under the utilization pillar.
Prevalence of undernourishment: The prevalence of undernourishment (or food inade-
quacy), "expressed as the share of people in a national population not meeting their mini-
mum food energy requirements" (de Haen et al. 2011: p. 761) is measured by the FAO. The
methodology for estimating the prevalence of undernourishment (or food inadequacy) is
based on the comparison of a probability distribution of the annual average of daily habitual
dietary energy intake of a representative (average) individual in the reference population and
a threshold level, called the minimum dietary energy requirement (MDER) for an active and
healthy life based on a physical activity level of 1.55 (prevalence of undernourishment) or
for an even higher physical activity level of 1.75 (prevalence of food inadequacy) (FAO 2013;
Moltedo et al. 2014).
The FAO estimates dietary energy consumption per capita in a country by calculating per
capita dietary energy supply based on FAO’s food balance sheets. Per capita dietary energy
supply is derived from data on production, trade, food stock changes, non-food uses and
food waste and losses (FAO 2013). Access to the calories is estimated by assuming a proba-
bility distribution of habitual energy consumption (adoption of the skew-normal and skew-
lognormal families of distributions introduced by Azzalini) defined by the mean dietary en-
ergy supply and the coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation is based on sample
distributions of calorie consumption or food expenditures from available representative na-
tional household surveys (FAO 2013; de Haen et al. 2011). To calculate the MDER threshold,
FAO employs a normative energy requirement standards based on the result of the joint FAO,
WHO and UNU consultation of 2001 (FAO 2001; FAO 2013).
To summarize, the ’prevalence of undernourishment’ indicator is estimated based on the
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quantity of calories available, the access to those calories among the population, and the
mean minimum amount of calories required by the population (de Haen et al. 2011: p. 761).
Therefore, in a strict sense, this indicator, even though it can represent substantively the
concept of an access or utilization outcome indicator, is technically an indicator combining
the availability and utilization pillar on the outcome level. FAO categorizes its measure as an
access indicator. Here, for the purposes of further analysis, prevalence of undernourishment
is based on its substantive interpretation categorized as an utilization outcome indicator.
SERF Right to Food Index: The SERF Right to Food Index by the Economic and Social Rights
Empowerment Initiative is calculated based on two variables: stunting of children (for non-
OECD countries) below five years and per capita GDP (PPP constant 2005 international dol-
lars). The latter functions as the proxy for resource capacity to reflect the economic and
social human rights concept of maximum available resources (see subsection ’Theoretical
Foundations and Four Pillars’). GDP per capita is plotted against the stunting variables
across non-OECD countries and time (1990-2006), resulting in a scatter plott. An achieve-
ment possibilities frontier (APF) is then fitted through the outer envelope of the scatter plot,
indicating the benchmark level of obligation at any given GDP per capita. A rescaled per-
formance indicator is calculated for each country and then compared with the relevant APF
benchmark level. The difference reveals the percentage of feasible level of the right to food
enjoyment achieved (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2011; Fukueda et al. 2015; see also Landman and
Kersten 2016). Whilst this indicator technically combines the access and utilization pillar, it
is here categorized as an utilization outcome indicator adding in a human rights element by
capturing the progressive realisation of the right to food.
Global Hunger Index: The Global Hunger Index, published by the International Food Pol-
icy Research Institute (IFPRI) since 2006, is the arithmetic mean of three equally weighted
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components: the proportion of the population that is undernourished (FAO’s prevalence of
undernourishment to indicate insufficient calorie intake), the prevalence of underweight in
children younger than five (as an indicator of child undernutrition) and the proportion of
children dying before the age of five (synergy of inadequate dietary intake and unhealthy en-
vironments). The index varies between a minimum of 0 (no hunger) and a maximum of 100
(complete hunger). The intention of the index is to address the multidimensionality of food
insecurity and is used to rank 121 countries (Masset 2011). This composite index aggregates
three of the outcome utilization indicators. Whilst the weighting scheme is simple it is also
rather arbitrary (Masset 2011). Furthermore, only few data points in time (every five years
from 1990) are provided. Therefore, the three components in its initial disaggregated form
are of interest for the further analysis.
Global Food Security Index: The Global Food Security Index, issued by the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit (EIU) since 2012, attempts to rank 109 countries according to their vulnerability
to food insecurity. The index is constructed based on 28 indicators categorised under the
three pillars affordability, availability, and quality and safety. Based on the variables, the af-
fordability pillar is most similar to the access pillar, the availability pillar to the availability
pillar, the quality and safety pillar to the utilization pillar.
The six indicators under the affordability pillar are: 1) food consumption as a share of house-
hold expenditure; 2) proportion of population under the global poverty line; 3) gross domes-
tic product per capita (PPP); 4) agricultural import tariffs; 5) presence of food safety-net pro-
grammes; 6) access to financing for farmers.
The eleven indicators under the supply pillar are: sufficiency of supply consisting of 7) av-
erage food supply and 8) dependency on chronic food aid; 9) public expenditure on agri-
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cultural research and development; agricultural infrastructure consisting of 10) existence of
adequate crop storage facilities, 11) road infrastructure, 12) port infrastructure; 13) volatility
of agricultural production; 14) political stability risk, 15) corruption; 16) urban absorption
capacity; and 17) food.
The eleven indicators under the quality and safety pillar are: 18) diet diversification; nutri-
tional standards consisting of 19) national dietary guidelines, 20) national nutrition plan or
strategy, 21) nutrition monitoring and surveillance; micronutrient availability consisting of
22) dietary availability of vitamin A, 23) dietary availability of animal iron and 24) dietary
availability of vegetal iron; 25) protein quality; food safety consisting of 26) agency to ensure
the safety and health of food, 27) percentage of population with access to potable water and
28) presence of formal grocery sector.
The pillar scores are first calculated from the weighted (equal or based on panel recom-
mendation) mean of the underlying normalised indicators and scaled from 0 to 100. Then,
the overall score is calculated via the simple weighted average of the category scores (The
Economist Intelligence Unit 2015).
Data is drawn from multiple sources - mainly from the FAO, WHO, WB, and internal sources
such as EIU risk briefings and EIU’s calculations and qualitative scoring. The composite in-
dex aggregates all three pillars and different indicator levels into one measure. The highly
composite nature and data availability since 2012 only, render the index unusable for the
envisaged purposes of further analysis in this Chapter.
Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index: The Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index
is developed by te Lintelo et al. (2013, 2014), to measure a government’s commitment to re-
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duce hunger. The index available from 2012 is constructed on the basis of performance in the
thematic areas of policy and programmes, legal framework and public expenditure. These
three areas are categorised according to a combination of one of the three pillars (food avail-
ability, access and utilisation) and one of four sectors such as food and agriculture, women’s
empowerment, social protection and health environment (te Lintelo et al. 2014; Pangari-
bowo et al. 2013).
In total nine indicators are identified and categorised as follows: 1) public expenditures on
agriculture (availability - food and agriculture), 2) public expenditure on education (access
- women’s empowerment), 3) public expenditures on health (utilisation - health environ-
ment), 4) access to improved sanitation (utilisation - health environment), 5) women’s ac-
cess to agricultural land (availability - women’s empowerment), 6) civil registration of births
(access - health environment), 7) constitutional right to social security (access - social pro-
tection), 8) constitutional protection of right to food (access - social protection), 9) existence
of a national hunger or nutrition strategy (all categories).
The single indicators are normalised, weighted and aggregated into subsets for each area
(policy and programmes, legal framework and public expenditure). The 21 analysed coun-
tries are then ranked according to the subset indices. An overall ranking is achieved by rank-
ing the countries according to the sum of the subset indices for each country (Borda ranking
scheme to preserve the ordinal nature of the index) (te Lintelo et al. 2014).
The intention behind this index is to keep commitment separate from outcome (Pangari-
bowo et al. 2013) based on the notion that governments contribute to but do not have to-
tal control over outcomes. According to the authors more insight might be "generated into
commitment if commitment is set against levels and progress in outcomes" (te Lintelo et al.
2014: p. 116). Whilst this composite index is in comparison with the previous composite
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index more distinct in terms of levels (commitment), it has a similar low data coverage in
terms of points in time, and an even lower in terms of countries; and is therefore unfit for the
purposes here.
Generally, the aggregation of indicators into composite indices is two-sided: on the one hand
these indices capture some of the multidimensionality of food (in-)security, but on the other
hand it is the aggregation, often across dimensions of pillars and levels, that can render the
understanding of food (in-)security even fuzzier. This in particular is the case if the aggrega-
tion function is not founded in a clear underlying theory of the concept and/or is rather ar-
bitrary. Therefore out of these reasons besides data coverage, only the SERF and FAO index,
which can be categorized into one dimension, are taken on besides the single indicators.
However, the review has highlighted that the single indicators are in most cases estimates
and have to be therefore understood in the context of its data gathering and generating pro-
cess. To guide a meaningful identification and concrete selection of food (in-)security indi-
cators, a theory driven conceptual framework is developed.
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2.3 SYNTHESIS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Similar to the indicators, varying food (in-)security or right to food frameworks have been
suggested in the literature (see in particular Aurino 2014 and OHCHR 2012; see also te Lin-
telo et al. 2014, EIU 2015, and to some degree Panagaribowo et al. 2013). Yet, all these
frameworks lack to provide a comprehensive and at the same time compact overview of the
food (in-)security concept. The conceptual framework introduced here, see Figure 2.3.1, fills
this gap by synthesising information on theory, theory driven pillars and indicator levels,
further information on aggregation levels and conversion factors. This framework facilitates
the identification of potential variables; and a number of concrete indicators including their
source (author and/or data compiler) are listed in Figure 2.3.1 as suggestions.
In detail, the framework combines the three pillars (Availability, Access and Utilization) with
the three levels (Structural, Process and Outcome) into nine dimensions. Additionally, po-
tential commitment indicators as suggested by Lintelo et al. (2014) are indicated across the
dimensions (with preceding letter ’c’). As the introduction of the different pillars already in-
dicated, indicators can be measured on different levels of aggregation: macro, meso and mi-
cro levels. In theory food availability is a concept mainly on the macro to meso level (coun-
try, region, community), access/accessibility on the macro (country) to micro (household)
level, and utilization/acceptability/adequacy mainly on the micro level (household and in-
dividual) (Aurino 2013). Access/accessibility does not only depend on availability but can
also depend on a set of macro conversion factors (which condition and contextualise ac-
cess) such as market structure including transparency, public goods and services and po-
litical freedoms.7 One proxy for the macro conversion factors is the political stability vari-
able - calculated by Brookings Institution and WB agenices, and compiled by FAO and WB.
7See also Sen (1999) on instrumental freedoms: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities,
transparency guarantees, protective security (Aurino 2013).
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Once access is given, utilization depends on micro conversion factors such as age, gender,
metabolism, pregnancy and health (as previously outlined) which convert accessed and then
consumed food into individual nutritional outcomes (Drèze and Sen 1989; Aurino 2013).
Some of the indicators on the utilization outcome dimension, e.g., anaemia amongst preg-
nant women, have some of these micro conversion factors incorporated by definition and/or
construction. In light of the micro conversion factors, food security and the right to food are
in principle individual concepts. Disaggregation ideally allows an analysis of the variability
of outcomes distributed within and between socio-economic groups (Devereux 2001; Had-
dad and Kanbur 1990; Pitt et al. 1990).
The selection of variables within each dimension is primarily based on the underlying com-
bined theory of each pillar and indicator level, and secondly on their availability - the latter
indicated by the relevant source (author or compiler such as the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Bank (WB), Agricultural Science and Tech-
nology Indicators led by International Food Policy Research Institute (ASTI led by IFPRI), In-
ternational Trade Centre (ITC), The United Nations Children’s Rights and Emergency Relief
Organization (UNICEF), and the World Health Organisation (WHO)). Indicators in braces
might be available from national or regional databases8 but are not yet harmonized and
compiled in a cross-country database. Therefore, these remain at this stage indicators to be
wished for and are listed here for a higher degree of completeness. The fourth pillar stability
or sustainability adds a time dimension across all nine dimensions, implying that variables
should be ideally presented over time to highlight their changes and/or degree of variability.
Structural indicators with regard to the legal framework, policy and programme across the
first three pillars can be dummy or categorical variables. These can indicate the underlying
8For an overview see, e.g., Jones et al. 2013.
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law and/or governance structure with regard to the right to food (all three pillars), the agri-
cultural sector, food availability (first pillar), land law and customs in terms of access to land,
and welfare and inclusion policies (second pillar) and food quality (third pillar).
Underlying structural conditions for food availability are as well as the general economical
condition of a country, land availability for agriculture, the quality of soil and water, and the
climate. Process indicators can be the investment in the agricultural sector plus the perfor-
mance of the sector. The outcome indicator under the availability variables is ideally the net
supply or per capita availability of major food items. Proxies for this indicator are variables
indicating the entire food production (value of food production, food production index), di-
etary energy supply adequacy, food waste, the affordability of food imports (value of food
imports over total merchandise exports), and food import (cereals) and aid dependency. Ad-
ditionally, the variable food stocks might provide further indication on food availability.
Structural and process indicators under the ’access to food’ pillar can be divided, in line
with the theory outlined in subsection ’Theoretical Foundations and Four Pillars’, into three
categories: economic, social and physical. Economic structural condition indicators ide-
ally describe the overall situation for food affordability. Variables on the national level are
domestic income per capita, long-term unemployment rates, food prices, inflation and ex-
change rates, and possibly import tariff rates. Ideal social indicators are variables on social
protection and inclusion policies (see also under law, policy, program). The geography of a
country, but also the build-up infrastructure for the agricultural and food sector are condi-
tional factors for accessibility to food.
On the process level, economic indicators are variables describing households’ food afford-
ability such as capital and work income or the disposable income, food consumption and
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expenditure disaggregated by population groups. Concrete social indicators are ideally work
participation (or unemployment) rates by sector and effectively received social benefits. Phys-
ical process indicators are variables such as road density, paved roads over total roads and
rail-lines density. For better information on physical access to food, indicators on food
deserts or, alternatively (the opposite), access to farmer markets and food stores with fresh
vegetables and fruits, are ideal.
A proxy for access outcome indicators are apart from being the concrete variable of food
expenditure of the poor, variables measuring income but also rural-urban inequality, such
as the GINI coefficient, poverty gap or headcount ratio at 1.90 or 3.10 dollars, or the rural
poverty gap or headcount ratio at national poverty lines. The rural population, whose in-
come relies often significantly on agriculture, belongs in particular in low and mid income
countries to the most food insecure. Thereafter, rural population change can function as a
proxy for access outcome indicators.
Structural indicators under the utilization pillar are complementary factors at the macro
level such as the general availability of and access to drinking water, sanitation facilities,
health care, medical facilities, epidemiological protection, climate conditions, (formal and
informal) and elementary education as mentioned in subsection ’Theoretical Foundations
and Four Pillars’. Ideal proxies for these are indicators on the coverage of drinking water,
sanitation, medical, processing and storage facilities and educational institutions. Available
variables are health expenditure per capita of GDP, diarrhoea treatment and immunization
for children, enrolment rate for primary education and literacy rate.
Process indicators providing a proxy for the concrete access to these facilities are improved
access to water and sanitation, and electricity (proxy for processing and storage facilities).
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Further process variables for the utilization pillar in terms of dietary adequacy are consump-
tion of iodized salt and coverage rate of vitamin A supplements among children (ideally, nu-
tritional intake based on the general daily diet should be accounted for). Further variables
describing dietary adequacy, proxy indicators on cultural (and social), and medical adequacy
would be ideal.
Finally, outcome indicators under the utilization pillar, are variables describing the outcome
of poor physical absorption and/or use of nutrients (see also subsection ’Theoretical Foun-
dations and Four Pillars’). These are anthropometric indicators such as stunting, under-
weight and wasting among children and biomedical indicators such as anaemia among chil-
dren and pregnant women, vitamin A and iodine deficiency. Moreover, variables prevalence
of undernourishment (or food inadequacy) and the right to food index are, for the purpose
of the Chapter, categorised as outcome utilization indicators.
Given the hierarchical structure of the first three pillars and the vertical structure of the three
levels, the utilization outcome indicators have a pivotal function and can be interpreted as
the variables measuring the actual realisation of food (in-)security. Accordingly, the frame-
work suggests to test the following. I) Outcome utilization indicators - covering multifaceted
aspects of short and longterm effects of insufficient and inadequate food intake amongst
children and pregnant women (taking into account some of the micro conversion factors),
plus the progressive realisation of the right to food - compose a latent variable of food inse-
curity. II) Given the multidimensional interdependent structures the suggested indicators of
the remaining dimensions contribute to the explanation of the just defined latent variable
food insecurity.
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2.4 MEASURING FOOD INSECURITY
2.4.1 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
I begin with presenting following outcome variables under the utilization pillar as listed in
Table 2.4.1 to evaluate whether these are potentially appropriate for operalitionising these
into a latent variable food insecurity, foodinsec.
Table 2.4.1: List of Utilization Outcome Variables
Variable Description (incl. unit) Source
mortality children under 5 yr. mortality rate (inf. per 1000 live births) WB
stunting children under 5 yr. below -2 st.dev. from median height-for-age (percentage) H
underweight children under 5 yr. below -2 st.dev. from median weight-for-age (percentage) H
wasting children under 5 yr. below -2 st.dev. from median weight-for-height (percentage) H
anaemia prevalence of anaemia among children (percentage) WB
anaempreg prevalence of anaemia among pregnant women (percentage) WB
undnourish prevalence of undernourishment in population (percentage) FAO
rightfood progressive fulfilment of the righ to food (index) SERF
Descriptive statistics for these eight variables are presented in Table 2.4.1 for 114 low and
mid-income countries (see Annex for list of countries) in 2010 (the most recent year for
which data are available for all eight variables).
Table 2.4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Utilization Outcome Variables (t=2010)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis Obs. (Missings)
mortality 51.509 42.155 6 209 1.329 4.506 114 (0)
stunting 29.125 14.248 5 58 -0.155 2.001 32 (82)
underweight 14.469 10.327 2 45 0.806 3.518 32 (82)
wasting 6.406 4.564 1 19 1.050 3.477 32 (82)
anaemia 44.637 17.422 17 87 0.589 2.166 113 (1)
anaempreg 36.257 12.017 20 65 0.883 2.500 113 (1)
undnourish1 16.818 11.609 5 53 0.963 3.292 99 (14)
rightfood 68.165 20.642 13 100 -0.492 2.802 103 (11)
Note: 1For values indicated < 5 the value 5 was inserted. Consequently relevant statistics might be overstated.
The descriptive statistics provide some indication that the indicators are not normally dis-
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tributed. Histograms in Figure 2.4.1 visualise the distribution of each variable across 114
countries in 2010.
Figure 2.4.1: Histograms of Utilization Outcome Variables (t=2010)
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The histograms show that the distributions in the case of mortality, underweight, wasting,
anemiapreg and undernourish are positively skewed. Rightfood is negatively distributed.
The distribution of the latter, aneamia and stunting approximate best a normal distribution.
To analyse how the variables are related to each other pairwise (Pearson) correlations are
shown in Table 2.4.3.
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Table 2.4.3: Pairwise Correlation (Pearson) Matrix of Utilization Outcome Variables (t=2010)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 mortality 1.000
(114)
2 stunting 0.619∗∗∗ 1.000
(32) (32)
3 underweight 0.589∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 1.000
(32) (32) (32)
4 wasting 0.436∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 1.000
(32) (32) (32) (32)
5 anaemia 0.800∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 1.000
(113) (32) (32) (32) (113)
6 anaempreg 0.708∗∗∗ 0.310∗ 0.414∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 1.000
(113) (32) (32) (32) (113) (113)
7 undnourish 0.517∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.323∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.174∗ 1.000
(99) (30) (30) (30) (99) (99) (99)
8 rightfood -0.355∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ 1.000
(103) (31) (31) (31) (103) (103) (92) (103)
Note: Number of pairwise observations are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Variables mortality, stunting, anaemia are highly positively correlated amongst and with the
other variables except few exceptions. Variable rightfood is expectedly negatively correlated
with all other variables (by construction and substantively as the right to food might be less
realised if child mortality, stunting, etc. is high). Variables which are strongly correlated
(ρ>0.80) with another variable that substantively covers some aspects of the first,9are not
taken on to avoid too much content overlap. Accordingly, underweight to avoid too much
content overlap with stunting, and wasting; and anaemia as it is well reflected via mortal-
ity and anaemiapreg are not included in further analysis. Whilst it can be argued that the
reduced set of the six remaining variables still entails highly pairwise correlation amongst,
these do cover substantially various aspects of food insecurity on the utilization outcome
dimension. Accordingly, in line with the first test variables mortality, stunting, wasting,
anaemiapreg, undernourish and rightfood are selected to measure the latent concept food-
insec.
9High correlation might not suggest interchangeability as Caspers and Tufis (2003) have shown in the context
of democracy measures.
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Other than the utilization outcome indicators, the conceptual framework suggests further
variables. These are screened and selected in terms of data availability (114 observations)
and variability. Eight potential covariates are accordingly identified as listed in Table 2.4.4.
Table 2.4.4: List of Covariates
Variable Description (incl. unit) Source
agrland agricultural land (percentage of total land area) WB
foodprod (3-year) average value of food production (international dollar per person) FAO
polstab political stability and absence of violence (index) FAO
gdpgrowth GDP per capita annual growth (percentage) WB
ruralpopu rural population annual growth (percentage) WB
healthexp health expenditure per capita (PPP constant 2011 international dollar) WB
sanitation population access to sanitation (percentage) WB
water population access to water (percentage) WB
Five dimensions plus one macro conversion factor, are represented by the selection of vari-
ables: the availability structural dimension by agrland, the availability outcome dimension
by foodprod, the access structural dimension by gdpgrowth, the access outcome dimension
by ruralpopu, the utilization process dimension by healthexp, sanitation and water, and the
macro conversion factor by polstab. Corresponding descriptive statistics of the eight vari-
ables are presented in Table 2.4.5 and relevant histograms are illustrated in Figure 2.4.2.
Table 2.4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates (t=2010)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis Obs. (Missings)
agrland 44.211 19.760 1 80 -0.155 2.226 114 (0)
foodprod 237.368 138.284 29 964 1.942 9.275 114 (0)
polstab -0.412 0.920 -3 1 -0.534 2.956 114 (0)
gdpgrowth 3.500 3.135 -7 12 -0.068 3.590 114 (0)
ruralpopu 0.711 1.456 -3 4 -0.370 2.894 114 (0)
healthexp 423.281 363.122 34 1823 1.174 3.981 114 (0)
sanitation 60.930 28.658 10 100 -0.333 1.695 114 (0)
water 83.070 15.142 47 100 -0.918 2.690 114 (0)
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Figure 2.4.2: Histograms of Covariates (t=2010)
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I apply a two-stage Structural Equations Approach, which is formally introduced in the fol-
lowing.
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2.4.2 STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS APPROACH
Structural equation modelling is a statistical method that can take on a confirmatory ap-
proach and is therefore ideal to test the theory driven suggestion of the horizontally and
vertically integrated latent measure ’food insecurity’. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
and Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes Model (MIMIC) are forms of structural equa-
tion modelling.10 In a first step, I apply CFA to test the suggested latent concept of food
insecurity. The idea is to test whether the identified utilization outcome indicators consti-
tute the latent concept food insecurity. In a second step, I test whether the proposed pivotal
function (interdependent structures of the pillars and levels) of the latent concept food in-
security defined via outcome utilization indicators holds. To do so I specify a MIMIC which
tests whether the suggested covariates contribute to the explanation of the latent variable
food insecurity - or more generally whether a model can be modelled as such. The MIMIC
model, introduced by Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975), integrates a measurement part (mea-
suring latent variable), and a structural part (regressing latent variable on covariates). The
formal applied model(s) are specified as follows.
The CFA, which also constitutes the measurement part of the MIMIC model is
y=λz+² (2.4.1)
where y is a kx1 vector of observable items (’outcome utilization’ variables), z is the scalar of
the latent concept ’food insecurity’, λ is a kx1 vector of factor loadings, and ² is a kx1 vector
of error variances of each item. k denotes the number of observable items (here k = 1, ...,6).
Errors ²k are in the basic form mutually independent. This will be partly relaxed as shown in
Subsection 4.3. Further, the expected value of squaring the errors, results into a kxk diagonal
10See for further elaboration on CFA and MIMIC estimation Annex A.I.
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matrixΘwith standard deviations of the ²k on its diagonal (E(²²
′ =Θ)).
The structural part of the MIMIC is defined as follows
z =β′x +υ (2.4.2)
where z is a scalar of the latent variable ’food insecurity’, β is a mx1 (and inverted 1xm)
vector of path coefficients, x is a mx1 vector of covariates or even exogenous causes of z, and
υ is a scalar of random measurement error of the latent concept. m denotes the number of
covariates (here m = 1, ...,8). Errors of the measurement equation ²k and structural equation
υ are independent (E(υ²′) = 0′), and the variance of the error term of the structural part is
constant (E(υ2)=σ2). The MIMIC can be mathematically summarized into
y=λ(β′x +υ)+² (2.4.3)
and illustrated in a path diagram as shown in Figure 2.4.3 for i countries .
Figure 2.4.3: Path Diagram for Specified MIMIC Model
The parameters (path coefficients, factor loadings, factor variances and covariances, error
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variances and covariances) are estimated to produce a predicted/hypothesized variance-
covariance matrix Σ that resembles the sample variance-covariance matrix S as closely as
possible. Given the highly skewed distributions of the items, the chosen estimation method
to minimize the differences between Σ and S is Robust Maximum Likelihood (MLR) with
robut standard errors. Further, the application of MLR, in the here employed software Mplus7,
assumes missing data to be missing at random.
2.4.3 RESULTS
In a first step, I model the CFA with latent variable food insecurity as the factor, foodinsec,
and six out of the eight observable utilization outcome variables as items - as listed in Table
2.4.1, namely mortality, stunting, wasting, anaempreg, undernourish and rightfood.
The unit of measurement across the eight observable items varies, and therefore estimated
parameter results are presented in its standardized values. In a CFA, one of the item or the
latent variable itself needs to be selected to be the marker indicator. In the underlying case,
the selection does not alter the values of the standardized results (with the exception of right-
food in terms of sign flip only, as expected). Here, item mortality is selected as the marker
indicator.
In line with Modification Indices and substantive reasonableness/meaningfulness, the pro-
posed model includes following pairwise residual correlations of items indicating a varia-
tion amongst them due to a further external cause (Brown 2008): anaempreg and mortality
- anaemia amongst pregnant women can result in long-term consequences up to death of
children; undernourish and anaempreg - some item content overlap here; and stunting and
rightfood - the right to food index has stunting amongst children as one of its component,
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and consequently the realisation of the right to food and stunting have a covariation that is
due to an exogenous factor other than the latent variable foodinsec. Completely standard-
ized results for the specified CFA are presented in a path diagram in Figure 2.4.4.
Figure 2.4.4: CFA Path Diagram showing Completely Standardized Results (t=2010, i=114)
Standardized factor loadings are located with standard errors in parentheses on each rele-
vant single-headed arrow originating in the latent concept symbolized with a circle. Factor
loadings can be interpreted as the change if food insecurity changes by one standardized
score. For example, in the case of stunting one standardized score change of foodinsec is,
ceteris paribus, associated with a 0.90 standardized score increase in stunting (Brown 2006).
Additionally, in this particular case of no double-loading indicators and one latent factor, the
completely standardized factor loading can be interpreted as the correlation of the indica-
tor with the latent factor. Accordingly, the square of completely standardized factor loading
for stunting, 0.81, is the proportion of variance (in the indicator) that is explained by the la-
tent factor foodinsec (Brown 2006). Hence, in the standardized solution, the errors (residual
variances), which are reported together with relevant standard errors of these in parentheses
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below the items symbolised with a square, indicate the proportion of variance in the relevant
item that is not accounted for by the latent concept (e.g., for stunting 1-0.81=0.19)); and are
therefore also named unique variances.
All factor loadings are statistically significant (z<0.0001) and standardized factor loadings are
above 0.40 and can therefore be considered as salient.11 The direction of effect of all factor
loadings is in line with theory: all factor loadings are positive except rightfood. The estimates
of the modelled pairwise correlations amongst the measurement errors are presented on the
double-headed arrows connecting the relevant items. All of these are statistically significant.
The CFA model fits according to the standard fit indices the data very well (see Table 2.4.6
for details). The Null-Hypothesis under the very strict Chi-Square Test (sample variance-
covariance matrix is equal to the predicted variance-covariance matrix) can not be rejected,
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) are all far
greater than the suggested cut-off criteria and thereby indicate that the model does fit the
data very well on their terms. Conclusively, the latent concept food insecurity is statistically
(construct validity) and substantially well captured via the utilization outcome indicators
and the specified model structure.
11This is not the case for non-standardized results. Non-standardized results indicate that in particular wasting
is not salient.
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Table 2.4.6: Fit and Model Selection Indices for CFA and MIMIC (t=2010, i=114)
Abbreviation Name Value
CFA MIMIC
χ2 Chi-Square Test Statistic 7.026 (df =6) 127.163∗∗∗ (df =46)
RMSEA Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 0.039 0.124∗∗∗
CFI Comparative Fit Index 0.993 0.809
TLI Tucker-Lewis Index 0.983 0.738
SRMR Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 0.077 0.072
AIC Akaike Information Criteria 4024.302 3857.603
BIC Bayesian Information Criteria 4081.763 3936.953
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
In a second step, I regress the latent concept foodinsec as specified above in a MIMIC on
most variables as put forward in the theoretic framework in Figure 2.3.1. However, only
a limited set of covariates as listed in Table 2.4.4 is selected for final model specifications
based on, first, data availability (114 observations) and variability for the year 2010, and sec-
ond, on statistically12 and theoretically sound results. The specified MIMIC does not fit the
data well in terms of the fit indices with the exception of the SRMR which is below the 0.08
cut-off criterion (see Table 2.4.6 for details). Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients (struc-
tural part) and factor loadings (measurement part) provide theoretically reasonable results
as presented in Table 2.4.7.
Regarding the measurement part, all factor loadings of the latent variable are salient, signif-
icant and generally in line with the CFA values. Regarding the structural part, all coefficients
are theoretically reasonable in terms of direction of effect, yet not all covariates contribute
to the explanation of the variation of food insecurity across countries in 2010 significantly at
the ten percent level. In detail, the less agricultural land, food production, political stability,
income growth, (health expenditure as a proxy for) health services , improved access to water
12Statistically sound might not necessarily mean that the estimate of the single parameter needs to contribute
significantly to the explanation of the latent variable, but it may be dropped if the overall model fit deteriorates
if the variable is added in, as e.g. in the case of ’access to electricity’.
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Table 2.4.7: MIMIC Standardized Estimates for Measurement and Structural Part (t=2010,
i=114)
Estimate (Standard Error)
Measurement Part
mortality 0.819∗∗∗ (0.035)
stunting 0.842∗∗∗ (0.034)
wasting 0.512∗∗∗ (0.096)
anaempreg 0.702∗∗∗ (0.054)
undnourish 0.620∗∗∗ (0.068)
rightfood −0.532∗∗∗ (0.080)
anaempreg c mortality 0.339∗∗∗ (0.087)
undnourish c anaempreg −0.417∗∗∗ (0.085)
stunting c rightfood −0.738∗∗∗ (0.081)
Structural Part
agrland −0.008 (0.046)
foodprod −0.132∗ (0.067)
polstab −0.064 (0.057)
gdpgrowth −0.001 (0.079)
ruralpopu 0.043 (0.087)
healthexp −0.136∗∗∗ (0.051)
sanitation −0.614∗∗∗ (0.092)
water −0.204∗ (0.114)
Note: ∗z<0.1; ∗∗z<0.05; ∗∗∗z<0.01
68
and sanitation is given, the higher food insecurity becomes (negative impact). Growth in ru-
ral population (proxy for inequality/poverty as other variables were filtered out on grounds
of data availability) is associated with more food insecurity (positive effect). Yet, based on
statistical significance and magnitude of standardized effects, only food production, health
services and access to sanitation and water indicate an association with food security. The
significance of food availability in particular for food insecure countries has been previously
shown in Headey (2013). Whilst the provision of health services have been identified as a
significant driver for food security in the literature (see e.g. Headey 2013, Smith et al. 2000),
access to water and sanitation has rather counter-intuitively not yet been found to do so
(Headey 2013; Aurino 2013). In that sense, the results make a contribution in highlighting
the importance of improved access to water and sanitation for food security outcomes. Nev-
ertheless, the hypothesized MIMIC is a miss-fit and tentative results can only be taken into
consideration with caution.13
To conclude, the first suggestion that food insecurity can be constructed as a latent concept
with the observable utilization outcome indicators is statistically confirmed for 114 low and
mid-income countries in 2010. 14 Yet, the second suggestion that the latent variable food in-
security is horizontally and vertically integrated in the theory driven conceptual framework
could for the underlying year and countries, and selected covariates, not be shown.
13The model-fit can be slightly improved by dropping the ’non-significant’ parameters. The MIMIC model
with latent conceptfoodinsec specified as above and covariates foodprod, healthexp, sanitation and water has
following fit and selection indices: χ2=66.102∗∗∗ (df =26), RMSEA=0.082, CFI=0.897, TLI=0.845, SRMR=0.071,
AIC=3852.192, BIC=3920.597.
14 Invariance testing across units (groups of countries) should ideally be conducted. Due to limited data avail-
ability invariance testing across groups was not feasible. Furthermore, it should be noted that the specified
models are most likely not robust over time. Data availability for 114 countries varies across time, and therefore
robustness of the model specification across time could not be tested as such.
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2.5 CONCLUSION
The theory driven conceptual framework introduced in this Chapter syntheses informa-
tion on theory, theory driven pillars and indicator levels, further information on aggrega-
tion levels and conversion factors. The framework facilitates the identification and justifies
the selection of potential food security indicators. By combining and building upon limited
frameworks in the literature, this framework offers a coherent, comprehensive and compact
overview of the multifaceted and multidimensional concept of food security. Thereby the
vertically and horizontally integrated framework indicates that, first, food insecurity is a la-
tent concept which can be measured via the observable pivotal outcome utilization indi-
cators, covering aspects of short and longterm effects of insufficient and inadequate food
intake amongst children and pregnant women (taking into account some of the micro con-
version factors), plus the progressive realisation of the right to food (multifaceted). Second,
the suggested indicators of the remaining dimensions contribute to the explanation of the
latent variable food insecurity (multidimensional).
The confirmatory SEM approach employed to test the suggestions, indicates that food in-
security can be measured as a latent concept with the observable multifaceted outcome in-
dicators across 114 mid and low income countries in 2010. However, the interdependence
of the framework could with the selected covariates and specified models not be confirmed.
Beyond data limitation15 further indicators as suggested within the different dimensions of
the framework should be included; and an analysis across time would be ideal. Further-
more, the framework and the subsequent statistical analysis focuses on domestic drivers.
Adding on an international level in the framework which depicts the role of international
financial markets including prices (of virtually traded agricultural goods), and the impact of
15Imputed datasets might be a good compromise. Here, it would be beyond the purpose of the Chapter, as
only original data to understand these and relations amongst in its unmodified form are of interest.
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trade and investment relations and regulations, may provide a more complete and therefore
better understanding of the multidimensional concept of food security. In the meantime,
single outcome indicators as selected in this Chapter might be employed as food insecurity
proxies in the applied research. To conclude, given the data limitation and the preliminary
findings, measuring food insecurity remains at this stage rather unsatisfactory. Hence, these
statistics are hunger statistics by description and beyond.
71
CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL AND
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON
FOOD SECURITY IN LOW AND MIDDLE
INCOME COUNTRIES
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Abstract Chapter 3
The Chapter analyses the impact of PTAs on food security across 93 low and middle income
countries for 1990-2014 with a Fixed Effects and Dynamic Panel model by controlling for
economic, political, social and human rights variables. To take into account some of the
multifaceted heterogeneity across PTAs, a distinction is made between Regional and Bilat-
eral Trade Agreements (RTAs and BTAs, respectively) as these are designed differently in the
light of food policy. BTAs are often negotiated among asymmetric trading partners in a com-
petitive manner and result in a more ’competitive’ design. In contrast, RTAs often entail
common policies or objectives on food security and related, and are therefore in compari-
son more cooperative. Findings of the empirical analysis confirm that having a PTA in force,
in contrast to having none, is associated with better food security outcomes. However, an
increase in the number of BTAs is negatively, and an increase in the number of RTAs is posi-
tively associated with food security outcomes in low and middle income countries.
Keywords: Preferential Trade Agreements / Food Security / Impact Assessment / Low-and
Middle Income Countries / Trade Policy
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Food insecurity in terms of absolute figures of undernourished people as estimated by the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) has remained prevalent. About 98 per-
cent of the estimated 795 million undernourished people in 2014-16 live in developing1
countries (FAO 2015).2 While under five year old child mortality, another food insecurity
indicator, decreased globally by about 53 percent from 1990 to 2015, the mortality rate ac-
counts for still 76 deaths per 1000 live births in low income countries, which is approximately
11 times the average in high income countries.3 In most developing countries, more than
half of the population live in rural areas and the majority’s individual income depends on
agriculture. Farmers, and particularly small-scale farmers, belong to the group where food
is most insecure. The governance of international trade in agricultural goods can be a con-
tributing factor to the state of food security across countries.
Trade in agricultural goods has been increasingly liberalised via amongst others multilateral
and preferential trade agreements (PTAs),4 in particular since the mid 1990s. In their pream-
bles, the WTO establishing agreement (Marrakesh Agreement 1994) and the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA)- both outcomes of the Uruguay Round - make reference to rising living
standards and particularly to food security, a then already widely diffused norm. Accord-
ingly, "relations in the field of trade should be conducted with a view to, inter alia, raising
standards of living" (Marrakesh Agreement: Preamble). In practice, the multicultural trad-
ing system has been arguably more favourable for high income trading partners, in partic-
1Unless I make reference to a source which makes use of the terms ’developing’ and developed’, I prefer the
terms ’low and middle income’ over ’developing’ and ’high income’ over ’developed’, as these are, in my view,
more accurate.
2According to the 2015 estimates (based on modified method) of the FAO, as published in The State of Food
Insecurity in the World 2015, p. 8. See also FAO (2010) for previous estimates that indicate an increasing trend of
undernourishment since the mid 1990. See also Hickel (2016) for a discussion on FAO’s modified figures.
3See WHO, GHO data.
4Please note, that different from the WTO terminology, I use the wording preferential trade agreements as
an umbrella term for any trade agreement that is not a WTO agreement (but governed by WTO law in most
cases), and therefore preferential to the multilateral trading system (see Appendix B.1 for details and comparative
overview of terminology). See also Johns and Peritz (2015).
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ular the EU, US and Japan, which continued to subsidize their agricultural exports. Given
the managed trade system in practice in contrast to a declared trade system in line with eco-
nomic principles, it can be argued that while the AoA was intended to increase policy space
for food security for its members, it did for high income countries who took advantage of the
loopholes within the law, but it restrained policy space for the countries who were already
struggling to fulfil their food security obligations (under international human rights law).
The WTO Doha (Development) Round, launched in 2001, has been strained by a political
power struggle between the EU and the US on the one side, and the economies now con-
ditioned by the implications of the previous round on the other side - the low to middle
income countries backed by rising economies such as Brazil, India and partly China. During
the from time to time sticky and stale, and until today un-concluded Doha Round, ’agricul-
ture’ remains one of the most sensitive, contentious and controversial issue of negotiations
(Richert 2009; Grant 2003, Morrison and Sarris 2007), and proposals on national food secu-
rity purposes brought forward by a group of low and middle income countries, led by India,
has been blocked by the US and remained unresolved.
The slow progress of the ongoing Doha Round is often considered to be one contributing fac-
tor to the proliferation of PTAs, which are governed by WTO law 5 on the bilateral and pluri-
lateral/regional level (see, e.g., Grant and Lambert 2008). The WTO counts as of February
2016 454 PTA notifications of which 267 are in force.6 The new generation of PTAs is compre-
5PTAs are governed by WTO rules. An exception to the WTO most-favourite-nation principle is granted by Ar-
ticle XXIV of GATT and the Enabling Clause, latter agreed upon in 1979 (For trade in services Article V of General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)). Under Article XXIV of GATT trading partners can enter into preferen-
tial trade agreements if these liberalise "substantially all trade" between them. The enabling clause provides a
relaxation of the criteria set in Article XXIV allowing for more flexibility with regards to granted preferences in
particular for developing countries (Dür and Elsig 2015). PTAs are not checked for compliance as such (Pauwe-
lyn 2009) and there is no agreement on the interpretation of "substantially all trade" - with the effect that all
sorts of PTAs are concluded (Pauwelyn 2009). While it is required by Article XXIV of GATT to include agriculture
in the PTAs, there is substantial flexibility (Fulponi 2015), with the effect that agriculture is most often treated
differently in these agreements (Josling 2009) including the protection for sensitive products (Fulponi 2015) of
particular commercial interest (e.g., sugar for EU, rice for Japan, maize for US).
6The WTO figures correspond to physical PTAs - counting goods, services and accessions together. The total
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hensive and entails provisions beyond mere tariff and non-tariff barrier reduction for trade
in agricultural goods, which affect trade in agriculture, such as sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, rules of origin, foreign direct investment, services, government procurement, and
intellectual property rights. While these provisions are substantially heterogeneous across
PTAs (Kim 2015; Baccini, Dür, Haftel 2015; Baier et al. 2015), these tend to establish deeper
integration in comparison with the WTO’s agreements (Grant and Lambert 2008) according
to some authors.
Given the stale negotiations on agriculture and food security on the multilateral level, PTAs
with substantial flexibility can potentially have a more direct effect on countries’ state of food
security - not only by increasing or redirecting agricultural trade flows but also by creating
common policies to institutions which promote food security. Nevertheless, agriculture re-
mains the most excluded or exceptionally treated not only in multilateral but also in bilateral
and plurilateral trade agreements. The reason lies in the sensitive nature of the agricultural
sector and its wider implications for national security (Josling 2009) and food security. Un-
surprisingly, agricultural trade remains the most distorted in the world economy (Panagariya
2005), partly, because the domestic agricultural sector is often supported and/or protected
from international competitors. This refers especially to bilateral trade agreements (BTAs),
which involve two trading partners in the same or not same region, and which tend to be ne-
gotiated among often economically unequal trading partners with the apparent mandate to
protect and support one’s own industry; resulting in ’competitive’ design of the agreement
text. In contrast, regional trade agreements (RTAs), which have at least three trading part-
ners in the same geographical (sub-)region7, tend to include provisions on common policy
objectives with regards to agriculture and also food security and are therefore considered to
be more cooperative.
count is 419 if counted separately. See WTO facts and figures on ’regional trade agreements’ (WTO terminology).
7At least three participating states can be set as a requirement for its definition (Josling 2009, Bese et al. 2009).
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The impact of those trade agreements on food security has remained unclear in theory and
practice. The relationship between agricultural trade (liberalisation) and food security (right
to food in particular contexts) has been discussed across the literature through multiple dis-
ciplinary and methodological lenses. The different lenses condition the views on whether
trade is generally seen as an opportunity or threat for food security in theory (normative de-
bate). The opportunity front is often grounded on primarily neo-classical economic theory
which demonstrates efficiency gains via liberalisation; ultimately leading to improved food
security. On the threat front, the different disciplines developed arguments by combining
theory with observations in practice. Accordingly a managed trade regime is influenced by
power realities and the implications of this system are outlined in the dependency theory.
The implications as outlined in the dependency theory are the macro conditions which con-
tribute to the individual violation of the human right to food of small scale farming families,
as argued by human rights scholars and practitioners. The empirical literature has exten-
sively dealt with the implications of liberalisation on economics growth (yet, remained in-
conclusive) but has neglected to further examine empirically the links between trade agree-
ments as such and its impacts on a coherent food security proxy across countries. Further-
more, no distinction has been made between RTAs and BTAs (or any different type of PTAs),
which have on average distinct implications for food security policies.
In this Chapter I distinguish the impact of PTAs on food security outcomes. In detail, after
summarizing the debate on trade liberalisation and food security and reviewing the existing
literature, I regress food security outcomes on different trade agreement variables across 93
low and middle income countries for 1990-2014 with a Fixed Effects model and Dynamic
Panel model (Generalized Method of Moments) by controlling for economic, political, social
and human rights variables. The estimation results indicate that, first, having a trade agree-
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ment in force, in contrast to having no trade agreement in force, is associated with better
food security outcomes. Second, an increase in the number of RTAs is positively and an in-
crease in the number of BTAs is negatively associated with food security outcomes. Given
that WTO membership has a negative impact, it can be concluded that the more compet-
itive BTAs can enhance the managed trading system but the more cooperative RTAs retake
some of the restricted policy space under the WTO and contribute to better food security
outcomes.
3.2 FOOD SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
3.2.1 CONTEXTUALISING THE DEBATE
Both the concept of food security and implications of the by now very comprehensive trade
agreements, evoke an interdisciplinary approach in understanding the contextual background
(of the questions raised). Therefore, I refer to the international economics, international
public law and political economy literature, to summarize the partly intersecting but also
distinct discussion on food security and trade liberalisation in the aforementioned disci-
plines. The different disciplinary and methodological lenses condition the views on whether
trade is generally seen as an opportunity or threat for food security in theory (normative de-
bate).8 At the same time there is often the acknowledgement that depending on multiple
underlying factors such as the level of economic development, the trade balance, the struc-
ture of the domestic markets, the characteristics of agricultural producers (FAO 2015b), the
regime type (Sen 1999), the absence or presence of conflict (Hendrix 2012; Hendrix and Hag-
gard 2015; Korean and Bagozzi 2017))9 the impacts of trade liberalisation on food security
can play out differently for different trading partners, sectors and income groups across time
(long, medium and short term effects). The debate, which has become more polarised over
8For an overview of the opportunity and threat debate see Clapp (2015).
9A further major influential factors can be the climate.
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the years, is in its essence underpinned by the notions of a country’s food self-sufficiency
and self-reliance in food (Clapp 2015). Self-sufficiency - often advocated on national secu-
rity and state/political sovereignty grounds, amongst other, - excludes trade, whereas self-
reliance sees the integration into the international market as an additional way of ensuring
food security by averting risks of food and other shortages (Brooks and Matthews 2015). To
lay out the relevant basis for further discussion relevant theories and perspectives in the eco-
nomics, law and political sciences literature are sketched, after briefly defining food security,
elaborating on the right to food and the understanding of trade and trade agreements in this
Chapter.
3.2.2 DEFINING FOOD SECURITY, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
In this Chapter, as in Chapter 2, the following definition of food security is referred to. Food
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an
active and healthy life (1996 World Food Summit, 2001 FAO). This implies that people will
be food secure if there is sufficient food available (availability pillar), they have access to it
(access pillar), and it can be well utilised (utilization pillar) over time (stability pillar) (Brooks
and Matthews 2015).10
The right to adequate food is an international human right and recognised in the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as part of the right to an adequate standard
of living (Article 25). While it is also referred to in several other instruments under inter-
national human rights law (for example, Article 24 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights
10For the evolution of the understanding of food security and details on the pillars see Annex B.2.
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to the Child), it is most comprehensively dealt with in the 1966 International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which is binding according to international
treaty law. In Article 11(1) of the ICESCR the right to adequate food is recognised as part of
an adequate standard of living and is further depicted in Article 11(2) by the wording "fun-
damental right of everyone to be free from hunger" (Kersten 2016). The key difference to the
concept food security is that the right to (adequate) food provides legal entitlements to every
individual to be food secure.
International trade can be regulated on the multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral level amongst
regional or non-regional trading countries. Trading rules often depict the removal of direct
trade barriers in the form of import tariffs (tax levied on imported good), import quotas
(quantitative restrictions), export subsidies and taxes, and/or the introduction of standards
and regulations, which are aimed to facilitate trade via harmonisation but could in the short-
term function in praxis as indirect trade barriers.11 Altogether these trading rules can con-
tribute to trade liberalisation. If governments, after concluding negotiating details of such
arrangements sign the agreed provisions, ’trade agreements’, then these constitute (binding)
international trade law (Article 2, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
3.2.3 TRADE AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FOOD SECURITY
The argument for liberalising trade is often founded on economic theory, dating from the
classical works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo.12 Their theories suggest that countries
can increase their welfare, when moving beyond autarky, and start trading with each other
(given that they trade in accordance to an absolute (Smith) and relative (Ricardo) factor en-
11See, e.g,. CARICOM Trade and Food Policy Brief 2001, No. 5, p. 1: "One area of direct impact is compli-
ance with international and industry-driven agricultural health and food safety (AHFS) measures. AHFS creates
difficulties for CARICO’s food and agricultural exports to enter markets."
12Followed by economic models of Eli Hekscher and Bertil Ohlin, and Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson.
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dowment (advantage)) (Dieckheuer 2001). However, since Jacob Viner’s (1950) pioneering
work on trade creating and diverting effects of preferential trade liberalisation, net welfare
effects for participating economies have remained rather ambiguous,13 in particular when
taking the initial situation of trade-distortion (theory of second best)14 into account (Kersten
2016).15
Despite the ambiguity of trade theory in the economics literature, proponents for agricul-
tural trade liberalisation refer frequently to the classical works of comparative advantage
only. According to them, trade can - apart from immediate effects of more food supply
(quantity and variety) via imports - improve allocation of resources due to a reduction of
costs, enhance competition, and increase thereby economic growth, household incomes,
and governmental budget for the provision of public services (in essence also the main argu-
mentation line of the modernization theory); and therefore all in all enhance efficiencies and
stability for an improvement of food security (Clapp 2015; FAO 2015b). A more differentiated
and nuanced view analyses the different channels, categorized by the three pillars of food se-
curity (availability, access and utilization) over time (stability - fourth pillar of food security)
through which trade may impact on food security (Brooks and Matthews 2014; Díaz-Bonilla
et al. 2000; Díaz-Bonilla 2015; Clapp 2015).16 This more nuanced approach can provide an-
swers within the extreme spectrum of the two positions - trade as an opportunity and trade
as a threat (Clapp 2015).
13See for example Corden (1988); Chacholiades (1978); Gandolofo (1998); Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996);
Krishna (2004); Panagariya (1999/2000); Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003); Baldwin and Venables (1995); and
Bhagwati (2002).
14According to the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956), it is not possible to ascertain, whether a
move to free trade improves or deteriorates the initial trade-distorted situation (Meade 1955).
15For more economic theory on customs unions and trade liberalisation in general, see Kemp and Wan (1976),
Ohyama (1972), Cooper and Massell (1965), Johnson (1965), Bhagwati (1968), Krishna and Bhagwati (1994),
Brecher-Bhagwati (1981), Grossman and Helpman (1995), Krishna (1998), and Bhagwati (1991); see also sum-
maries on these theories in Bhagwati (2008).
16See for an example Annex B.2.
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3.2.4 TRADE AS A THREAT FOR FOOD SECURITY
The trade as threat narrative has its reasoning rooted in different disciplines, including agroe-
colocial science17 (e.g., environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity), sociology (e.g.,
world-systems and dependency theories, (ecologically and other) unequal exchanges en-
hancing international inequalities),18 and human rights law (incoherence amongst or frag-
mentation of law regimes, focus on rights of individuals particularly the marginalized). The
reasoning is therefore far more diverse, and an illustration of such would be beyond the
scope of the Chapter. Therefore, I focus on the human rights law perspective adopted by
some scholars, experts and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which partly entails
some of the dependency theory arguments.
In principle, liberalising trade has been seen as an opportunity to reduce hunger as, for ex-
ample, outlined in the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the
Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, which were developed
by an intergovernmental working group, international organizations, NGOs, and represen-
tatives of civil society.19 Yet, human rights scholars, NGOs and others, started to increas-
ingly question whether trade liberalisation contributes to fulfilling the right to food in prac-
tice. These views are often based on the observation that import surges, which occur rela-
tively soon after liberalization, have immediate negative effects on mostly small scale farm-
ers’ livelihoods in often previously relatively highly protected agricultural import compet-
ing subsectors in low and middle income countries. In more detail, the imports from high
income countries depress domestic prices, as these are offered at very low prices as di-
rectly subsidised by the exporting countries’ governments,20 and consequently reduce mar-
17Agroecology combines disciplines such as agronomy, horticulture and ecology, with sociology and eco-
nomics (Chappell 2015).
18See, e.g., Wallerstein (1974/2011), Emmanuel (1972), Hornborg (2001).
19Adopted in 2004 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Council, the executive
body of FAO.
20Prices are also influenced by the fact that farming in higher income countries is less labour but more capi-
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ket shares of domestic produce or almost entirely crowd these out. Without sufficient public
safety nets in place and given the relative inflexibility of the agricultural labour force, the
livelihoods including food security of small-scale farmers and their families are and have
been severely affected across these countries. The fact that the majority of the food insecure
people worldwide are farming families in low and middle income countries, highlights the
implicit links between the agricultural sector and trade on the one site, and food security/the
right to food on the other site.
While based on economic theory temporary losses are expected in the readjustment phase
inbetween trade liberalization and the next optimal (re-)allocation, the above described situ-
ation of farming families is from a human rights perspective (focusing on the individual and
groups of people) a clear violation of the right to food of the individually affected (against
the principle of progressive realisation amongst other).21 Therefore, the right to adequate
food as part of international human rights law and trade agreements as part of international
trade law, while often held to be compatible with regard to their declared principles, have
been increasingly claimed to be inconsistent with regard to their implementation and con-
sequences. These observations instirred a 15 year still ongoing debate on the normative and
institutional relations, or the general nature of relations between international human rights
and trade law (Kersten 2016).
The arguments brought forward by the human rights community reflect some points of the
dependency theory which has its origins in concerns for low and middle income countries
losing shares in the world trade, and turning from food net exporting into food net import-
ing economies since the 1950s. One of the main arguments of the dependency theory in this
tal/technology intensive.
21See, e.g., Matthews (2015b) and de Schutter (2009).
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context is that developing countries are trapped into continuous worsening terms of trade,22
because these countries do not export expensive manufactured goods and tariffs are esca-
lated (Hopewell 2016) - i.e., lower tariffs are levied on unprocessed agricultural goods (e.g.,
pineapples and cocoa) as opposed to processed agricultural goods (e.g., pineapple juice and
chocolate) (ICTSD 2009).
Conclusively, the claim can be made that the (de-)regulation (but in fact regulation) of trade
does not necessarily prevent asymmetric allocation of trade outcomes; in contrast, it can
be even instrumental in market distorting practices instead of living up to free market prin-
ciples. Scholars in the political sciences/political economy literature therefore explain that
the regulation of trade is rather determined by political realities of (economic) power. Ac-
cordingly, states with economic power are able to impose their preferred (’managed’) trade
regime (Luterbacher and Norrlöf 1999) in their favour (Hopewell 2016) partly influenced by
lobbying efforts of special interest groups (Buzard 2016).
3.2.5 INCONCLUSIVE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND LACUNAE
The vast empirical literature on the impacts of PTAs, in general, remains inconclusive. Lit-
erature reviews show how widely estimates can vary (Jean and Bureau 2016). This can be
due to different modelling (gravity models in most cases), problems with endogeneity due
to missing variables and unaccounted heterogeneity across agreements (Jean and Bureau
2016; Kohl 2014; Baier et al. 2015; Hicks and Kim 2012). Beyond the agreement design23
and level of integration (type of trade agreement)24 - and a combinations of these to proxy
22However, see also Panagariya’s (2005) theoretical rebut on impacts of agricultural liberalization on least de-
veloped countries.
23Baccini, Dür and Haftel (2003) summarize that variation in the design of trade agreements is explained by
some studies based on regime type, interest groups, or political stability (Düer 2007; Kucik 2012; Mansfield,
Milner and Rosendorff 2002) and by other studies based on regional factors, such as economic interdependence
and the balance of power (Haftel 2013; Johns 2013; Smith 2000).
24The degree of integration amongst trading partners can be distinguished in five forms (listed by increasing
degree of integration): 1) Preferential Trade Area or Arrangement (also generic term for all following forms), 2)
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the depth of liberalisation (Baccini et al. 2013, Dür et al. 2014) -, further factors and charac-
teristics of trade agreements might have different implications and render these even more
heterogeneous in praxis.25 The number of trading partners for each agreement (breadth),
the number of agreements concluded by each trading partner including the partly overlap-
ping agreement (network) structure of hubs and spokes26 (ties and nodes)27 (Barabási and
Bonabeau 2003; Pauwelyn and Alschner 2015), and the geopolitical setting and location of
the trading partners - besides each country’s economic, political condition, governance and
infrastructure. All these factors, can contribute to determining the efficiency of the agree-
ment over time (Gray and Slapin 2012, Pauwelyn and Alschner 2015).
A recent study by Jean and Bureau (2016), which tries to countervail the shortcomings of
previous studies by taking into account some of the above, reports an average increase for
agricultural and food exports based on an analysis of 74 agreements for the 1998-2009 pe-
riod. Trade flows might provide some, however, not sufficient indication, such as the interim
variable ’economic growth’ (for which there is paramount empirical literature) - for food se-
curity outcomes, which is the dependent variable of interest in this Chapter.28
There is substantial literature on the impacts of agricultural trade liberalisation on food se-
Free Trade Area or Arrangement, 3) Customs Union, 4) Common Market, 5) Economic Union (Chacholiades
1978, Gandolfo 1998)
25See Johns and Peritz (2015) on details of trade agreement desig (depth, scope, flexibility, breadth and institu-
tionalization).
26The hub is the country that has several PTAs with other countries, the spokes (Kowalczyk and Wonnacott
1992), and is therefore in an advantageous position due to better access to all of its free-trading partners (Gan-
dolfo 1998). Welfare implications for existing spoke countries depend, according to Kowalcyzk and Wonnacott
(1992), on the exports of the new spoke country in relation to the exports of old spoke countries. In the case
of complement export products, initial PTA partners of the hub gain. In the case of substitutes initial spoke
countries might lose by a decreased degree of preference in the hub market (Kowalczyk and Wonnacott 1992).
27"Power law distribution also has an effect on diffusion within the system. New norms that are adopted by
hub countries are more likely to spread within the network than is legal innovation undertaken by peripheral
members" (Pauwelyn and Alschner 2015: 506).
28For implications of PTAs on civil and political human rights, see Hafner-Burton (2005), Spilker and Böhmelt
(2012); and for implications of Bilateral Investment Treaties on civil and political human rights, see Bodea and
Ye (2015).
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curity for single countries29 and/or regions.30 In a systematic screen of this literature (1,176
articles identified in total), 34 empirical mostly single country (and a few group ’developing
countries’ or ’low-income countries’) studies ex ante or ex post assessment for different pe-
riods were selected for a meta-analysis/review (McCorriston et al. 2013). Findings across
the studies are inconclusive. Furthermore, the fact that the dependent variable of interest,31
metric to operationalise food security, varies and depicts different pillars (access, availability
and utilization) of the food security concept across the mostly single country studies, does
not set a valid basis to draw any tentative conclusions from the comparison. For a coherent
cross-country comparison a harmonized country-level proxy for food security is needed.
There are two recent empirical studies which apply such a proxy for food security. Olper et al.
(2014) assess how the child mortality rate (utilization pillar) changes if the trade liberaliza-
tion index (based on Wacziarg and Welch 2008) changes for 80 developing countries for the
period 1960-2010. Bezuneh and Yiheyis (2014) estimate changes in per capita daily dietary
energy supply (availability pillar) for every trade liberalization episodes, which are compiled
by Li (2003), for 37 countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In both studies, results are relatively
mixed, but indicate some improvement (at least in the longer run; in Bezuneh and Yiheyis
(2014), yet, not significant) for food security. The food security metrics and the trade liber-
alization proxies differ across the studies. Furthermore, the trade liberalization proxies do
not depict trade agreements. Therefore, liberalisation due to different types of agreements
remains unaccounted.
The review of the empirical literature highlights a lacunae: first, the impact of PTAs on one
(coherent and) harmonized food security proxy across countries, and years, in the context as
29See McCorriston et al. (2013) for a list of examples.
30See, e.g., Herath et al. 2014 for ASEAN; and Nega 2015 for Africa.
31E.g., quantity of food requirement, per capita food supply, malnutrition, calorie intake, food insecurity
threshold, underweight, import dependence.
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outlined above; second, the differentiation of trade agreements in the light of food security
outcomes. In the following subsection it is explained why differentiating between RTAs and
BTAs is particularly relevant for understanding the impact on food security.
3.2.6 REGIONAL AND BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND POLICY SPACE FOR
FOOD SECURITY
Given the comprehensive provisions of the PTAs, the heterogeneous design across the agree-
ments and overlapping structure of provisions (e.g., overlapping tariff-phase-out schedules),
it is not feasible to assess the distinguished impact of PTAs on the different food security
pillars in all its complex combinations and possibilities.32 Furthermore, for the question
of interest, PTAs which include provisions on agriculture, may be seen as the only relevant
category. However, as already indicated, provisions, other than agriculture, can potentially
impact agricultural trade and food security, and therefore PTAs which include or do not in-
clude provisions on agricultural trade are considered here. To take into account some of the
heterogeneity across PTAs, these are distinguished into RTAs and BTAs as these can have po-
tentially distinct implications for food security for the following reasons.
RTAs33 have a complex set of economic and political objectives (Fulponi 2015). In detail,
whilst market access remains a key factor, the rationale of RTAs is often increasing regional
cohesion, e.g., in agricultural policy, and policy coordination (Josling 2009; Fulponi 2015)
such as health and safety standards (Fulponi 2015), and the objective of enhancing food
security (Josling 2009) amongst others. While the agreements are often "relatively flexible,
allowing for varying levels of legal commitments and differing approaches to trade policies"
32For an overview of the different provisions and their potential paths of effects on the first three pillars of food
security see Appendix B.2.
33RTAs are generally reciprocal, but some have special treatment for low-income partner countries (Josling
2009). Here, only reciprocal RTAs will be considered because the implications of symmetric obligations are of
prime interest in this Chapter and because non-reciprocal are often constrained anyway "when sensitive do-
mestic industries (such as agriculture) are involved" (Josling 2009: 144).
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because of their need to balance numerous objectives (Fulponi 2015:5), these are of a highly
cooperative nature (Bese et al. 2009). In the light of food security, RTAs often refer explicitly
to food security as an aim or even to common food security objectives/programmes to be
implemented. Furthermore, agricultural policy is in most cases included in the provisions,
ranging from an intended cooperation and/or harmonization of policies to a common agri-
cultural policy.
In contrast, BTAs, aimed at trade expansion via market access, do not intend to establish a
common (agricultural) policy and are relatively more competitive. The negotiation of pro-
visions on agriculture are most likely influenced by power dynamics and can therefore pose
both problems and opportunities (Josling 2009). Often BTAs are negotiated amongst asym-
metric trading partners with the result that the higher income country is "likely to be able
to shelter sensitive import-competing sectors and to impose an agreement that favours its
export interests" (Josling 2009:144). Accordingly, the nature of the agreement text and the
implications will depend to a large extent on the commercial interests of the higher income
country (Josling 2009).
In conclusion, lower and middle income countries may not be able to benefit in areas in
which the more powerful negotiation partner has its key interests. Particularly, trade in agri-
cultural goods may be sensitive as outlined above. Therefore, it is likely that lower and mid-
dle income countries potentially face on average adverse implications of such BTAs in the
light of food security. Furthermore, BTAs do not entail provisions on common objectives or
aims for cohesion on food security, agricultural policies or other as can be found in RTAs
and as mentioned above. The right to food or similar wording is in none of the PTAs texts
included. If a human rights clause is entailed (mostly PTAs with EC/EU), than these refer
rather to political and civil rights and not to economic, social and cultural rights.
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In conclusion, RTAs are on average relatively more cooperative than BTAs in principle. While
BTAs among asymmetric trading partners may enhance the managed trade regime due to
power relations (Luterbacker and Norrlöf 1999), RTAs can with common policies and objec-
tives countervail the restricted policy space34 set by the multilateral framework.
3.2.7 QUESTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
To reiterate and set the research question, I rephrase the conclusion above. Given the gen-
eral assumption that the Uruguay Round policy outcome is a managed trade regime, to the
disadvantage of mainly low and middle income countries in terms of food security, then it
can be stated that the policy space for food security of those governments is constrained.
In the light of the proliferation of PTAs, have those PTAs regained or created policy space to
contribute to better food outcomes, and does the type of trade agreement, i.e. RTA or BTA,
make a difference? Figure 3.2.1 provides an overview of the question contextualised in the
debate between theory (potential positive effects on food security outcomes, indicated by a
plus sign) and practice (potential negative effects on food security outcomes, indicated by a
minus sign).
34In the trade agreement and food security context, policy space refers to the autonomy/room of manoeu-
vre available to countries to implement food security enhancing policies including budget expenditures which
are not constrained by multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral and/or regional trading rules (See for a more general
definition Matthews (2015a and 2015b).).
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Figure 3.2.1: Model Context
Having a PTA (governed by but an exception to the WTO rules) in force can potentially retake
some initial room manoeuvre for food policy and is therefore associated with better food se-
curity outcomes. The focus here is on the comparison of having a PTA in force to having
none in place given the multilateral trade system.35 The PTA is expected to re-take/create
some of the policy space, no matter whether it is a BTA or RTA. Accordingly, I formulate the
first hypothesis as follows.
H1: A PTA in force, in contrast to having no PTA in force, is associated with better food security
outcomes.
Yet, whether an increasing number of PTAs is increasingly beneficial for food security de-
pends on whether these are relatively cooperative or competitive. Therefore, PTAs need to
be differentiated and the second hypothesis is stated takes into account the heterogeneity of
PTAs.
H2: RTAs contribute to improving food security, whereas an increasing number of BTAs is
counter-productive.
35This implies that the following analysis does not measure what the impact of one PTA (be it RTA or BTA) is.
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The details of the model are presented in Figure 3.2.2. Accordingly, in line with the hypothe-
ses ’Food Security Outcomes’ (of the utilisation-outcome dimension of the food security
framework as introduced in Chapter 2) are positively associated with a country having a PTA
in force. The effect of the increment of the number of PTAs depends on whether it is a RTA or
BTA. The more cooperative RTAs are positively associated with food security, and the more
competitive BTAs negatively.
Figure 3.2.2: Model Overview
To start with the first covariates of control, WTO membership can be negatively associated
with food security outcomes in practice, as discussed above, and the ratification of the ICE-
SCR positively. While it has not been assessed whether the ratification of ICESCR leads to
positive economic, social and cultural human rights outcomes, the literature on the impacts
of human rights treaties on civil and political human rights indicates that these treaties do
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have the intended effect.36 The positive relationship between democracy (see regime type
and durability) and food security has been established in the theoretical and empirical liter-
ature, most prominently by Sen (1999).37 Violent conflict can be a major driver of acute food
security (Hendrix and Brinkman 2012).38
The remaining cluster of covariates are all food security indicators themselves given the
framework introduced in Chapter 2 (see also Annex B.2). Yet, these are of another dimension
than the utilization-outcome dimension (see Chapter 2 for details). Given the framework’s
logic of the horizontally and vertically interdependence, these indicators are drivers for food
security outcomes of the utilisation-outcome dimension, and therefore function well as con-
trols (see also Chapter 2 and 3).
Food availability is depicted via agricultural land (structural), dietary energy supply ade-
quacy and food imports over merchandise exports (both outcome). GDP per capita and eco-
nomic growth rates, structural indicators under the availability and access pillar, are both
positively associated with food security outcomes. The more agricultural land and dietary
energy supply is available, the better are the ultimate food security outcomes of the util-
isation outcome dimension. The latter variable, food imports over merchandise exports,
not only reflects food availability but also depicts the purchasing power for food imports in
terms of merchandise exports (i.e., foreign exchange reserves to pay for food imports), and
therefore presents the access pillar as well. The greater the merchandise export flows of a
country the more affordable food imports become. According to the dependency theory, in
particular lower income countries (exporting mainly unprocessed agricultural goods) have
36See, e.g., Fariss (2014 and forthcoming) for mainly civil and political human rights and related documents.
Fariss’ analysis does not include economic, social and cultural human rights.
37See also Marshall and Jagger 2002, but note that there are critiques and differentiated views to this main
strand.
38Reversely, Food security can be a driver for unrest and conflict. See, e.g., Hendrix 2012, Hendrix and Haggard
2015, Koren and Bagozzi 2017.
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on average a low ratio, negatively affecting food security outcomes.
Given that most of the food insecure live in rural areas, the lower the growth for the rural pop-
ulation, the better are the average food security outcomes. The latter variable is an indicator
in the access-outcome dimension. To control for other dimensions under the utilization pil-
lar, improved sanitation and access to water sources, are added which contribute positively
to food security outcomes of the utilization-outcome dimension. These variables are further
described in the context of their concrete measure in the following section.
3.3 DATA, MEASUREMENT AND METHOD
3.3.1 DATASET
The pooled, cross-section, time-series dataset includes variables for 93 low and middle in-
come countries, for 1990-2014.39 Despite basing the case selection on data availability amongst
other criteria, some observations of the covariates are still missing at random (see Annex
C.5 for Pattern of Missings). Therefore, the missings (at random) in the original dataset
were imputed.40 All models are fitted based on the strongly balanced imputed dataset with
2325(=N*T=93*25) observations.
I describe the variable of interest, food (in-)security, the explanatory variables, trade agree-
ments, and the covariates for control in the following, before elaborating on the structure
of the dataset and the estimation method in more detail. The descriptive statistics for all
variables, of which all numerical values were last updated 25th October 2015, are reported in
39The process of case selection is based first on data availability. Second, one case for which the dependent
variable, food security, has a strongly differing time series pattern (e.g., Haiti in 2010) is taken out, so as islands
of Oceania which show a different pattern in the relation of food security and trade agreements in comparison
to other regions. Third, further outliers are omitted.
40Imputations were run 100 times by semiparametrically estimating the parameters of a Gaussian copula with
R package sbgcop (Hoff 2015). The means of 100 imputations for each variable constitute the dataset. This
method was chosen over other methods and R packages for reasons given in Hollenbach et al. 2017.
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Annex B.4 (original dataset with MAR) and Annex C.5 (imputed dataset).
3.3.2 VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT
Food (In-)Security41
The dependent variable of interest, food security is proxied with child mortality. In Chap-
ter 2 I have shown the complexity of the concept food security and introduced a framework
which facilitates the identification of relevant food security variables (See Annex B.2. See also
Chapter 2 for an introduction.) According to this framework, utilisation-outcome variables
are the variables measuring the actual realisation of food (in-)security. Child mortality is one
of the identified outcome-utlization variables. The indicator child mortality reflects apart
from individual outcomes under the utilization pillar complementary factors on the macro
level (some of the control variables). Furthermore, child mortality is highly correlated with
other food insecurity proxies of the utilization-outcome dimension such as anthropometric
and biochemical indicators (see Annex B.2). Even though high correlation might not sug-
gest interchangeability as Caspers and Tufis (2003) have shown in the context of democracy
measures, in this context child mortality might reflect the other utilization-outcome vari-
ables well. For instance, child deaths are found to be attributable to undernutrition in low
and middle income countries (Black et al. 2013).42 Based on these reasons (besides data
availability) the dependent variable of interest food security are proxied with child mortality
as, for exmaple, done in Olper et al. (2014).43
Child mortality is the mortality rate among children and describes more precisely the prob-
41Sourced from World Bank. Data provided by UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF,
WHO, World Bank, UN DESA Population Division).
42See also Campbell et al. 2009, who have shown that higher household food insecurity in Indonesia is associ-
ated with higher child mortality.
43Child mortality, or other anthropometric variables, are referred to in the literature as a food security proxy.
See, e.g., Olper et al. (2014) and McCorriston et al. (2013).
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ability per 1,000 that a newborn dies before year five (0-4 years) (Chapter 1). Accordingly, the
dependent variable depicts not food security but Food Insecurity and therefore all effects as
listed in Figure 3.2.2 are reversed. For example, according to theory it is expected that RTAs
are negatively and BTAs are positively associated with child mortality.
The mean (across countries) of child mortality plus/minus one standard deviation over time
is presented in Figure 3.3.1. Child mortality is not logarithmized despite its skewed distribu-
tion to allow increments of higher values to weigh more heavily.
Figure 3.3.1: Mean and Standard Deviation of the Variables of Interest over Time
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PTAs44
There are four variables depicting PTAs as the main independent variables of interest. The
first variable, PTA Dummy, is a dummy indicating whether a country has (value=1) or has not
(value=0) a PTA. The second variable, PTA, depicts, the cumulative count of all trade agree-
ments in force for each country in a given year. The third and fourth variable, RTA and BTA
respectively, are in the first case the cumulative count of all RTAs and in the second case of
all BTAs in force for each country in a given year.
All PTAs in force (beyond the WTO notification list) were screened and selected according
to the following positive or negative criteria. Trade agreements, that have at least one party
as a low or middle income country are included (i.e., trade agreements with high income
trading partners only are excluded). Trade agreements with European countries (as defined
by UNSTAT, i.e. including European countries outside the EU custom union) only, are ex-
cluded. Trade agreements among or with a former Soviet State are excluded as these transi-
tion economies constitute economically specific cases. Highly inefficient trade agreements
such as the Arab Maghreb Union and trade agreements that are no longer in force as of to-
day 45 were taken out to reduce overall complexity.46 Only reciprocal trade agreements are
included (i.e., no partial scope agreement and/or in WTO terminology preferential arrange-
ment agreements are included). Some trade agreements cover trade in goods only.
All trade agreements in force for each country in a given year are shown in Figure 3.3.1. Figure
3.3.2 shows the mean (across countries) of RTAs and BTAs over time. The graph highlights
that a country has on average less RTAs than BTAs, and the latter increased over time. This
44Own coding based on comparatively compiled PTA list given WTO RTA-IS database, McGilll RTAs and PTAs
database, SICE Foreign Trade Information System, Asia Regional Integration Center, UN Commission for Africa.
45Exception is made for Venezuela and MERCOSUR. Venezuela left MERCOSUR December 2016.
46It would be more accurate to take into account all historical trade agreements. Yet, to reduce the number of
inefficient trade agreements these are not considered. Furthermore, if left in, the degree of efficiency should be
controlled for, which is rather challenging to operationalise in this context.
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indicates that the PTA variable will be stronger correlated with the BTA variable than with the
RTA variable. Given the relatively constant mean of RTA, the RTA variable is expected to be
stronger correlated with the PTA Dummy than with the count of the PTAs variable PTA (see
Annex B.4 for correlation coefficients).
Figure 3.3.2: Mean of RTA and BTA Variables (Number of PTAS) over Time
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For a presentation of the bivariate relationship between the dependent and key independent
variables please refer to Figure B.4.5 (correlation matrix) and B.4.6 (scatter plots) in Annex
B.4.
WTO Membership47
The WTO membership dummy variable, WTO, indicates whether a country is a member to
47Own coding based on WTO membership list.
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the WTO (value=1) or not (value=0) in a given year. It means that the value of the WTO vari-
able can change over time for a country.
ICESCR Ratification48
The ICESCR ratification ordinal variable, ICESCR denotes whether a country ratified (value=2)
or signed (value=1) the UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or none of
the aforementioned. The reason to chose an ordinal rather than a dummy variable (ratified
or not) is twofold. First, in principle, a signature subject to ratification does express the will-
ingness of the signatory state to ratify and it creates an obligation to refrain from acts that
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty (Article 10 and 19, Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties). Ratification creates the obligation to be bound to the treaty (Article 2(b)
and 14, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), which in principle can therefore have
a stronger positive impact on the right to food. The second reason is methodological. An
ordinary variable allows potentially for more within variation than a dummy variable.
Regime Type and Duration49
Polity IV is the rescaled Polity IV variable depicting regime type (strong autocracy to strong
democracy) on a scale 0 to 1 (from original scale -10 to 10), ranging from strongly autocratic
to strongly democratic.50.
The variable regime durability, Reg. Durability, describes the number of years since the most
recent regime change (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual v2016: 17).
Armed Conflicts51
48Own coding based on UN Treaty Collection List.
49Source: Polity IV Project.
50See (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual v2016: 16-17
51Source: UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2012; and Gled-
itsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002).
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The variable Conflict denotes the number of active armed conflicts (internal and interna-
tionalized internal) in a country for a given year.52
Controls derived from the Food Security Framework53
The variable Log(GDP) is the logarithm of real (constant 2011 international dollar) GDP per
capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) for better cross country comparison.54 GDP
per capita is logarithmized, not primarily to control for skewness of the distribution, but to
allow for similar effects of increments along minimum to maximum values. GDP growth (in
percentage) is the annual GDP (in local currency) growth rate per capita.
The variable agricultural Land (sourced from WB but originally from FAO) is the share of land
area that is arable (in percentage).
Dietary energy supply adequacy55 is the energy supply (calories for food consumption) for
a country divided by the average dietary energy requirement of the population (percentage,
3-year average). Accordingly, rather than just providing information on the quantity, it indi-
cates whether the supply is sufficient in relation to the population.
The variable food imports over total merchandise exports56 (percent, 3-year average) has
comparatively high values for particularly lower income countries, given that these have rel-
atively low merchandise export flows. Therefore, to adjust the high values to a lower scale,
and to take account for the skewed distribution (lesser reason), the logarithm is taken of this
variable, and named Log(Food/Merchandise)
52Readme file for the UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset.
53All sourced from World Bank or FAO; original data provided by different agencies.
54Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
55Source: FAO.
56Source: FAO.
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The variable Rural Population Growth (annual percent)57 is the growth rate of the share of
the population living in rural areas as defined by national statistical offices and calculated as
the difference between total population and urban population.
Improved sanitation facilities58 depicts the percent of population using improved sanitation
facilities; and presented by variable Sanitation. The variable improved Water source59 refers
to the percentage of population with access to an improved drinking water source. The dis-
tribution of the variable is skewed. However, to keep the variable on the percentage scale as
the rest of the ’food-security’ covariates for control and to make it more comparable to the
related variable sanitation, the values of the variable are not transformed.
3.3.3 ESTIMATION MODEL AND METHOD
I fit three (restricted) Fixed Effects models on the strongly balanced cross-country time se-
ries data to control for further unobserved country-specific effects on food security.60 The
full61 linear fixed effects model for country i =1,...,93 and year t=1,...,25 is presented in the
following. For the first restricted model, model (1), only the PT ADi t variable out of all main
independent variables (PT ADi t , PT Ai t RT Ai t and BT Ai t ) is included, i.e. parameters γ2,γ3
and γ4 are set to zero. For the second restricted model, model (2), it is variable PT Ai t , i.e. ,
parameters γ2, γ3 and γ4 are set to zero; and for model (3) the variables are RT Ai t and BT Ai t ,
57World Bank estimates based on UN World Urbanization Project.
58Sourced from World Bank. Original source is WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and
Sanitation.
59Sourced from World Bank. Original source is WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and
Sanitation.
60Hausman test statistically confirms that Fixed Effects model is to be preferred over Random Effects model.
Moreover, Fixed Effects model is the only option out of the two, as the moment/strict exogeneity condition most
likely does not hold.
61The full model is noted here for efficient presentation purposes. Substantively and methodologically the
full model is not sensible (different data generating processes for the main independent variables and multi-
collinearity).
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i.e. γ1 and γ2 are zero.
F I Si t =αi +γ1PT ADi t +γ2PT Ai t +γ3RT Ai t +γ4BT A
+β1IC ESC Ri t +β2W T Oi t +β3POLI T Yi t +β4RDU Ri t +β5CON Fi t
+β6Log (GDP )i t +β7Log (GDPGR)i t +β8L AN Di t +β9SU PPLYi t
+β10FOMEi t +β11RPOPGRi t +β12S AN I T AT IONi t +β13W AT ERi t +ui t
(3.3.1)
F I Si t is the dependent variable food insecurity; αi is the unobserved individual country
effect; PT ADi t is the main independent variable for model (1), which is a dummy vari-
able with value=1 if a PTA is in force and value=0 otherwise; PT Ai t is the main indepen-
dent variable for model (2), which is the cumulative count of PTAs; RT Ai t and BT Ai t are
the main independent variables for model (3), which depict the cumulative count of RTAs
and BTAs, respectively; IC ESC Ri t is the ICESCR ratification variable; W T Oi t is a dummy
on WTO membership; POLI T Yi t is the Polity IV variable; RDU Ri t is the regime durability
variable; CON F LIC Ti t is the conflict variable; Log (GDP )i t is the GDP per capita variable;
GDPGRi t is the GDP per capita growth variable; L AN Di t is the agricultural land variable;
SU PPLYi t is the dietary energy supply variable; FOMEi t is the values of food imports di-
vided by values of merchandise exports variable; RPOPGRi t is the rural population growth
variable; S AN I T AT IONi t is the improved sanitation variable; W AT ERi t is the improved
water source variable; ui t is the error term.
After controlling for unit heterogeneity in the Fixed Effects model,62 (results are presented
under the following section in Table 3.4.1), there is still heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan
test) and also autcorrelation (Breusch-Gorfrey, Wooldrdige and Durbin-Watson test) in the
errors. Therefore, to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation I employ a robust
62See for results of Mixed Effects model with Random Intercepts, which are similar to the Fixed Effects Model
estimates, Annex B.6.
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covariance matrix according to the White (1980, 1984)63 64 and the Arellano (1987) method,
clustered over countries. Results for robust standard errors are presented under the follow-
ing section in Table 3.4.2.
Furthermore, to correct alternatively for violations of the Gauss-Markov assumption and
to generally specify an alternative model for robustness 65, I fit an Arellano-Bond dynamic
model (General Method of Moments) with adjusted standard errors for clustering on country
(one-step, differences as instruments). Alternative dynamic models with additional moment
conditions (instruments for level equation: lagged level of dependent variable) show robust
results for all key independent variables and are therefore not presented. Provisions within
the trade agreements texts, and other independent variables (covariates) can have immedi-
ate to medium term impacts (within a year), and therefore I first present estimation results
of models with a contemporaneous impact of independent variables. Based on these re-
sults I specify a further dynamic model in which I lag some of the control variables. If the
Nickell-Bias is relatively small given that the number of time periods is relatively small , then
an alternative model is the Fixed Effects Model with a lagged dependent variable. The esti-
mates (with robust standard errors ) are presented in Table B.6.2 in Annex B.6 and compared
with outcomes of the Arellano-Bond dynamic model.
3.4 RESULTS
Estimates of the Fixed Effects model with and without an adjusted variance-covariance ma-
trix for robust standard errors, are presented in Table 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively. The esti-
mates of the Dynamic model are presented in Table 4.4.2 and 4.4.3.
63Based on Eicker 1963.
64Here, adjustments for small/finite samples according to MacKinnon and White (1985) amongst other did not
lead to significant differences in the standard errors. Therefore, the simple weighting for the variance-covariance
matrix is applied.
65Other reasons are that the robust standard errors more than double in the Fixed Effects model. This can
potentially be an indication for a misspecified model according to King an Roberts (2015).
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The independent variables of interest have, in line with the hypotheses, following direction
of effect across the Fixed Effects and Dynamic model (indicating robustness): PTA Dummy is
negatively, PTA positively, RTA negatively and BTA positively associated with Food Insecurity.
Conclusively, in line with the hypothesis having a trade agreement in contrast to having no
trade agreement, can improve food security. However, an increasing number of trade agree-
ments does not necessarily translate into better food security outcomes. The direction of
effect is conditional on the type of trade agreement. An increasing number of RTAs has pos-
itive impacts and an increasing number of BTAs adverse impacts on the dependent variable.
The results reflect that the variable PTA Dummy is strongly correlated with RTA, and variable
PTA with BTA. Furthermore, the key independent variables of model 3, RTA and BTA are sig-
nificant in the Fixed Effects and Dynamic models.
In light of these results and the direction of effect of the estimated coefficient for the WTO
variable (negatively associated with food security in the Fixed Effects and Dynamic models),
it can be interpreted that having a PTA (in contrast to having no PTA), counter-effects the
multilateral constraints on food policy space. Yet, an increasing number of BTAs, enhances
the managed trading regime and increases negative impacts. In contrast, RTAs countervail
and create policy space for food security. Across the models, the magnitudes of the effects
show that an increase in the cumulative number of RTAs is more than countervailing the
negative effect of WTO membership, and an increase in the number of BTAs has less than a
third of the effect as an increment in the number of RTAs.
The direction of effect of the estimated coefficient for ICESCR, is positive (and not-significant)
for the Fixed Effects specification, but has a positive and significant effect on food security
(or negative effect on Food Insecurity) across the Dynamic models (1)-(3). It indicates that the
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implications of the ICESCR are undetermined across the Fixed Effects and Dynamic models.
However, if the criteria of significance is given importance, then it can be argued that the
ratification of the covenant which entails the right to food contributes positively to the real-
isation of the right to food.
All other estimated coefficients (covariates) have the expected direction of effect in the Fixed
Effects specification as discussed above. The more democratic and politically stable (in
terms of regime durability) a country is the better the food security situation. Armed conflict
has adverse impacts. The income of a country (GDP per capita), foreign exchange reserves to
pay for food imports (merchandise exports/food imports) and economic growth (all food se-
curity indicators under the availability and access pillar) are positively associated with food
security outcomes. The more agricultural land and energy supply in relation to population
are available (availability pillar), the lower is the child mortality rate. The lower the growth
for the rural population (access pillar) who are among the most food insecure, the better are
the average food security outcomes. Improved access to sanitation and water sources, has a
positive impact on food security.
In the dynamic specification as presented in Table 4.4.2 the direction of effect flips for five of
the control variables, namely Conflict, Log(GDP), Log(Food/Merchandise), Rural Population
Growth and Sanitation. It could be argued that these variables are sluggish in comparison
to the other controls. For example, at the start of a conflict food security might not be im-
mediately affected; a decrease in the rural population might not immediate translate into
improved food security; and the effects of improved sanitation might not show as quickly
as the improved access to water. There is less substantial reason for income (GDP and pur-
chasing power for food imports) to have a sluggish effect. Nevertheless, I lag these as well by
one period (i.e. one year). Furthermore, the ratification of the ICESCR can have assumably
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delayed effects, and therefore I lag the variable as well as presented in Table 4.4.3.
The impact of the lagged ICESCR remains positive on food security (and significant). While
the direction of effect for variables Log(GDP), Log(Food/Merchandise) and Sanitation remains
the same when lagging by one period, these change for Conflict and Rural Population Growth
in line with theory.
If the number of time periods is sufficiently large so that the Nickell-Bias is approximating
zero, then the estimates of a Fixed Effects model with a lagged dependent variable (and ro-
bust standard errors) might be of relatively good quality (small bias and efficient) and can be
compared to the coefficients of the Dynamic model. The direction of all covariates of interest
(trade agreement variables) is in line with theory and a further indication of robustness for
those (see Table B.6.2 in Annex B.6). The ICESCR coefficients indicate that the ratification is
positively associated with food security. All other control variables have the same direction
of effect as in the original Fixed Effects model, with the exception of the Conflict, Log(GDP)
and Log(Food/Merchandise) variables. The coefficients of these variables show a sign flip
across models (1) to (3) within the otherwise same model specification, and have therefore
to be interpreted also in light of the Dynamic Model outcomes with caution.66
66The purpose here is to analyse how BTAs and RTAs affect food insecurity in terms of direction of effect and
relative magnitude (marginal effects are presented in the tables). It is not the purpose to derive interpretations
on quantities of interest. The interpretation of it (one BTAs (RTAs) increases (reduces) child mortality) would
not only be misleading but too me a morally wrong question to ask. Therefore, I am not presenting quantities of
interest.
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Table 3.4.1: Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
(1) (2) (3)
PTA Dummy −10.038∗∗∗
(1.030)
PTA 0.752∗∗∗
(0.243)
RTA −9.374∗∗∗
(0.755)
BTA 1.747∗∗∗
(0.243)
WTO 5.600∗∗∗ 3.513∗∗ 3.768∗∗
(1.533) (1.552) (1.487)
ICESCR 1.318∗ 0.460 0.394
(0.748) (0.760) (0.728)
Polity −23.236∗∗∗ −27.798∗∗∗ −21.149∗∗∗
(2.463) (2.482) (2.425)
Reg. Durability −0.114∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.035)
Conflict 0.245 −0.125 0.348
(0.885) (0.901) (0.864)
Log(GDP) −5.513∗∗∗ −9.271∗∗∗ −10.992∗∗∗
(2.099) (2.196) (2.109)
GDP Growth −0.196∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.053)
Land −0.154∗∗ −0.165∗∗ −0.147∗∗
(0.071) (0.073) (0.070)
Supply −0.171∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.060) (0.057)
Log(Food/Merchandise) −1.140∗ −1.081 −1.708∗∗∗
(0.646) (0.663) (0.637)
Rural Pop. Growth 0.908∗∗ 0.786∗ 0.615
(0.410) (0.418) (0.400)
Water −1.989∗∗∗ −2.079∗∗∗ −1.789∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
Sanitation −0.330∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.069) (0.066)
Observations 2,325 2,325 2,325
R2 0.634 0.620 0.651
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.602 0.634
F Statistic 274.628∗∗∗ 258.657∗∗∗ 276.080∗∗∗
Degrees of Freedom df = 14; 2218 df = 14; 2218 df = 15; 2217
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
106
Table 3.4.2: Fixed Effects Robust
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
(1) (2) (3)
PTA Dummy −10.038∗∗∗
(2.815)
PTA 0.752
(0.551)
RTA −9.374∗∗∗
(2.603)
BTA 1.747∗∗∗
(0.647)
WTO 5.600 3.513 3.768
(3.876) (4.123) (3.696)
ICESCR 1.318 0.460 0.394
(1.930) (2.036) (2.014)
Polity −23.236∗∗∗ −27.798∗∗∗ −21.149∗∗∗
(7.733) (8.325) (7.687)
Reg. Durability −0.114 −0.119 −0.135∗
(0.083) (0.088) (0.081)
Conflict 0.245 −0.125 0.348
(1.658) (1.571) (1.564)
Log(GDP) −5.513 −9.271 −10.992
(7.367) (7.813) (7.356)
GDP Growth −0.196∗∗ −0.201∗∗ −0.173∗∗
(0.079) (0.085) (0.077)
Land −0.154 −0.165 −0.147
(0.149) (0.156) (0.142)
Supply −0.171 −0.224 −0.182
(0.150) (0.156) (0.149)
Log(Food/Merchandise) −1.140 −1.081 −1.708
(2.232) (2.300) (2.259)
Rural Pop. Growth 0.908 0.786 0.615
(0.912) (0.891) (0.869)
Water −1.989∗∗∗ −2.079∗∗∗ −1.789∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.359) (0.334)
Sanitation −0.330 −0.419 −0.440∗
(0.255) (0.284) (0.259)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.4.3: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Robust (Country Cluster)
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
(1) (2) (3)
Lag(Food Insec.) 0.950∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.015) (0.015)
PTA Dummy −0.584
(0.464)
PTA 0.291
(0.202)
RTA −1.949∗∗∗
(0.366)
BTA 0.560∗∗∗
(0.213)
WTO 0.547 0.293 0.957
(0.603) (0.623) (0.611)
ICESCR −1.099∗∗∗ −1.257∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗
(0.313) (0.367) (0.219)
Polity −4.935∗∗∗ −5.284∗∗∗ −3.230∗∗∗
(1.183) (1.218) (0.930)
Reg. Durability −0.076∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Conflict −0.213 −0.215 −0.176
(0.266) (0.266) (0.280)
Log(GDP) 3.165∗∗∗ 2.745∗∗∗ 1.421∗
(0.955) (0.843) (0.822)
GDP Growth −0.032 −0.030∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Land −0.005 −0.005 −0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Supply −0.069∗∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.028)
Log(Food/Merchandise) 0.730∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗
(0.203) (0.213) (0.178)
Rural Pop. Growth −0.072 −0.047 −0.113
(0.119) (0.117) (0.116)
Water −0.341∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ −0.293∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.078) (0.071)
Sanitation 0.275∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.057) (0.050)
Constant −0.948∗∗∗ 8.073 14.422
(8.349) (10.278) (10.122)
Observations 2139 2139 2139
No. of Instruments 291 291 292
Wald Chi2 35184.15∗∗∗ 34262.81∗∗∗ 42128.88∗∗∗
Degress of Freedom 15 15 16
Note: ∗z<0.1; ∗∗z<0.05; ∗∗∗z<0.01
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Table 3.4.4: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Robust with Lags (Country Cluster)
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
(1) (2) (3)
Lag(Food Insec.) 0.953∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
PTA Dummy −0.596
(0.496)
PTA 0.250
(0.197)
RTA −1.979∗∗∗
(0.377)
BTA 0.526∗∗
(0.204)
WTO 0.482 0.224 0.877
(0.572) (0.583) (0.602)
Lag(ICESCR) −1.085∗∗∗ −1.253∗∗∗ −0.547∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.337) (0.203)
Polity −4.266∗∗∗ −4.642∗∗∗ −2.894∗∗∗
(1.064) (1.108) (0.865)
Reg. Durability −0.071∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Lag(Conflict) 0.356 0.330 0.351
(0.297) (0.286) (0.280)
Lag(Log(GDP)) 3.063∗∗ 2.624∗∗ 1.250
(1.369) (1.205) (0.826)
GDP Growth −0.007 −0.009 −0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Land −0.006 −0.005 −0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Supply −0.051∗ −0.055∗ −0.059∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025)
Lag(Log(Food/Merchandise) 0.717∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.216) (0.176)
Rural Pop. Growth 0.095 0.096 0.053
(0.103) (0.103) (0.111)
Water −0.325∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.075)) (0.069)
Lag(Sanitation) 0.273∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.067) (0.057)
Constant −4.179 4.063 11.956
(9.979) (10.407) (8.202)
Observations 2139 2139 2139
No. of Instruments 291 291 292
Wald Chi2 41027.41∗∗∗ 35594.60∗∗∗ 44541.91∗∗∗
Degress of Freedom 15 15 16
Note: ∗z<0.1; ∗∗z<0.05; ∗∗∗z<0.01
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3.5 CONCLUSION
Different disciplinary and methodological lenses condition the views on whether trade is
generally seen as an opportunity or threat for food security in theory (normative debate).
The empirical literature provides no consensus on the impacts of trade agreements on food
security. Yet, there has been some consensus that the multilateral trading system, WTO, is a
managed trading regime which has restricted the policy space for food security of low and
middle income countries. In light of the proliferation of PTAs, the question is whether those
have regained or created policy space to contribute to better food outcomes, and whether
the relatively cooperative RTAs have a different impact than the relatively competitive BTAs.
To answer the question I regressed a coherent and harmonized food security proxy, child
mortality, on trade agreements variables for 93 low and middle income countries for 1990-
2014, by controlling for economic, political, social and human rights variables. The results
of the analysis indicate that the multilateral trading system, WTO, has restricted the policy
space for food security of low and middle income countries. PTAs, which are an exception
to the WTO rules, can have an initial positive impact on food security, when contrasted to
none being in place. However, an increase in the number of PTAs does not necessarily lead
to improved food security outcomes. BTAs, which are often negotiated among asymmetric
trading partners in a competitive manner and result in a more ’competitive’ design, may en-
hance the managed trading regime, as an increase of these is negatively associated with food
security outcomes. RTAs, which often entail common policies and objectives on food secu-
rity and related - and are therefore in comparison more cooperative -, contribute to better
food security outcomes.
In the light of the results, it can be recommended that countries, if these have not already
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exhausted their options of regional integration (number of RTAs is limited due to its defini-
tion/construction), should focus on improving an efficient implementation of the concluded
RTAs (also by harmonising overlapping RTAs) rather than initiating new BTAs. Apart from the
seemingly adverse effects of the latter on food security in low and middle income countries,
the increasingly intervened bowl of any kind of noodles (see terms ’Spaghetti’ and ’Noo-
dle Bowl’ in the literature) is creating an increasingly administrative burden and therefore a
highly inefficient trading system. Moreover, given that BTAs are negotiated by bureaucrats in
a competitive and power driven setting, these BTAs are not oriented on economic principles
but politics.
To strengthen and support the efficient implementation of concluded but not yet efficient
RTAs, more efficient trading blocks, such as the EU, should conclude BTAs (if at all) with
entire trading blocks and not single out members of those for separate trade arrangements.
The provisions of BTAs between high income and low income countries have to ensure that
sufficient policy space is granted for countries to fulfil their right to food.
Not only BTAs but also RTAs are a distortion to the multilateral trading system in theory. Yet,
while RTAs can potentially become good building blocks of the multilateral system67 and im-
prove regional food security, these will most likely fail to solve sensitive and crucial (market
distorting) issues such as agricultural subsidies more efficiently than multilateral negotia-
tions. Conclusively, RTAs on their own are not the first answer and a multilateral system
might provide the optimum platform in theory.
The (geo-)politcial shift within the WTO sets hope for the ongoing slow to stale Doha Round
to have a more balanced outcome than the previous round, if concluded. If amongst other
67Whether RTAs constitute stepping stones or stumbling blocks for the multilateral trading system is contro-
versially discussed in the literature.
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the Nairobi package is being lived up to, than the price-distorting direct export support to
domestic farmers in mostly high income countries will be phased out, and hence, the mar-
kets will be regulated more in line with economic principles. However, WTO member states
need to move beyond the mere declaratory text of the AoA and Marrakesh preamble, and
concretely tackle further trade related issues which potentially hamper food security in low
and middle income countries. Low and middle income countries learnt their lesson from
the previous round and its implications, and hence, the only way forward for the multilat-
eral trading system, which ideally promotes food security, is fair play.
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CHAPTER 4
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
FOOD SECURITY ACROSS THREE REGIONS
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Abstract Chapter 4
An increase in the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs), which are relatively more
cooperative than bilateral trade agreements, is positively associated with food security out-
comes for 93 low and middle income countries in 1990-2014. To build on these results I look
into how RTAs and food security are associated across the three sub-regions of Sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America and South East Asia. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis with RTAs as
the unit of analysis highlights first patterns of commonalities, but more so differences. To
take into account heterogeneity across the RTAs I operationalise provisions on food security
and related issues in the agreement texts. I then set up two distinct research designs and
model specifications. First, to test the impact of the aggregate provisions on food security
for 67 low and middle income countries which are member of at least one of the RTAs in the
three sub-regions, 1990-2014, I fit a Dynamic model. Results indicate that the more food se-
curity related provisions a country has across its RTAs, the better its food security outcomes
are. Second, to test whether the state of food security affects the design of a RTA, I fit a Count
model, which includes an instrumental variable, on the same data. Estimates indicate that
the state of food security is indeed associated with the design. The more severe the state of
food insecurity within a country, the more food security related provisions the country has
across its RTAs.
Keywords: Food Security / Preferential Trade Agreements / Trade Policy / Design of Trade
Agreements
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Regional trade agreements (RTAs),1 which are relatively cooperative, can have positive im-
pacts on food security when compared with Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTAs), which are
relatively competitive for low and middle income countries (Chapter 3). However, why are
RTAs on average associated with better for food security outcomes? Moreover, does the state
of food security possibly influence the design of RTAs? In other words, is it the case that the
higher the acuteness of food insecurity the more likely it is for food security and food secu-
rity related provisions to be included in the agreement text? And if so, do these provisions
lead to better food security outcomes? To answer these questions I first look at the impact of
the RTAs on food security in more detail and then I see how the state of food security possi-
bly influences the design of RTAs across three sub-continents: Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter
Africa), Latin America (hereafter America) and South East Asia (hereafter Asia).
Kenya has been a member state of the East African Community (EAC) since its revival in
2000. The EAC increased its degree of integration by becoming a customs union in 2005 and
progressed to a common market in 2010. At the same time, child mortality (in probability per
1000 that a new born dies before year 5), decreased at a much higher rate than before 2000
(since its decline in 1997). In the above context, it could then be argued that at a time when
food insecurity proxied by child mortality was relatively high, Kenya agreed to negotiate a
RTA which was designed in a way that it is favourable for food security; and that the impact
of the EAC contributed to decreasing food insecurity.
1 RTAs involve at least three trading partners in the same geographical (sub-)region (Josling 2009; UNU-CRIS
2008; see also Bese et al. 2009)
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Figure 4.1.1: Child Mortality in Kenya 1990-2014
However, factors contributing to, or countervailing, food security outcomes are multiple and
conditioned by regional history, culture, economy, infrastructure, geo-political setting and
climate. As established in Chapter 3, trade agreements can be a key contributing factor. This
chapter tries to find whether the association of food security and a RTA as demonstrated by
the example of Kenya holds across the thee regions by controlling for some of these other
factors.
Based on the notion of self-sufficiency (Chapter 3) and the classical theoretical argument of
welfare gains though increased trade, regional trade cooperation and integration is often un-
derstood to enhance common food security goals. However, no consensus in the theoretical
and empirical literature has been established on the impact of trade liberalisation in general
and literature reviews of empirical studies show that estimates vary widely (Jean and Bu-
reau 2016; see also Cipollina and Salvatici 2010). Jean and Bureau (2016) identify two major
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problems as the potential source of variation: heterogeneity and endogeneity. Trade agree-
ments are often either insufficiently or not at all differentiated ("generalist" vs. "specialist"
approach), with the result that trade agreements’ specificities are not taken into account and
thereby the heterogeneity of impact is not modelled (Kohl 2014). Some scholars made a start
at addressing the shortcoming of specificity by differentiating trade agreements according
to different criteria such as network trade (Orefice and Rocha 2014), differences in non-tariff
provisions (Kohl et al. 2016) and degree of liberalisation (Baier et al. 2015).2 Yet, heterogene-
ity across agreement texts in the light of food security has not been taken into account. The
criticism of endogeneity refers to the omission of variables which affect the outcome vari-
able. In my analysis on why RTAs are associated with better for food security outcomes, I am
addressing both shortcomings as follows.
First, by differentiating RTAs and BTAs some heterogeneity of trade agreements is already
taken into account. In this chapter, RTAs are the focus of analysis. Therefore, I first look into
the commonalities of RTAs which set them apart form BTAs, and then more importantly I
analyse the extent of heterogeneity across the RTAs. Given the meanwhile comprehensive
and complex nature of RTAs, I focus on potential heterogeneity in light of the research ques-
tion. Accordingly, while the norm to ensure food security seems - generally - widely diffused
across the continents, it is enshrined to different degrees in the RTAs of the three sub-regions.
More concretely, a comparison of the agreements’ texts highlights that provisions range from
mere declarations to concrete policy stipulations on common approaches to food security
and/or agricultural policy - ranging from agricultural policy coordination, cooperation and
harmonization to common food security policies and institutions. I then analyse how these
specific provisions are associated with food security.
2See also Jean and Bureau (2016) for a summary.
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Second, as the state of food security can potentially influence how a particular norm is taken
into account in trade negotiations and ultimately agreement design, the second question is
whether the state of food security has an impact on the RTA design (reverse causality). Ac-
cordingly, to address the problem of endogeneity (other than the panel approach to avoid
omitted variable bias), I employ an instrumental variable (natural disaster) which is exoge-
nous to the provisions in question (outcome variable). The variation in the design of trade
agreements has already been explained by several studies (as summarized by Baccini, Dür
and Haftel (2015)) based on regime type, interest groups, or political stability (Düer 2007;
Kucik 2012; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002), as well as by other studies based on
regional factors, such as economic interdependence and the balance of power (Haftel 2013;
Johns 2013; Smith 2000). However, to test whether the state of food security influences the
design of trade agreements is novel.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I start first with the commonalities of RTAs, to dif-
ferentiate them from BTAs. I subsequently highlight the heterogeneity of RTAs by comparing
food security related provisions across the agreement texts; I summarise and compare the
commonalities and differences in a (truth) table according to the Qualitative Comparative
Analysis. This analysis sets the grounds for two hypotheses: 1) The more food security pro-
visions a country has, the better its food security outcomes; 2) if a country is more food
insecure it is more likely to include food security and related provisions. Second, after out-
lining the relevant research designs, I test the first hypothesis with variations of Dynamic
Panel Models for 67 low and middle income countries, that are member to a RTA of the three
regions over the period 1990-2014. I test the second hypothesis with a Count-model and
an instrumental variable approach to control for endogeneity. In this context I argue based
on previous research (Chapter 2), why child mortality is a good proxy for food (in-)security.
Third, after discussing the results in light of the research design, I conclude.
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4.2 REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND AMERICA
4.2.1 COMMON GROUNDS
RTAs can be distinguished from BTAs in terms of trading partners, negotiation process, the
resulting design of the agreements text and the potential implications of all of these. Ac-
cordingly, RTAs have common overarching but also common regional characteristics, which
I elaborate on in the following by setting it into context with the relevant theories in the lit-
erature; and relating it after to the concept of food security.
The rationale of a RTA is generally the economic and political stabilisation of the region.
Trading partners have the continent-specific knowledge which sets an optimal basis to ne-
gotiate provisions which indeed facilitate the intended objectives. In other words, they es-
tablish a "dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their re-
lations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements" (Bull and
Watson 1984: 1). Furthermore, relations among trading partners from the same region are
very often more balanced and equitable than in the case of BTA members. As a consequence
the negotiation process and its outcome, and the design of the RTA are expected to be rela-
tively cooperative (see, e.g., Bese et al. 2009).
In more detail, the underlying theory for decision-making in regional agreements can be ex-
plained by fundamental norms and shared ideas, "plus inter-subjective beliefs, traditions,
and habits" (World Trade Report 2007: 64) within a (sub-)region of in which countries often
share similar cultural backgrounds (cognitivism/cognitivist approach). Common coherent
goals (English school) might be another factor in the negotiation process. A classical ex-
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ample is the thought that trade can promote peace, a notion developed particularly in the
aftermath of World War II (WTO World Trade Report 2007).
Accordingly, while economic gain via market access remains a key factor, fundamental norms
and shared ideas have shaped the process of RTA design. Furthermore, regional cohesion,
policy coordination and integration (Josling 2009; Fulponi 2015) and common objectives
often with the common aim to strengthen and stabilise the region economically and polit-
ically have increasingly become the rationale for RTAs. Accordingly, common examples of
such common goals or objectives enshrined in provisions of RTAs include: policy coordina-
tion of the agricultural sectors and/or health and safety standards (Fulponi 2015), or (the aim
of) a common agricultural policy, or the objective of enhancing food security (Josling 2009).
This reflects the realists line of thought, according to who transnational norms must be first
enshrined in law and policy before becoming reality (Elkins and Simmons 2005).
While food security can be a common norm and a coherent goal, it is, however, rather inte-
gral of the aim of economic prosperity and stability rather than a key driver for cooperation
on its own. Yet, RTAs entail specific provisions on food security and related. These provisions
declare common food security aims, whilst also setting out concrete measures on policy co-
ordination and cooperation through joint institutions. I argue that the common intention
based on shared norms and values, and context specific knowledge, shapes further policy
making and action to achieve the declared common aims. Ideally, institutions are put in
place that further the aim.
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4.2.2 HETEROGENEITY
While the motivation for RTAs is relatively similar across the continents, their concrete de-
signs differ. RTAs can be differentiated according to a number of different factors. One key
factor is the degree of integration.
Generally, the degree of integration amongst trading partners can be distinguished in five3
forms of integration. A Preferential Trade Area or Arrangement (PTAA) is an arrangement
between two or more countries to impose lower tariffs and to reduce restrictions on imports
(Gandolfo 1998; Panagariya 1999). Each member of the PTAA sets its own external tariffs and
restrictions on imports from non-member countries (Gandolfo 1998). The term PTAA serves
at the same time as a generic term for subsequent forms of integration. The next deeper
form of integration is a Free Trade Area or Arrangement (FTA), an arrangement of two or
more countries to abolish tariffs and other restrictions on their mutual trade in all goods,
while retaining their individual tariffs against non-member countries (Gandolfo 1998; Cha-
choliades 1978). In addition to the provisions of an FTA, a Customs Union (CU) establishes
a common external tariff schedule on all imports from the rest of the world (Gandolfo 1998;
Chacholiades 1978). A deeper form of integration goes beyond trade relations and is called
common market. Common market member countries allow themselves in addition to the
provisions of the custom union "free movement of all factors of production between the
member countries" (Chacholiades 1978: p. 546). An economic union is established when in
addition to the common market, member countries "proceed to unify their fiscal, monetary,
and socioeconomic policies" (Chacholiades 1978: p. 546).4 If governments, after concluding
negotiating details of such agreements, sign these, this so called trade agreement then con-
3Jovanovic (1998) differentiates six forms of economic integration. According to him the sixth, deepest level
of integration, is the total economic union, which he describes as a "union with a single economic policy and a
supranational government". Gathii (2011) critiques the classical five forms as being a ’Western’ idea of integra-
tion.
4Modified text based on Kersten (2008).
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stitutes binding international trade law (Article 2, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
Regional arrangements often aim to achieve a higher degree of integration over time. While
some RTAs start as FTAs (and have formally remained as such), other RTAs became formal
CUs (or are at least aiming to become one).
Meanwhile, trade agreements have become, regardless its degree of integration, more com-
prehensive and encompass, beyond mere trade in goods regulations (tariffs and non-tariff
barriers to trade, rules of origin), standards (sanitary and phytosanitary measures), and other
areas such as intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment and services, govern-
ment procurement, and dispute settlement mechanisms. Furthermore, beyond the degree
of integration and areas covered, further factors of agreement design such as depth, scope,
flexibility, breadth and institutionalisation (Johns and Peritz 2005) render these agreements
even more heterogenous - all having different implications and effects.
The number of trading partners for each agreement (breadth), the number of agreements
concluded by each trading partner including the partly overlapping agreement (network)
structure of hubs and spokes5 (ties and nodes)6 (Pauwelyn and Alschner 2015), 7 and each
country’s economic, political condition, governance and infrastructure can contribute to de-
termining the efficiency of the agreement over time (Gray and Slapin 2012, Pauwelyn and
Alschner 2015; Chapter 3).
5The hub is the country that has several PTAs with other countries, the spokes (Kowalczyk and Wonnacott
1992), and is therefore in an advantageous position due to better access to all of its free-trading partners (Gan-
dolfo 1998). Welfare implications for existing spoke countries depend, according to Kowalcyzk and Wonnacott
(1992), on the exports of the new spoke country in relation to the exports of old spoke countries. In the case
of complement export products, initial PTA partners of the hub gain. In the case of substitutes initial spoke
countries might lose by a decreased degree of preference in the hub market (Kowalczyk and Wonnacott 1992).
6"Power law distribution also has an effect on diffusion within the system. New norms that are adopted by
hub countries are more likely to spread within the network than is legal innovation undertaken by peripheral
members" (Pauwelyn and Alschner 2015: 506).
7One prime example of overlapping membership to agreements, are the RTAs on the African continent.
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In the context of food security, provisions on trade in agricultural goods, on agricultural sec-
tors and policies are of prime relevance. Arguably, these provisions have the potential of
affecting food security more directly than others.8 For RTAs, export patterns of agricultural
goods are often similar, and therefore, on the one hand, liberalisation may not result im-
mediately in increased intra-regional trade (Josling 2009). However, on the other hand, po-
tential members of a RTA are more likely to have similar climate and soil conditions, and
therefore more similar production patterns and costs than in the case of cross-regional trade
agreements. This may well make it easier to coordinate agricultural and food security via
agreement provisions, and creates the opportunity to take advantage of specialisation and
economies of scale (Josling 2009).
As already outlined above, whilst market access remains a key factor, the rationale of RTAs is
often increasing regional cooperation, coordination and cohesion in agricultural policy and
in the common objective of enhancing food security (Josling 2009). As a result, the text of
RTAs entails provisions on not only the regulation of trade in agricultural goods, but also on
the coordination, cooperation and/or harmonization of agricultural policies, food security
aims, and in some cases, on a common agricultural policy and common food security policy.
These provisions differ across RTAs, and reflect therefore some further heterogeneity of RTAs
in the context of food security.
8See for an overview of different channels Annex.
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4.2.3 BY REGION
The RTAs across the three sub-continents are introduced in the light of the above context to
start highlighting some of the commonalities and differences.9 These are systematised in the
following sub-section in a comparative overview to set the basis for a Qualitative Compara-
tive Analysis.
Africa
Regional integration in recent history on the African continent dates back to 1910 (with the
establishment of the SACU). Since the independence of African states in the 1950s and 1960s,
the idea of regional integration was further developed within different regions of the conti-
nent, driven by "the Pan-African movement of shared values, collective self-reliance in de-
velopment and political independence" (UNCTAD 2009: 8). The African Economic Commu-
nity (AEC) was established under the Abuja Treaty 1991, with the aim to create an African
Common Market (African Capacity Building Foundation 2014) over a 34-year period (van
Dijk 2011). While the AEC is still in its making, it sets out the spirit of cooperation in devel-
opment beyond purely economic oriented goals (Gathii 2011). For example, in the context
of food security, the Abuja Treaty sets out that parties should cooperate in developing the
agricultural sectors to achieve food security (Article 46, Treaty of Abuja) and aim for a com-
mon agricultural policy at a later stage (Article 8, Abuja Treaty). This spirit of cooperation in
development - particularly in the context of food security - is found in most African RTAs.10
A further common characteristic of African RTAs is that they outline "mechanisms to mini-
mize distributional losses by creating opportunities such as compensation for losses arising
from implementation of region-wide liberalization commitments" (Gathii 2011: p. 35).11
9See Annex C.3 for further details.
10According to Brüntrup and Heidhues (2011) "a purely neo-liberal approach is not sufficient" in the African
context "to foster food security and, consequently, development". See The African Capacity Building Foundation
2014: 33.
11Notably, an African Continental Free Trade Area (draft) Agreement with the aim to establish an African Union
was signed among 44 African countries on 21st March 2018. As the agreement was signed after the writing up of
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Likewise the multiple RTAs, with partly overlapping memberships, "were and continue to be
seen as frameworks for development cooperation" (Gathii 2011: xxix) rather than an engine
of economic growth only. All of the effective (i.e., still actively existing) RTAs on the conti-
nent,12 include provisions on agriculture policies and/or food security aims.
ECOWAS
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 with the
aim to set up an economic and monetary union. A revised treaty was signed in 1993. While
progress on a common external tariff is being made, ECOWAS is at this stage still declared/-
classified as a free trade area (Gathii 2011), currently consisting of fifteen member states -
of which all are former colonies. In its revised treaty of 1993, Article 3 (Aims and Objec-
tives) stipulates that the "aims of the Community are to promote co-operation and inte-
gration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise
the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, fos-
ter relations-among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the
African Continent". To achieve these aims, the Community shall ensure "the harmonisa-
tion and co-ordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programmes,
projects and activities, particularly in food(,) [and] agriculture" (Article 3, ECOWAS Treaty
1993). Furthermore according to Article 25 on Agricultural Development and Food Security,
"Member States shall co-operate in the development of agriculture, forestry, livestock and
the text, an elaboration on the agreement is not included.
12In total there are more RTAs (not all of them are trade agreements in the classical sense but political cooper-
ation agreements and similar) of which not all are effective. Gathii (2011) provides an exhaustive list: eight pil-
lars of the African Economic Community: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan
States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eatern and Souther Africa (COMESA), the East African Community
(EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority of Development (IGAD), and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC); other economic unions: Economic and Monetary Community of Central
Africa (CEMAC), the West African Economic and Monetary Zone (UEMOA), and the West Africa Moenatary Zone
(WAMZ); other groupings: Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Mano Rvier Union (MRU), Economic
Coummunity of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).
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fisheries in order to ensure food security". In 2005, a common agricultural policy (ECOWAP)
was adopted to alleviate rural poverty and to enhance food security by supporting small-
holders (van Dijk 2011).
COMESA
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established in 1994
(replacing the previous Preferential Trade Area in place since 1981) with the aim to form a po-
litical and monetary union in its last stage. An FTA is in place among 19 members - of which
17 are former colonies. The 1994 establishing treaty lays out in detail how co-operation in
agriculture should be implemented via different channels (Articles 131-136). Thereby, co-
operation should be conducted with a view of having a common agricultural policy (Article
130), which should be ensured (Article 129). The "overall objectives of co-operation in the
agricultural sector are the achievement of regional food security and rational agricultural
production" (Article 129, COMESA Treaty 1994).
EAC
The East African Community (EAC) came into force in 2000. The customs union, with the
aim of a political federation, has five members of which all are former colonies. Similar to
the COMESA 1994 treaty, the EAC establishing treaty stipulates that the "overall objectives of
co-operation in the agricultural sector are the achievement of food security and rational agri-
cultural production" (Article 105, EAC Treaty 2000) to be achieved via harmonising national
policies (also to ensure a common agricultural policy) and developing (original wording)
food security (Article 105). Notably, Article 110 suggests in further detail mechanisms how
to develop food security - amongst other the harmonization of nutrition and food security
policies and strategies. Notably, the EAC has over time developed policy and strategy doc-
uments that address the improvement of food security and agricultural development (van
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Dijk 2011; ECDPM 128c 2012): the Agricultural and Rural Development Policy (ARDP); the
Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy (ARDS); (Agriculture and) Food Security Action
Plan (FSAP); Regional Agricultural Trade Information Network (RATIN).
SADC
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1980; a Protocol on
Trade was created in 1996 (Githii 2011). In 2000, the implementation of the 1996 SADC Trade
Protocol commenced (start of arrangement), and was amended in 2005. In 2008, the SADC
gained status of a FTA (Githii 2011). A free trade arrangement is currently in place among 13
of the 15 members of which all are former colonies. The final aim is to establish an economic
union with a single currency. "The SADC treaty specifies food security, land and agriculture
as areas in which member countries shall cooperate but no further information is offered
with respect to agricultural trade and cooperation" (van Dijk 2011: 13). The latter was spec-
ified in the 2004 Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in the SADC
Region, which is merely declaratory and external to the trade agreement. A Regional Agri-
cultural Policy has been formally developed, yet, not been implemented.
SACU
The history of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) dates back to 1889 (Githii 2011).
The next agreement to revise the customs union was signed in 1910 and was in effect un-
til 1969, when it was replaced by the following agreement. The trade agreement currently
in place, was implemented in 2004 (last amended in 2013), and has five members, which
all are former colonies and share the same official language. In contrast to the other RTAs in
Sub-Sahara Africa, the text of the latter agreement only entails a provision on cooperation on
agricultural policies. Namely, "Member States agree to co-operate on agricultural policies in
order to ensure the co-ordinated development of the agricultural sector within the Common
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Customs Area" (Article 39 SACU Agreement).
CEMAC
The precedent of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) was es-
tablished in 1964 by the Brazzaville Treaty and became effective in 1966. The CEMAC treaty
of 1994 came into force on 24th June 1999. CEMAC has six members, which share a colonial
past and the same official language. The trade agreement text itself covers merely trade in
agricultural foods and does not explicitly refer food security or related in its provisions, al-
though a Common Agricultural Strategy and Regional Food Security Program exists beyond
the main trade agreement text.
WAEMU/UEMOA
The West African Economic and Monetary Zone (WAEMU) was established in 1994 (legal
framework updated in 2002) and is composed of eight West African Francophone countries,
which at certain times in their histories, have all been colonised. Besides covering trade in
agricultural goods, the original treaty set out the objective to coordinate national sectoral
policies in such areas as agriculture amongst other (Article 4(d), WAEMU Treaty 1994).
In conclusion, all RTAs texts of Sub-Saharan African countries - with the exception of CEMAC
- clearly show the "strong desire for regionalism and economic integration as a way to ad-
vance Africa’s food security needs and socioeconomic objectives" (The African Capacity Build-
ing Foundation 2014: 19).
America
All Latin American countries member to the here introduced RTAs gained their indepen-
dence from Spain, or Portugal in the case of Brazil, in the early 19th century. As on the African
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continent, a supra regional trade agreement has been negotiated with the aim to form a - yet
to be implemented - sub-regional free trade area named the Union of South American Na-
tions (UNASUR). UNASUR is mainly a merger between two sub-regional customs unions
the Andean Pact and the Southern Common Market in addition to a few other countries.
The two trading blocks which are potential UNASUR members, have the most progressive
RTA texts in terms of food security provisions when compared with the other RTAs texts on
the continent. Therefore, these will be introduced in more detail than the other four RTAs.
As on the African continent some countries are member to more than one RTA, resulting in
overlapping memberships.
CAN
The Andean Pact (CAN) has grown out of the dissatisfaction of smaller economies of the
Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) formed in 1960. The Caragena Agreement (1969)
established the Andean Pact and the objective of creating a customs union. CAN member-
ship has been changing. It has currently four members of which all are former colonies and
share Spanish as their official language. The CAN Agreement stipulates under the chapeau
’Agricultural Development Programs’, that "with the purpose of promoting common agri-
cultural and agroindustrial development and attaining greater subregional food security, the
Member Countries shall carry out an Agricultural and Agroindustrial Development Program,
harmonize their policies, and coordinate their national plans in the sector" (Chapter VII,
Article 9.9, CAN Agreement 1969). Furthermore, to fulfil these objectives, the Commission
shall take steps to "create an Andean System and National Systems of Food Security", and
"(J)[j]oint policies for agricultural and agroindustrial development by products or groups of
products" (Chapter VII, Article 9.9, CAN Agreement 1969).
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MERCOSUR
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was created in 1991, but only the Treaty of Asun-
cion 1994 introduced a common tariff and established thereby a common market (customs
union) in 1995. MERCOSUR has five member of which all are former colonies. The Treaty
calls for the co-ordination of agricultural policies between the state parties; furthermore the
common market involves the commitment by the members "to harmonize their legislation
in the relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process" (Article 1, MERCOSOR
Treaty 1994).
CACM and CAFTA
The Central American Common Market (CACM), a customs union, was established in 1961,
revised in 1993, and has currently five members. The Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA), is a FTA between five members which entered into force in 2001. All member states
are former colonies and share Spanish as their official language. The two RTAs mentioned in
these paragraph entail provisions on the regulation of trade in agricultural in their texts but
no further ones on food security and related.
NT+Colombia
The free trade agreement between the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Hon-
duras) and Colombia (NT+Colombia) came into force in 2009, and is categorised as a RTA for
the purposes of this paper. All member states are former colonies and share the same official
language.
NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a free trade arrangement between
Mexico, Canada and the United States. As Mexico is included in the dataset, this RTA is taken
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into account in the analysis, despite its rather cross-cultural and relatively competitive na-
ture when compared to other RTAs. Unsurprisingly, the text of this RTA only covers trade in
agriculture but not common aims on food security or related to food security.
In conclusion, some but not all of the RTAs of Latin American countries show some desire for
regionalism and economic integration to advance food security. Conclusively, Latin Ameri-
can RTAs seem to be more heterogeneous in light of the food security provisions than Sub-
Saharan African RTAs.
Asia
In comparison, to the RTAs on the other two sub-continents, no supra-regional integration
is envisaged. Plus, countries member to the two sub-regional RTAs tend to be more het-
erogeneous in terms language and culture than their African and American counterparts.
Furthermore, while colonisation of Asian countries ended rather recently, not all Asian RTA
members were colonised.
AFTA
The Free Trade Agreement of ASEAN was established in 1993 and has currently 10 members
of which 9 are former colonies. Among the AFTA members there is a focus rather on food se-
curity than on agricultural policy in general. However, in the AFTA text there are no concrete
provisions as such but declarations are made in other official documents. Food security in
the AFTA text is mentioned in the context of emergency situations only: "Each Member State
acknowledges the value of exchanging information, particularly in an emergency situation
on food safety crisis" (Article 83, AFTA Agreement 1993). Food safety is integral to the con-
cept of food security.13
13Food safety is a compontent of the utilization pillar of the food security framework as introduced in Chapter
2.
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SAFTA
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formed in 1985 and has
currently 8 members of which 6 are former colonies. An Agriculture Centre (SAARC, pre-
viously SAIC) was established in 1988 with the mandate for information management pri-
marily in the field of agriculture. However, only in 1995 SAARC produced its first agreement
(SAPTA); and concluded a South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2006. In SAFTA,
trade in agriculture is regulated but no provisions on food security or related are included.
In conclusion, the Asian RTAs are the least cooperative in terms of food security.
Cross Regional Comparison
To summarise, African and Asian RTAs have on average more members (higher degree of
breadth), than Asian RTAs. This could potentially imply that the RTAs with a higher degree of
breadth have larger impacts (due to economies of scale). Yet, all of the larger regional trad-
ing arrangements are primarily FTAs (with the exception of COMESA). Whether the breadth
outbalances a higher degree of integration is most likely impossible to ascertain. All African
countries, which are a member to the RTAs outlined, share a recent colonial past (until 20th
century). All Latin American RTA member countries gained independence in the 19th cen-
tury. While the colonial times of Asian countries is also rather recent, not all of the RTA
members were colonised. This could imply that African countries member to the outlined
RTAs share a post-colonial culture that is much more present. The latter is potentially one
influencing factor for a more focused approach on stabilising the region via deeper cooper-
ation on socio and economic matters as can be seen on the example of food security.14
14The usage of a common language is more homogeneous among the RTA member countries on the American,
than on the African continent; the usage of official languages on the Asian continent differ from country to
country. While sharing the same language might simplify/facilitate trade negotiation as linguistic nuances are
potentially better transmitted, the language factor might not be too significant, as often English is applied as the
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While all RTAs across the three continents entail meanwhile provisions on trade in agricul-
tural goods, the inclusion and/or extent of provisions on agricultural policies and food se-
curity differ across the RTAs. Based on the comparative text analysis, African RTAs are on
average the most cooperative with regards to food security, followed by American RTAs, and
then Asian RTAs. The following section provides a more detailed and comparative overview
on the commonalities and differences across the RTAs to identify patterns in light of out-
come variable food security.
4.2.4 QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANLYSIS
To summarise the heterogeneity and commonalities of RTAs across the regions compara-
tively, I present a Qualitative Comparative Analysis truth table with RTA as the unit of anal-
ysis. In detail, Table 4.2.1, comparatively presents the degree of food security cooperation
with average food security outcomes. The degree of food security cooperation consists of
key trade agreement characteristics and the relevant number of provisions in the RTA con-
cerned.
First, the degree of cooperation can be determined by the type of trade agreement. Accord-
ingly, the type of trade agreement is coded to indicate the degree. The rationale is that a
FTA is the basis of trade cooperation, and therefore given the numerical value of 0. A cus-
toms union, representing a deeper form of integration is assigned the numerical value of 1.
Second, the more members are part of a RTA, the more effective are potentially the impacts
of the trading arrangement due to economies of scale. Therefore, a RTA with five or less is
coded 0, and with more than 5 members 1. Third, the specific provisions with implications
default if negotiating partners do not share the same official language.
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for food security as already outlined above for each RTA, are summarised. Specifically, those
provisions can be categorised as follows: provisions on (1) trade in agricultural goods/foods
(Agricultural Coverage), (2) coordination, harmonization and/or cooperation of agricultural
policies (Agricultural Policy), (3) a food security objective/aim or related (with the excep-
tion of emergency situations) (Food Security Aim), (4) common agricultural policy (Com-
mon Agricultural Policy) and (5) common food policy (Common Food Policy).
The numerical value 1 indicates where a provision is entailed in the relevant RTA, and 0
where absent. The column Aggregate Provisions (abbreviated with Aggr. Provisions) indi-
cates the cumulative count of these provisions (the aggregate measure).15 The next column
sums up the points of aggregate measure, degree and breadth of integration. To compare
the aggregate value of provisions with food security outcomes, the mean of food insecurity
proxy, child mortality,16 for each trading block in 2014 (taking into account all member states
of a RTA, which are in the dataset, see Annex C.3), was compared with the regional average
in 2014 and scored accordingly. The midrange (mean plus/minus 1/2 standard deviation)
scores 0; above the midrange -1, and below the midrange 1 (see last column titled Food Se-
curity Outcome).17
While the comparative analysis does not show one coherent pattern, there are some general
tendencies to observe. African RTAs entail on average more food security related provisions
which can be explained by the findings of the previous table that African countries share a
more recent culture of colonial past and therefore are more focused on cooperation. Fur-
thermore, if there are more food security relevant provisions then food security outcomes
seem on average to be better on the African continent. This relationship is less clear for
15Please note that provisions are intentionally not weighted to keep the analysis simple.
16See subsection 4.4.2 for reasons why child mortality is a good proxy for food security.
17By taking the average of 2014, the analysis is simplified to comparing the factors with a recent outcome,
rather than an outcome occurring a set number of years after ratification.
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Table 4.2.1: RTA Text Provisions
Type Breath Agri- Agri- Food Common Common Aggr. Sum Food
cultural cultural Security Agricultu- Food Provi- Security
Coverage Policy Aim ral Policy Security sions Outcome
Africa
EAC 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 5 0
ECOWAS 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 4 5 0
CEMAC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 -1
COMESA 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 4 5 0
SACU 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 3 1
SADC 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 4 1
WAEMU 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 5 -1
America
CAN 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 6 -1
CAFTA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
CACM 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
NT+C 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0
MERCOSUR 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 4 0
NAFTA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Asia
AFTA 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
SAFTA 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
Type - FTA=0, CU=1;
Breath - more than 5 member countries=1, otherwise=0;
Agricultural Coverage - provision on trade in agricultural goods/foods=1, none=0;
Agricultural Policy - provision on coordination, harmonization and/or cooperation of agricultural policies=1,
none=0;
Food Security Aim - provision on food security objective/aim or related=1, none=0;
Common Agricultural Policy - provision on common agricultural policy=1, none=0;
Common Food Security (Policy) - provision on common food policy=1, none=0;
Aggr. Provisions - cumulative count of provisions;
Sum - sum of all previous points;
Food Security Outcome - realisation of food security outcome in 2014 in comparison: 0 midrange, 1 above
midrange, -1 below midrange.
the American continent (NAFTA is an exceptional case - in stark contrast to other American
RTAs). Here, the RTAs with the highest number of provisions are not associated with better
food security outcomes but the opposite. A plausible explanation could be that, given the
acute state of food insecurity more provisions on food security were included in the Ameri-
can RTAs to improve the situation. No conclusion can be drawn from the two cases on the
Asian continent. Thereby, the truth table indicates that a two-way rationale/flow is possible.
The food security related provisions can influence food security, but also the state of food
security can potentially influence whether provisions are included in the trade agreement
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text (see e.g., CAN). Based on these observations, I derive two hypotheses.
H1: Food security provisions and related lead to better food security outcomes.
Besides the factors mentioned above which influence the decision to enter into trade negoti-
ations, the process of negotiations and ultimately the agreement design, the (common) state
of food security itself can be key in the choice of provisions. If a country/region faces a lack
of food security, then there is a vital motivation for that country/region to include provisions
on food security and related (enhancing food security) in the trade agreement text. There-
fore, my second hypothesis is as follows.
H2: The more acute a country’s situation of food insecurity, the more food security and related
provisions that country has across the RTAs of which it is a member.
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
To test the first hypothesis, I assess the impact of the specific RTA provisions on food se-
curity (Impact Model, short Model 1). Accordingly, the dependent variable is food security
outcomes and the independent variables of interest is the cumulative count of the five spe-
cific provisions (as introduced above), which is expected to have a positive impact on food
security.
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Figure 4.3.1: Model 1 Overview
Food security outcomes represent the ultimate outcome of the state of food security as pre-
sented by the outcome-utilisation dimension of the food security framework as introduced
in Chapter 2. Variables that can potentially affect food security are included in the model
as controls. WTO membership can be negatively associated with food security outcomes in
practice for low and middle income countries as they have been adversely affected by the
WTO Agreements of 1995 (see Chapter 3). The ratification of the ICESCR can have a positive
impact on food security outcomes. While it has not been assessed whether the ratification
of ICESCR leads to positive economic, social and cultural human rights outcomes, the litera-
ture on the impacts of human rights treaties on civil and political human rights indicates that
these treaties do have the intended effect.18 The positive relationship between democracy
(see regime type and durability) and food security has been established in the theoretical
18See, e.g., Fariss (2014 and forthcoming) for mainly civil and political human rights and related documents.
Fariss’ analysis does not include economic, social and cultural human rights.
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and empirical literature, most prominently by Sen (1999) (Chapter 3).19 For example, fragile
states in Africa reported higher child mortality compared to other low-income countries that
enjoyed higher political stability (African Development Bank Group 2012; see also Delbiso et
al. 2017(a)). Violent conflict can be a major driver of acute food insecurity (Hendrix and
Brinkman 2012).
Intuitively, natural disasters can affect food security negatively in the short and medium
term. Therefore, the natural disaster variable is expected to be negatively correlated with
food security (or positively correlated with food insecurity). However, for example Plümper,
Quiroz and Neumayer (2017) highlight the standard narrative that individuals and govern-
ments in disaster prone areas learn to cope and are able to reduce detrimental effects and
deaths in subsequent disasters.20 In the context of food insecurity proxied with child mortal-
ity, a number of articles confirm that there is not necessarily a positive association with natu-
ral disasters. For example, De Waal et al. (2006) found that whether or not an area in Ethiopia
was affected by drought during the 2002/03 drought made no difference on child mortality.21
Delbiso et al. (2017(a)) analysed the effect of drought on child mortality in Ehtiopia for a
longer period, between 2009 and 2014. Their study could also not find associations between
droughs, short- or long-term, and child mortality.22 The authors explain that this could be
due to "the resilience capacity the country developed over time to deal with shocks related to
drought and food shortage" (Delbiso et al. 2017(a): 5). They list four potential reasons: na-
tional policy on disaster risks and its potential consequences, productive safety net program
19See also Marshall and Jagger 2002, but note that there are critiques and differentiated views to this main
strand.
20Plümper, Quiroz and Neumayer (2017) further outline under which scenarios the learning effect can be
counter-productive: misplaced trust in preparedness measures and misleading lessons from past experiences.
The latter is also discussed in Neumayer, Plümper and Barthel (2014), which shows that while the economic loss
of an average hazard for a country with high disaster propensity might be relatively small, extreme hazards (out-
liers) might still lead to damage (Neumayer, Plümper and Barthel 2014). However, for the purpose of the paper
the standard narrative is followed.
21See also Delbiso et al. 2017(a) on possible reasons for the null-findings: no differentiating of drought inten-
sity; the one-year time elapse between the drought occurrence and time of study.
22Findings for wasting and drought show a similar pattern. See Delbiso et al. 2017(b).
138
for food insecure households in famine-prone areas highly vulnerable to climate shocks,23
road network development which creates better access to markets for farmers and relief pro-
vision to remote villages, and the increased effectiveness of humanitarian response due to
early warning systems and assessment results during emergencies.24 The effects of differ-
ent natural disasters on food food security might differ in terms of gratitude, and thus the
mitigating effects across countries (see also Plümper, Quiroz and Neumayer (2017) for this
and other reasons). For modelling purposes, the argument of the learning effect/mitigating
effects in disaster prone areas is adopted.
The remaining cluster of covariates are all food security indicators themselves given the
framework introduced in Chapter 2. Yet, these are of another dimension than the utilisation-
outcome dimension (See Chapter 2 for details.). Given the framework’s logic of the hori-
zontally and vertically interdependence, these indicators are drivers for food security out-
comes of the utilisation-outcome dimension, and therefore function well as controls (See
also Chapter 2 and 3.). GDP per capita and economic growth rates, both structural indica-
tors under the availability and access pillar, are positively associated with food security out-
comes. Food availability is depicted via agricultural land (structural), dietary energy supply
adequacy and food imports over merchandise exports (both outcome). The more agricul-
tural land and dietary energy supply is available, the better are ultimately the food security
outcomes of the utilisation-outcome dimension. The last variable, food imports over mer-
chandise exports, not only reflects food availability but also depicts the purchasing power
for food imports in terms of merchandise exports (i.e., foreign exchange reserves to pay for
food imports), and therefore equally presents the access pillar. The greater the merchandise
export flows of a country, the more affordable food imports become. According to the depen-
23See also Delbiso et al. 2017(b).
24See also The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: National Policy And Strategy on Disaster Risk Man-
agement (2013).
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dency theory, in particular lower income countries (exporting mainly unprocessed agricul-
tural goods) have on average a low ratio, negatively affecting food security outcomes. Given
that the majority of the food insecure live in rural areas, the lower the growth of the rural
population, the better average food security outcomes. The latter variable is an indicator in
the access-outcome dimension. To control for other dimensions under the utilization pillar,
improved sanitation and access to water sources are added, which contribute positively to
food security outcomes of the utilization-outcome dimension (Chapter 3).
As already outlined, lack of food security can be a motivating factor to include the specific
provisions on agriculture and food security in a RTA. Therefore, the previous model design
potentially ’suffers’ from endogeneity. To counter this technical problem, but also based on
substantive reasons as outlined in the previous subsection and to advance the literature on
the factors of RTA design, I reverse the direction of effect. To test the second hypothesis, the
aggregate measure of the provisions (cumulative count) is now the variable to be explained
in the Design Model (abbreviated with Model 2). Food security outcomes is the independent
variable of interest. The less food security is achieved the more likely it is that the relevant
provisions are contained in a RTA.
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Figure 4.3.2: Model 2 Overview
To control for endogeneity I include the instrumental variable (IV): natural disaster. Natural
disasters are exogenous to the here analysed RTA provisions (provisions on food security in
the context of emergency, as stipulated, e.g., in AFTA, are not taken into account here).
As already outlined above, intuitively, natural disasters can affect food security negatively in
the short and medium term. Yet, recent research has highlighted that mitigating/learning
effects in disaster prone areas, can on average outweigh potential detrimental effects of nat-
ural disasters. Therefore in the model context, the natural disaster variable is expected to be
positively correlated with food security (or negatively correlated with food insecurity).
The controls are similar to the ones in Model 1 but are selected for different theoretical rea-
sons. If a country is a member of the WTO it is more likely to have more food security related
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provisions for three potential reasons depending on the time of when the trade agreement
was negotiated. First, for RTAs before the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in 1995, coun-
tries opted to include provisions on food and related to food set regulations at least within
regions (missing on multilateral level). Second, for RTAs which entered into force just af-
ter 1995, countries may have wished to further specify minimum bounds and beyond set by
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture within their RTAs. Third, once the implications of the
interpretations of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in praxis have become more clear for
low and middle income countries, countries were motivated to intensify their cooperation
on food security related matters to counterbalance the adverse affects stemming from the
multilateral arrangement. If a country ratified the ICESCR it obliges itself (by international
law) to fulfil economic, social and cultural human rights. Therefore, countries that ratified
the ICESCR are in theory more inclined to ensure that food security is taken into account in
their trade deals.
Previous research has shown that the regime type (see also Baccini, Dür and Haftel (2015);
Düer 2007; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002) matters for trade agreement design. In
this particular case it can be explained based on Sen’s work of 1999 (see also Sen 2000): the
more democratic a country is the more will the relevant government try to ensure that ba-
sic needs, including food security, are ensured to maintain a satisfied electorate (see also
Scanlan 2004 and Zidouemba 2017). The more stable a regime is, the more likely it is that
long-term strategies are kept in place to ensure food security - also in its trade agreements.
GDP per capita and growth can be positively associated with the aggregate measure of food
security related provisions based on the rationale that ensuring food security and related
provisions can be given more focus once a country progressed from (mere survival) being a
low income country to a middle income country. Prior to that the focus might be on quanti-
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tative growth only.25
The more agricultural land is available the more likely it is that the agricultural sector pro-
duces goods for exports. Accordingly, provisions on trade in agricultural goods and related
are more likely to be included in the RTAs. The more dietary energy supply adequacy is guar-
anteed, the less there is concern for lack of food security, and provisions are less likely to be
included.
The food imports over total merchandise exports variable not only reflects food availability
but also depicts the purchasing power for food imports in terms of merchandise exports (i.e.,
foreign exchange reserves to pay for food imports). The greater the merchandise export flows
of a country the more affordable food imports become. According to the dependency the-
ory, in particular lower income countries (exporting mainly unprocessed agricultural goods)
have on average a low ratio, negatively affecting food security outcomes. The more afford-
able food imports become for a country, the more likely it is that a country would like to
specify trade in agricultural goods and related issues further.
Given that the majority suffering food insecurity live in rural areas, rural population growth
indicates, that food security can potentially become more severe. Accordingly, it is more
likely for a country to include more food security related provisions in its RTAs if the rural
population grows.
Other potential controls could be economic interdependence and the balance of power (Haf-
tel 2013; Johns 2013; Smith 2000) as previously discussed in the literature as factors of design.
25Please note that it can not be excluded that natural disaster potentially impact on food security via some of
the controls- such as GDP, agricultural land, dietary energy supply adequacy. See comment also in Subsection
4.4.3.
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However, as RTAs, are concluded among trading partners with a relative balanced distribu-
tion of power and interdependence, these variables are not included (these would be rele-
vant in the context of the more competitive cross-regional trade agreements).
All of the briefly mentioned variables are further described in the context of their concrete
measure in the following section.
4.4 DATA, MEASUREMENT AND ESTIMATION
4.4.1 DATASET
The pooled, cross-section, time-series dataset includes variables for 67 low and middle in-
come countries who are a member of at least one of the introduced RTAs, for 1990-2014.26
Despite basing the case selection on data availability amongst other criteria, some observa-
tions of the covariates are still missing at random (see Annex C.5 for Pattern of Missings).
Therefore, the missings (at random) in the original dataset were imputed.27 All models are
fitted based on the strongly balanced imputed dataset with 1675(=N*T=67*25) observations.
I describe the variable of interest, food (in-)security, the explanatory variables, trade agree-
ment provisions, the covariates for control and the instrumental variables in the following,
before elaborating on the structure of the dataset and the estimation method in more detail.
The descriptive statistics for all variables, of which all numerical values were last updated
25th October 2015, are reported in Annex B.4 (original dataset with MAR) and Annex C.5
(imputed dataset).
26After filtering for low and middle income RTA member countries the process of case selection is based first
on data availability; second, whether countries have missings at random (otherwise deletion); third, outliers are
not included.
27Imputations were run 100 times by semiparametrically estimating the parameters of a Gaussian copula with
R package sbgcop (Hoff 2015). The means of 100 imputations for each variable constitute the dataset. This
method was chosen over other methods and R packages for reasons given in Hollenbach et al. 2017.
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4.4.2 VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT
Food (In-)Security28
In Chapter 2 I highlighted the complexity of the concept of food security and introduced a
framework which facilitates the identification of relevant food security variables. According
to this framework, utilisation-outcome variables are the variables measuring the actual re-
alisation of food (in-)security. Child mortality is one of the identified outcome-utilization
variables. The indicator child mortality reflects apart from individual outcomes under the
utilization pillar complementary factors on the macro level (some of the control variables).
Furthermore, child mortality is highly correlated with other food insecurity proxies of the
utilization-outcome dimension such as anthropometric and biochemical indicators (see Chap-
ter 2). Even though high correlation might not suggest interchangeability as Caspers and
Tufis (2003) have shown in the context of democracy measures, in this context child mortal-
ity might reflect the other utilization-outcome variables well. For instance, child deaths are
found to be attributable to undernutrition in low and middle income countries (Black et al.
2013).29 Based on these reasons (besides data availability) the dependent variable of interest
in Model 1 and the key independent variable in Model 2, food security are proxied with child
mortality as, for example, done in Olper et al. (2014).30
Child mortality is the mortality rate among children and describes more precisely the prob-
ability per 1,000 that a newborn dies before year five (0-4 years) (Kersten PhD Paper I). Ac-
cordingly, the dependent variable depicts not food security but Food Insecurity and therefore
all effects as listed in Figure 4.3.1 (Model 1) and the effect of the key independent and instru-
mental variable in Figure 4.3.2 (Model 2) are reversed.
28Sourced from World Bank. Data provided by UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF,
WHO, World Bank, UN DESA Population Division).
29See also Campbell et al. 2009, who have shown that higher household food insecurity in Indonesia is associ-
ated with higher child mortality.
30Child mortality, or other anthropometric variables, are referred to in the literature as a food security proxy.
See, e.g., Olper et al. (2014) and McCorriston et al. (2013).
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RTA Provisions31
The key independent variables in Model 1 and the one outcome variable in Model 2 is a
variable that operationalises the specific provisions of RTAs across the three regions as intro-
duced above. This variable is constructed by five variables. In detail, the five disaggregated
variables Trade in Agricultural Coverage, Cooperation of Agricultural Policy, Declaration of
Food Security Aim, Common Agricultural Policy, and Common Food Security Policy depict
each a different provision. The variable Trade in Agricultural Coverage cumulatively counts
the number of RTAs that cover trade in agricultural goods for each country. Similarly, the
variable Cooperation of Agricultural Policy cumulatively counts the number of provisions a
country has on the coordination, cooperation and harmonization of agricultural policy. The
variable Declaration of Food Security Aim cumulatively counts provisions on whether food
security is at least declared (if not also concretely mentioned as a key objective). The vari-
able Common Agricultural Policy and Common Food Security Policy each cumulatively count
provisions which concretely outline the aim of a common policy. The key dependent vari-
able of interest Aggregate Measure for Provisions sums up the values of the five disaggregated
variables for each country and year.
For a presentation of the bivariate relationship between the dependent and key independent
variables please refer to Figure C.4.2 (correlation matrix) and C.4.3 (scatter plots) in Annex
C.4.
WTO Membership32
The WTO membership dummy variable, WTO, indicates whether a country is a member to
the WTO (value=1) or not (value=0) in a given year. It means that the value of the WTO vari-
31Own coding.
32Own coding based on WTO membership list.
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able can change over time for a country (see also Chapter 3).
ICESCR Ratification33
The ICESCR ratification ordinal variable, ICESCR denotes whether a country ratified (value=2)
or signed (value=1) the UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or none of
the aforementioned. The reason to chose an ordinal rather than a dummy variable (ratified
or not) is twofold. First, in principle, a signature subject to ratification does express the will-
ingness of the signatory state to ratify and it creates an obligation to refrain from acts that
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty (Article 10 and 19, Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties). Ratification creates the obligation to be bound to the treaty (Article 2(b)
and 14, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), which in principle can therefore have a
stronger positive impact on the right to food. The second reason is methodological. An or-
dinary variable allows potentially for more within variation than a dummy variable (see also
Chapter 3).
Regime Type and Duration34
Polity IV is the rescaled Polity IV variable depicting regime type (strong autocracy to strong
democracy) on a scale 0 to 1 (from original scale -10 to 10), ranging from strongly autocratic
to strongly democratic.35.
The variable regime durability, Reg. Durability, describes the number of years since the most
recent regime change (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual v2016: 17) (see also Chpater
3).
33Own coding based on UN Treaty Collection List.
34Source: Polity IV Project.
35See (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual v2016: 16-17
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Armed Conflicts36
The variable Conflict denotes the number of active armed conflicts (internal and interna-
tionalized internal) in a country for a given year (see also Chpater 3).37
Natural Disasters38
The variable Natural Disaster depicts the count of the occurrences of different types of nat-
ural disasters within a year and country. If no count is given for a year and country, it is
assumed that no disasters occurred. The types of natural disasters are: drought, earthquake
epidemic, extreme temperature, flood, impact, insect infestation, landslide, mass movement
(dry), storm, volcanic activity and wildfire.
Controls derived from the Food Security Framework39
The variable Log(GDP) is the logarithm of real (constant 2011 international dollar) GDP per
capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) for better cross country comparison.40 GDP
per capita is logarithmized, not primarily to control for skewness of the distribution, but to
allow for similar effects of increments along minimum to maximum values. GDP growth (in
percentage) is the annual GDP (in local currency) growth rate per capita (see also Chapter 3).
The variable agricultural Land (sourced from WB but originally from FAO) is the share of land
area that is arable (in percentage).
Dietary energy supply adequacy41 is the energy supply (calories for food consumption) for
36Source: UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2012; and Gled-
itsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002).
37Readme file for the UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset.
38Data were provided by Alejandro Quiroz Flores; see also Flores and Smith (2012). The data applied here were
prepared by Alejandro Quiroz Flores. The source of raw data is EM-DAT The International Disaster Database.
39All sourced from World Bank or FAO; original data provided by different agencies.
40Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
41Source: FAO.
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a country divided by the average dietary energy requirement of the population (percentage,
3-year average). Accordingly, rather than just providing information on the quantity, it indi-
cates whether the supply is sufficient in relation to the population (see also Chapter 3).
The variable food imports over total merchandise exports42 (percent, 3-year average) has
comparatively high values for particularly lower income countries, given that these have rel-
atively low merchandise export flows. Therefore, to adjust the high values to a lower scale,
and to take account for the skewed distribution (lesser reason), the logarithm is taken of this
variable, and named Log(Food/Merchandise) (see also Chapter 3).
The variable Rural Population Growth (annual percent)43 is the growth rate of the share of
the population living in rural areas as defined by national statistical offices and calculated as
the difference between total population and urban population (see also Chapter 3).
Improved sanitation facilities44 depicts the percent of population using improved sanitation
facilities; and presented by variable Sanitation (see also Chapter 3). The variable improved
Water source45 refers to the percentage of population with access to an improved drinking
water source. The distribution of the variable is skewed. However, to keep the variable on the
percentage scale as the rest of the ’food-security’ covariates for control and to make it more
comparable to the related variable sanitation, the values of the variable are not transformed
(see also Chapter 3).
42Source: FAO.
43World Bank estimates based on UN World Urbanization Project.
44Sourced from World Bank. Original source is WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and
Sanitation.
45Sourced from World Bank. Original source is WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and
Sanitation.
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4.4.3 ESTIMATION MODEL AND METHOD
For Model 1, I fit first a Fixed Effects model on the strongly balanced cross-country time
series data to control for further unobserved country-specific effects on food security.46 The
linear fixed effects model for country i =1,...,67 and year t=1,...,25 is presented in (4.4.1). The
difference to (3.3.1) in Chapter 3, are the key independent variables. In Chapter 3, the key
independent variables were PTA, RTA and BTA. Here, the key independent variable is the
Aggregate Measure for Provisions variable.
F I Si t =αi +γ1 ALLPROVi t
+β1W T Oi t +β2IC ESC Ri t +β3POLI T Yi t +β4RDU Ri t
+β5CON F LIC Ti t ++β6N AT D I S AST ERi t
+β7Log (GDP )i t +β8Log (GDPGR)i t +β9L AN Di t +β10SU PPLYi t
+β11FOMEi t +β12RPOPGRi t +β13S AN I T AT IONi t +β14W AT ERi t +ui t
(4.4.1)
F I Si t is the dependent variable food insecurity; αi is the unobserved individual country ef-
fect; ALLPROVi t is the main independent variable, which is a cumulative count variable
aggregating all five specific provisions; γ1 is the slope parameter for ALLPROVi t ; W T Oi t is
a dummy on WTO membership; IC ESC Ri t is the ICESCR ratification variable; POLI T Yi t
is the Polity IV variable; RDU Ri t is the regime durability variable; CON F LIC Ti t is the con-
flict variable; N AT D I S AST ERi t is the natural disaster variable; Log (GDP )i t is the GDP per
capita variable; GDPGRi t is the GDP per capita growth variable; L AN Di t is the agricultural
land variable; SU PPLYi t is the dietary energy supply variable; FOMEi t is the values of food
imports divided by values of merchandise exports variable; RPOPGRi t is the rural popula-
tion growth variable; S AN I T AT IONi t is the improved sanitation variable; W AT ERi t is the
46Hausman test statistically confirms that Fixed Effects model is to be preferred over Random Effects model.
Moreover, Fixed Effects model is the only option out of the two, as the moment/strict exogeneity condition most
likely does not hold.
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improved water source variable; β1 to β14 are the relevant slope parameters; ui t is the error
term.
After controlling for unit heterogeneity in the Fixed Effects model estimated via Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) (results are presented under the following section in Table 4.4.1, col-
umn FE (1)), there is still heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test) and also autcorrelation
(Breusch-Gorfrey, Wooldrdige and Durbin-Watson test) in the errors. Therefore, to correct
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation I employ a robust covariance matrix according
to the White (1980, 1984)47 48 and the Arellano (1987) method, clustered over countries. Re-
sults for robust standard errors are presented under the following section in Table 4.4.1 under
column Robust FE (2).
Furthermore, to correct alternatively for violations of the Gauss-Markov assumption and
to generally specify an alternative model for robustness 49, I fit an Arellano-Bond dynamic
model (estimated via General Method of Moments (GMM)) with adjusted standard errors
for clustering on country (one-step, differences as instruments); see Table 4.4.2, column
(1). There is no statistical indication for autcorrelation to be remaining (Arellano-Bond test).
Given that the autoregressive process is not persistent, there is indication for the differences
to be sufficiently strong instruments. Nevertheless, I fit additionally a model with additional
moment conditions, namely the lagged difference of the dependent variable (level equa-
tion), according to Arellano-Bover-Blundell-Bond, also to highlight robustness in results (see
Table 4.4.2, column (2)). Also, in the latter case, there is no statistical indication for the er-
rors (first-differences) to correlate. I modify the dynamic models, in a third specification, by
47Based on Eicker 1963.
48Here, adjustments for small/finite samples according to MacKinnon and White (1985) amongst other did not
lead to significant differences in the standard errors. Therefore, the simple weighting for the variance-covariance
matrix is applied.
49Other reasons are that the robust standard errors more than double in the Fixed Effects model. This can
potentially be an indication for a misspecified model according to King an Roberts (2015).
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lagging the Conflict and Natural Disaster variables as presented in Table 4.4.3. The country
specific constants take into account the region specific heterogeneity well. Additional Re-
gional dummies are multicollinear and are therefore not specified.
One major problem with Model 1 is endogeneity between the dependent and key indepen-
dent variable. The design of the trade agreement has potentially an effect on food insecurity
but also vice versa. Therefore, and also in context of the research question on driving factors
of design, the key independent variable food security in Model 1, is set to be the variable to
be explained in Model 2. To control for endogeneity, I employ an instrumental variable (IV),
which influences potentially the state of food insecurity but not the here examined trade
agreement provisions. One potential instrumental variable is the Conflict Variable. Yet, as
the state of peace can influence whether or not there is planned cooperation; and if, then
the presence/absence of conflict can still influence the negotiation process. Furthermore,
a country with ongoing and and severe conflict is less likely to implement relevant provi-
sions effectively. Therefore, the Conflict Variable is not a strong IV on substantive grounds.
In contrast, it is very unlikely that the variable Natural Disaster influences the design of the
relevant provisions (with the exception of droughts), but can potentially immediately impact
the state of food security. Therefore, the variable Natural Disaster is a more sound IV on sub-
stantive grounds (validity).
On statistical grounds, the Natural Disaster variable is the more ideal IV given that it cor-
relates (Pearson) more strongly with the key independent variable Food Insecurity (r=-0.23)
than with the dependent variable Aggregate Provision (r=-0.19) (strength). The variable Con-
flict has almost no correlation with the variable Food Insecurity However, Natural Disaster
is only a weak instrument. Given that the correlation with Food Insecurity is rather weak,
standard errors are expected to be large (inefficiency). Plus, given this weak correlation, the
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correlation with Aggregate Provision is too high. Moreover, the exclusion restriction does very
likely not hold, as natural disaster potentially affects food security via some of the controls
such as the GDP variables, agricultural land and dietary energy supply.
To take into consideration that the dependent variable of Model 2, Aggregate Provision, is
a count variable I fit a Poisson model with multiplicative error term on the data. Model 2
is estimated via the General Method of Moments (minimizing sample moment condition
according to Gauss-Newton). Furthermore, to take account for endogeneity of the key inde-
pendent variable, I apply a control function estimator (auxiliary parameter). I first introduce
the generic model before applying it to the here relevant context.
The multiplicative model can be expressed as the dependent variable yi being the function
of the key independent and endogenous variable y2,1, the exogenous covariates xi and the
error ²i = ρvi + ci . z is the instrumental variable, and the vector z˜ is (x’i ,z’i ). To control for
endogeneity the control-function estimator augments the original multiplicative model with
an estimated term from a first-stage estimation that controls for the endogeneity of y2,i in the
second stage. In more detail, the first step (auxiliary function), which theoretically constitute
parts of the error term in step two (²i = ρvi + ci , with ci being the errors), functions as an
additional covariate which controls for endogeneity of the key independent variable. The
relevant coefficient ρ indicates the strength of endogeneity. The augmented model a specific
form of the exponential conditional mean model is specified as follows (second step).50
50For further details on the method see Wooldridge 2010, Newey 1984, Mullahy 1997; and STATA help file
ivpoisson.
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yi = exp(x′iβ1+y′2,iβ2+v′iρ+ ci ) (4.4.2)
Where y2,i is the auxiliary function estimated in the first step.
y2,i =Bz˜i +vi (4.4.3)
I reiterate now the model with the relevant variables. In a first stage, the relationship be-
tween the endogenous covariate, the key independent variable Childmortatlity, and the in-
strument Natural Disaster plus the other exogenous covariates is estimated (see first equa-
tion of Model 2 below). The residuals of the first step, which theoretically constitute parts of
the error term in step 2 (²i t = ρv̂i t + ci t , with ci t being the errors), are employed as an ad-
ditional covariate which controls together with the coefficient ρ (strength of endogeneity),
for the endogeneity of Childmortatlity. The second equation shows the Poisson model with
multiplicative error term with the dependent variable Aggregate Provision, the exogenous
covariates, and the control function estimator (ρv̂i t ). In this way endogeneity is accounted
for, yet, heterogeneity is a remaining issue. To control for heterogeneity to some degree, the
errors are clustered by country.51
51Clustering the errors by region, results in no significant key variables and are not presented but further com-
mented on in the results section.
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Model 2
F I Si t =αi t +γ1N AT D I S AST ERi t
+β1W T Oi t +β2IC ESC Ri t +β3POLI T Yi t +β4RDU Ri t +β5CON F LIC Ti t
+β6Log (GDP )i t +β7Log (GDPGR)i t +β8L AN Di t +β9SU PPLYi t
+β10FOMEi t +β11RPOPGRi t + vi t
ALLPROVi t =exp(αi t +γ2F I Si t
+β12W T Oi t +β13IC ESC Ri t +β14POLI T Yi t +β15RDU Ri t +β16CON F LIC Ti t
+β17Log (GDP )i t +β18Log (GDPGR)i t +β19L AN Di t +β20SU PPLYi t
+β21FOMEi t +β22RPOPGRi t +ρ1v̂i t + ci t )
(4.4.4)
F I Si t is the dependent variable food insecurity;αi t is the individual constant; N AT D I S AST ERi t
is the natural disaster variable; W T Oi t is a dummy on WTO membership; IC ESC Ri t is the
ICESCR ratification variable; POLI T Yi t is the Polity IV variable; RDU Ri t is the regime dura-
bility variable; CON F LIC Ti t is the conflict variable; N AT D I S AST ERi t is the natural dis-
aster variable; Log (GDP )i t is the GDP per capita variable; GDPGRi t is the GDP per capita
growth variable; L AN Di t is the agricultural land variable; SU PPLYi t is the dietary energy
supply variable; FOMEi t is the values of food imports divided by values of merchandise ex-
ports variable; RPOPGRi t is the rural population growth variable; β1 to β11 are the relevant
slope parameters; vi t is the error term; ALLPROVi t is a cumulative count variable aggregat-
ing all five specific provisions; γ2 is the slope parameter for ALLPROVi t ; β12 to β22 are the
relevant slope parameters; v̂i t are the residuals of the first equation; ρ1 is the slope parame-
ter of the residuals (strength of endogeneity); ρv̂i t +ci t is the entire error term with ci t being
the errors of the second equation.
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4.4.4 RESULTS
Estimates of Model 1 for the Fixed Effects model with and without an adjusted variance-
covariance matrix for robust standard errors, are presented in Table 4.4.1. Estimates of Model
1 for the Dynamic model are shown in Table 4.4.2 and 4.4.3.
Model 1 controls for heterogeneity, but not, as outlined above, for endogeneity. Therefore,
results are not reliable as such (due to bias/inconsistency) but are briefly commented on.
Across the results (OLS and GMM) of Model 1, the key independent variable Aggregate Pro-
vision, has the expected direction of effect: The more provisions related to food security a
country has committed to in its trade agreement(s), the lower the state of food insecurity
(significance across the variations of estimations). The estimated coefficients of the WTO
variable show the expected direction of effect across the results (significant for Arellano-
Bond-Blundell-Bover model). These results confirm previous findings in Chapter 3, which
indicate that a membership of the WTO has sofar been to the detriment of low and mid-
dle income countries in terms of food security. Coefficients of the ICESCR variable have the
expected direction of effect for the GMM models (significant for Arellano-Bond). The ratifi-
cation of the CESCR is positively associated with food security outcomes.
The more democratic (Polity) (coefficients are significant except for FE robust) and the more
politically stable a country is (Regime Durability coefficients are significant for most GMM
results) the higher its food security. While the coefficients of the Conflict variable show the
expected direction of effect only for the two lastly specified models (GMM with lags), the
estimates for the Natural Disaster variable have the expected negative direction of effect for
the dynamic models with and without lags.52 Coefficients of Log GDP (exception is Arellano-
Bond-Blundell-Bover specification) and GDP Growth are in line with theory and accordingly
52Including a third lag of the Natural Disaster variable leads to similar estimates.
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positively associated with food security. The more Land and dietary energy Supply is avail-
able the better is food security realised (exceptions are Arrelano-Bond and Arellano-Bond-
Blundell-Bover specifications). The direction of effect for the variables Food/Merchandise
and Rural Population Growth are in line with theory for the GMM models, but not for the
OLS models. TheWater variable is - as expected - negatively associated with child mortality,
but the Sanitation variable shows the expected direction of effect only for the OLS models.
Accordingly, while the key variables are robust, not all control variables are across the mod-
els.
In the first exponential mean model specification for Model 2 all variables are included, as
presented in the first column of Table 4.3.1. All coefficients show the expected direction of
effect, and the auxiliary coefficient rho, ρ (strength of endogeneity), is significantly different
from 0 at the 5 percent level. The latter indicates, that Childmortality is significantly endo-
geneous in this specification.
However, when further improving the specification of the model by taking out insignificant
variables such as Land, Supply and Rural Population (an exception is made for the WTO vari-
able, which is kept in the model for substantive reasons), the strength of endogeneity slightly
decreases, and the coefficient is now significantly different from 0 - a the slightly above 5 per-
cent level (p=0.05), see second column of Table 4.4.4.
To take into account, that Natural Disasters might have effects on the Food Insecurity proxy
in the medium term (also to take the learning/mediating effect better into account), I lag
the instrumental variable by two years, see Table 4.3.2. The results confirm, that the models
with a lag fit the data with more precision (p-values for Childmortality and Natural Disaster
become smaller).
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Table 4.4.1: Model 1: OLS Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
FE Robust FE
AggregateProvision −3.231∗∗∗ −3.231∗∗∗
(0.297) (1.080)
WTO 4.009∗∗ 4.009
(1.929) (4.771)
ICESCR 2.219∗∗ 2.219
(0.932) (2.648)
Polity −10.353∗∗∗ −10.353
(2.785) (9.366)
Regime Durability −0.044 −0.044
(0.044) (0.097)
Conflict −0.596 −0.596
(1.040) (1.863)
Natural Disaster 0.118 0.118
(0.199) (0.194)
Log(GDP) −22.768∗∗∗ −22.768∗∗
(2.969) (11.061)
GDP Growth −0.275∗∗∗ −0.275∗
(0.082) (0.161)
Land −0.031 −0.031
(0.096) (0.200)
Supply −0.314∗∗∗ −0.314
(0.088) (0.258)
Log(Food/Merchandise) −4.473∗∗∗ −4.473
(0.806) (2.901)
Rural Population Growth −0.732 −0.732
(0.532) (1.319)
Water −2.070∗∗∗ −2.070∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.400)
Sanitation 0.039 0.039
(0.089) (0.261)
Observations 1,675
R2 0.678
Adjusted R2 0.662
F Statistic 223.511∗∗∗ (df = 15; 1593)
Note: ∗p,z<0.1; ∗∗p,z<0.05; ∗∗∗p,z<0.01
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Table 4.4.2: Model 1: GMM Dynamic Models
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
Arellano-Bond +Blundell-Bover
Lag(Childmortatility) 0.938∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016)
Aggregate Provision −0.561∗∗∗ −0.480∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.161)
WTO 1.185 1.608∗∗
(0.827) (0.797)
ICESCR −0.891∗∗ −0.400
(0.383) (0.395)
Polity −2.828∗∗ −4.282∗∗∗
(1.209) (1.497)
Regime Durability −0.064∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.029)
Conflict −0.415 −0.751∗∗
(0.293) (0.359)
Natural Disaster −0.008 −0.044
(0.032) (0.047)
Log(GDP) −0.721 1.985∗
(2.255) (1.160)
GDP Growth −0.003 −0.037∗
(0.015) (0.020)
Land −0.013 0.060∗∗
(0.011) (0.027)
Supply 0.023 0.056
(0.044) (0.046)
Log(Food/Merchandise) 0.812∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗
(0.273) (0.364)
Rural Population Growth 0.010 0.141
(0.221) (0.223)
Water −0.399∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.092)
Sanitation 0.393∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.067)
Observations 1541 1608
Wald chi2 Statistic 29324.46∗∗∗ (df = 16) 51858.78∗∗∗ (df = 16)
Note: ∗p,z<0.1; ∗∗p,z<0.05; ∗∗∗p,z<0.01
159
Table 4.4.3: Model 1: GMM Dynamic Models with Lags of Covariates
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
Arellano-Bond +Blundell-Bover
Lag1(Childmortatility) 0.933∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014)
Aggregate Provision −0.519∗∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.162)
WTO 1.117 1.710∗
(0.891) (0.894)
ICESCR −1.471∗∗ −0.620
(0.583) (0.586)
Polity −3.002∗∗ −4.596∗∗∗
(1.348) (1.714)
Regime Durability −0.078∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.034)
Lag1(Conflict) 0.340 0.019
(0.301) (0.295)
Lag2(Natural Disaster) −0.109∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.050)
Log(GDP) −1.466 1.809
(2.666) (1.193)
GDP Growth −0.001 −0.040∗
(0.015) (0.022)
Land −0.017 0.059∗∗
(0.012) (0.029)
Supply 0.025 0.075
(0.078) (0.070)
Log(Food/Merchandise) 0.774∗∗∗ 0.698∗
(0.273) (0.370)
Rural Population Growth 0.308 0.635∗∗
(0.287) (0.301)
Water −0.413∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.081)
Sanitation 0.457∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.077)
Observations 1474 1541
Wald chi2 Statistic 28523.11∗∗∗ (df = 16) 52838.56∗∗∗ (df = 16)
Note: ∗p,z<0.1; ∗∗p,z<0.05; ∗∗∗p,z<0.01
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The instrumental variable Natural Disaster, whether lagged or not, is negatively associated
with the Food Insecurity proxy according to the above described model results. This was
expected based on the descriptive statistics and the findings in the literature (see Plümper,
Quiroz and Neumayer 2017).53 Conclusively, it can be confirmed that there is statistical in-
dication for natural disaster mediating programs and similar to be effective.
The higher food insecurity, the more food security provisions a country has enshrined in
its RTAs. WTO membership further influences this positively (however, direction of effect is
not robust across the models). Also the ratification of the ICESCR has a positive impact on
including the food security related provisions. The more democratic a country is and the
more stable the regime is, the higher the number of these trade provisions. GDP per capita
and growth are also positively associated with the provision variable. Estimates for the agri-
cultural Land, Supply, and Rural Population Growth variables are not significantly different
from zero, and furthermore have sign flips across the models (same for the WTO variable).
Conclusively, the results for those variables are not reliable, and are therefore not interpreted
here.
As an alternative to clustering standard errors by country, I clustered these by region. How-
ever, the key dependent variable Childmortality is not further significant and no lag of the
natural disaster variable then fits the data well. These results indicate that RTAs within re-
gions are heterogenous.54 This complements findings based on the qualitative analysis as
outlined in the conclusion.55
53There is a positive association when the variables Childmortality and Natural Disaster are log transformed
and squaring after. Yet, overall the model then seems not to fit data well and there is no statistical indication for
endogeneity - which was then erroneously accounted for.
54A RTA variable to capture variation on the RTA level, is due to overlapping membership to RTAs not feasible
as such. The optimal approach take on here is to take heterogeneity into account via the provisions variable.
55In addition, I added year dummies, which did not change the results substantively and are therefore not
presented here. Furthermore, I fitted an Arellano-Bond-Blundell-Bover (not taking into account that dependent
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The results confirm both hypotheses. The higher food insecurity is (proxied with child mor-
tality) the more likely it is for countries to take into account food security provisions in their
RTAs. The more food security provisions a country has stipulated in its RTAs the better are
food security outcomes.
variable is a count variable) and a Poisson Fixed Effects models which are misspecified and also not further
presented.
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Table 4.4.4: Model 2: Poisson Model with Multiplicative Error Term and Instrumental Vari-
able Control Function (Country Cluster)
Dependent Variable: Aggregate Provision
Full Model Reduced Model
Childmortality 0.039∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(0.020) (0.021)
WTO 0.072 0.097
(0.365) (0.380)
ICESCR 0.606∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.211)
Polity 1.775∗∗ 1.710∗∗
(0.769) (0.830)
Regime Durability 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Log(GDP) 1.722∗ 1.791∗
(0.964) (1.060)
GDP Growth 0.042∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.020) (0.021)
Land −0.007
(0.009)
Supply −0.0004
(0.011)
Log(Food/Merchandise) 0.428∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.211)
Rural Population Growth 0.038
(0.112)
Constant −20.458 −20.923
(10.495)∗∗ (11.422)∗
Control Function with Childmortality as Dependent Variable
Natural Disaster −1.831∗∗∗ −1.760∗∗∗
(0.614) (0.657)
Rho −0.040∗∗ −0.042∗
(0.020) (0.021)
Observations 1675 1675
Note: ∗p,z<0.1; ∗∗p,z<0.05; ∗∗∗p,z<0.01
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Table 4.4.5: Model 2: Poisson Model with Multiplicative Error Term and Instrumental Vari-
able Control Function with Lagged Instrumental Variable (Country Cluster)
Dependent Variable: Aggregate Provision
Full Model Reduced Model
Childmortality 0.029∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗
(0.009) (0.017)
WTO −0.0729 −0.364
(0.282) (0.361)
ICESCR 0.447 0.472∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.166)
Polity 1.242 1.407∗∗
(0.498) (0.661)
Regime Durability 0.016 0.018∗∗
0.007 (0.008)
Log(GDP) 1.167∗∗∗ 1.528∗
0.424 (0.844)
GDP Growth 0.224∗∗ 0.026∗
(0.114) (0.015)
Land 0.008
(0.007)
Supply −0.003
(0.008)
Log(Food/Merchandise) 0.319∗∗ 0.396∗∗
(0.123) (0.178)
Rural Population Growth −0.008
(0.098)
Constant −13.664∗∗∗ −17.631
(4.460) (8.966)∗∗
Control Function with Childmortality as Dependent Variable
Lag2(Natural Disaster) −1.924∗∗∗ −1.853∗∗∗
(0.522) (0.665)
Rho −0.030∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.009) (0.017)
Observations 1541 1541
Note: ∗p,z<0.1; ∗∗p,z<0.05; ∗∗∗p,z<0.01
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4.5 CONCLUSION
Given that RTAs are on average better for food security outcomes than BTAs, I looked more
closely into how RTAs and food security are associated across the three sub-regions of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and South East Asia. A comparative analysis of RTAs high-
lighted their commonalities, which set them apart from BTAs, but also indicated the hetero-
geneity of RTAs across and within the regions in the light of food security. Those commonal-
ities and differences -the latter based on a comparative text analysis of food security relevant
provisions - were comparatively summarised in a QCA. The analysis highlighted that the
state of food insecurity might influence the design of trade agreements, and the specific de-
sign impacts the the state of food security. Accordingly, I formulated two hypotheses: First,
more food security relevant provisions in RTAs, lead to better food security outcomes (Im-
pact Model). Second, the more acute the state of food in-security the more likely it is for a
country to entail a higher number of food security related provisions across its RTAs (Design
Model).
To test the hypotheses I set up two distinct research designs and model specifications. To test
the impact of the aggregate provisions on food security for 67 low and middle income coun-
tries which are member of at least one of the RTAs in the three sub-regions, 1990-2014, I fit a
Dynamic model. Results, which have to be taken with caution, indicate that the more food
security related provisions a country has across its RTAs, the better it is a for food security
outcomes. This confirms the first hypothesis. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature by
taken into account a more differentiated trade agreement variable which reflects the hetero-
geneity of RTAs in the light of food security.
To test whether the state of food security affects the design of a RTA, I fit a Count model,
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which includes an instrumental variable, on the same data. Estimates indicate that the state
of food security is indeed associated with the design. The more severe the state of food inse-
curity within a country, the more food security related provisions the country has across its
RTAs.
While the qualitative analysis highlighted patterns of regional commonalities, the quantita-
tive analysis further specified that RTAs within regions are sufficiently heterogeneous in the
light of food security and should be analysed separately (rather than clustered).
In conlusion, the empirical results complement the QCA, and show that the pattern as shown
by the introductory example of Kenya holds on average across the analysed countries. Coun-
tries which are less food secure bring food security relevant objectives to the regional nego-
tiation table. RTAs with a higher number of food security and related provisions, lead on
average to the intended better food security outcomes across the three regions.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Different disciplinary and methodological lenses condition the views on whether trade is
generally seen as an opportunity or threat for food security in theory (normative debate).
The opportunity front is often grounded on primarily neo-classical economic theory which
demonstrates efficiency gains via liberalisation; ultimately leading to improved food secu-
rity. On the threat front, the different disciplines developed arguments by combining theory
with observations in practice. Accordingly, a managed trade regime is influenced by power
realities and the implications of this system are outlined in the dependency theory. The mul-
tilateral trading system, the WTO, is argued to be such managed trading regime which has
restricted the policy space for food security of low and middle income countries. The im-
plications as outlined in the dependency theory are the macro conditions which contribute
to the individual violation of the human right to food of small scale farming families, as ar-
gued by human rights scholars and practitioners. The empirical literature has extensively
dealt with the implications of liberalisation on economics growth (yet, remained inconclu-
sive) but has neglected to further examine empirically the links between trade agreements
as such and its impacts on a coherent food security proxy across countries.
In light of the proliferation of PTAs, the question is whether those have regained or created
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policy space to contribute to better food outcomes. More specifically, I examined first, in
Chapter 3, whether the relatively cooperative RTAs have a different impact than the rela-
tively competitive BTAs. According to the findings RTAs are more better for food security
outcomes than BTAs. Therefore, I then, in Chapter 4, looked into why RTAs are potentially
good for food security outcomes and whether the state of food security influences the design
of RTAs.
In detail, to operationalise one of the key variables of analysis ’food security’, I developed a
framework to identify different food (in-)security indicators, and to justify the selection of
one for further analysis. The framework implies that food security is a latent concept which
can be measured by the pivotal outcome-utilization indicators. The utilisation-outcome
variables are the variables measuring the actual realisation of food (in-)security. While a con-
firmatory Structural Equation Approach confirmed this, limited data availability restricts to
apply the latent variable approach over the period 1990-2014.
Given this shortcomings I selected child mortality as a proxy for food insecurity for the fol-
lowing reasons. The indicator child mortality reflects apart from individual outcomes under
the utilization pillar complementary factors on the macro level (some of the control vari-
ables). Furthermore, child mortality is highly correlated with other food insecurity proxies of
the utilization-outcome dimension such as anthropometric and biochemical indicators (see
Annex B.2). Even though high correlation might not suggest interchangeability as Caspers
and Tufis (2003) have shown in the context of democracy measures, in this context child
mortality might reflect the other utilization-outcome variables well, as, e.g., child deaths are
found to be attributable to undernutrition in low and middle income countries (Black et al.
2013).1 Based on these reasons (besides data availability) the dependent variable of interest
1See also Campbell et al. 2009, who have shown that higher household food insecurity in Indonesia is associ-
ated with higher child mortality.
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food security is proxied with child mortality as, e.g., done in Olper et al. (2014).2
The fact that the framework is vertically and horizontally integrated among the dimensions,
implies that the suggested indicators of the dimensions other than the ultization-outcome
one contribute to the explanation of the latent variable food insecurity (multidimensional).
There is some (tenative/weak) indication based on the Multiple Indicators and Multiple
Cause Model, that variables such as agricultural land, food production, political stability,
GDP growth, growth of the rural population, health expenditure, access to sanitation, and
access to water may contribute to the explanation of food security. Accordingly, some of
these variables are, depending on data availability and pattern of missing across time and
countries, included in the following analysis as control variables.
To answer the first question I regressed a coherent and harmonized food security proxy, child
mortality, on trade agreements variables for 93 low and middle income countries for 1990-
2014, by controlling for economic, political, social and human rights variables. The results
of the analysis indicate that the multilateral trading system, WTO, has restricted the policy
space for food security of low and middle income countries. PTAs, which are an exception
to the WTO rules, can have an initial positive impact on food security, when contrasted to
none being in place. However, an increase in the number of PTAs does not necessarily lead
to improved food security outcomes. BTAs, which are often negotiated among asymmetric
trading partners in a competitive manner and result in a more ’competitive’ design, may en-
hance the managed trading regime, as an increase of these is negatively associated with food
security outcomes. RTAs, which often entail common policies and objectives on food secu-
rity and related - and are therefore in comparison more cooperative -, contribute to better
food security outcomes.
2Child mortality, or other anthropometric variables, are referred to in the literature as a food security proxy.
See, e.g., Olper et al. (2014) and McCorriston et al. (2013).
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Building on these results, I analysed - to answer the second question - how RTAs and food
security are associated across the three sub-regions, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and
South East Asia. A comparative analysis of RTAs highlighted commonalities of RTAs, which
set them apart from BTAs, but also indicated the heterogeneity of RTAs across and within
the regions in the light of food security. Those commonalities and differences -the latter
based on a comparative text analysis of food security relevant provisions - were compara-
tively summarised in a QCA. The analysis highlighted that the state of food insecurity might
influence the design of trade agreements, and the specific design again the state of food secu-
rity. Accordingly, I formulated two hypotheses:3 First, more food security relevant provisions
in RTAs, lead to better food security outcomes (Impact Model). Second, the more acute the
state of food in-security is the more likely it is for a country to entail a higher number of food
security related provisions across the RTAs it is member of (Design Model).
To test the hypotheses I set up two distinct research designs and model specifications. To test
the impact of the aggregate provisions on food security for 67 low and middle income coun-
tries which are member of at least one of the RTAs in the three sub-regions, 1990-2014, I fit a
Dynamic model. Results, which have to be taken with caution, indicate that the more food
security related provisions a country has across its RTAs, the better it is a for food security
outcomes. This confirms the first hypothesis. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature by
taken into account a more differentiated trade agreement variable which reflects the hetero-
geneity of RTAs in the light of food security.
To test whether the state of food security affects the design of a RTA, I fit a Count model,
which includes an instrumental variable, on the same data. Estimates indicate that the state
3Please note that I elaborate more details for Chapter 4 than for Chapter 3, as Chapter 4 dealt with multiple
approaches (and not just one as in Chapter 3): one qualitative analysis and two distinct quantitative models.
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of food security is indeed associated with the design. The more severe the state of food inse-
curity within a country, the more food security related provisions the country has across its
RTAs.
While the qualitative analysis highlighted patterns of regional commonalities, the quantita-
tive analysis further specified that RTAs within regions are sufficiently heterogeneous in the
light of food security and should be analysed separately (rather than clustered).
The empirical results complement the QCA. Countries which are less food secure bring food
security relevant objectives to the regional negotiation tables. RTAs with a higher number
of food security and related provisions, lead on average to the intended better food security
outcomes across the three regions. The results of the Chapters indicate that RTAs are poten-
tially an opportunity for food security - and the more food security and related concepts are
addressed in the text, the greater the opportunity. In contrast, BTAs are potentially a threat
to food security. These results add to the literature by indicating that trade agreements are
not per se a threat or an opportunity for food security, but need to be further differentiated
in light of food security relevant characteristics.
In the light of the results, it can be recommended that countries, if these have not already
exhausted their options of regional integration (number of RTAs is limited due to its defini-
tion/construction), should focus on improving an efficient implementation of the concluded
RTAs also by harmonising overlapping RTAs rather than initiating new BTAs. The African
Continental Free Trade Area Agreement signed in March 2018 seems to set a good starting
basis for doing so. The inclusion of food security provisions can enhance the positive effect
of the RTAs. These provisions, however, may need to be further specified, for sustainable
food security aims. Apart from the seemingly adverse effects of BTAs on food security in low
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and middle income countries, the increasingly intervened bowl of any kind of noodles (see
terms ’Spaghetti’ and ’Noodle Bowl’ in the literature) is creating an increasingly administra-
tive burden and therefore a highly inefficient trading system. Moreover, given that BTAs are
negotiated by bureaucrats in a competitive and power driven setting, these BTAs are not ori-
ented on economic principles but politics.
Not only BTAs but also RTAs are a distortion to the multilateral trading system in theory. Yet,
while RTAs can potentially become good building blocks of the multilateral system4 and im-
prove regional food security, these will most likely fail to solve sensitive and crucial (market
distorting) issues such as agricultural subsidies more efficiently than multilateral negotia-
tions. Conclusively, RTAs on their own are not the first answer and a multilateral system
might provide the optimum platform in theory.
The (geo-)politcial shift within the WTO sets hope for the ongoing slow to stale Doha Round
to have a more balanced outcome than the previous round, if concluded. If amongst other
the Nairobi package is being lived up to, than the price-distorting direct export support to
domestic farmers in mostly high income countries will be phased out, and hence, the mar-
kets will be regulated more in line with economic principles. However, WTO member states
need to move beyond the mere declaratory text of the AoA and Marrakesh preamble, and
concretely tackle further trade related issues which potentially hamper food security in low
and middle income countries. Low and middle income countries learnt their lesson from
the previous round and its implications, and hence, the only way forward for the multilat-
eral trading system, which ideally promotes food security, is fair play. To say in the words
of Kahlil Gibran: the exchange of the gifts of the earth ought to be done in love and kindly
justice for there to be no hunger.
4Whether RTAs constitute stepping stones or stumbling blocks for the multilateral trading system is contro-
versially discussed in the literature.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX CHAPTER 2
A.1 STATISTICAL MODEL: INTRODUCTION TO THE APPLIED METHOD
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is one form of structural equation modelling that mea-
sures the relationship between observed variables (items) and an unobservable latent vari-
able (factor). CFA is applied to test a theory-driven hypothesis (Brown 2006). This means
strictly speaking that the number of factors and the pattern of factor loadings (equivalent to
coefficients/regression slopes) and unique variances in the indicators that is not accounted
for by the latent factor(s) (measurement error, error variance, indicator unreliability) is pre-
determined a priori. Yet, often the specified model can be adjusted based on an evaluation
of the goodness of fit, modification indices, the interpretability and strength of the result-
ing estimates (Brown 2006). The latter can be described as "model generating, rather than
model testing" (Jöreskog 1993: p. 295).
Technically, the latent variable accounts for the variation and covariation among the here
strongly interrelated outcome indicators (Brown2006). Accordingly, CFA is based on the
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analysis of variance-covariance structures. In detail, the parameters (factor loadings, fac-
tor variances and covariances, error variances and covariances) are estimated to produce a
predicted/hypothesized variance-covariance matrix Σ that resembles the sample variance-
covariance matrix S as closely as possible. In other words, the difference (residuals) between
the sample and the parameter/hypothesized variance-covariance matrices results is to be
minimized (residual variance-covariance matrix = S - Σ). The most commonly applied fit-
ting function to minimize the difference (minimum discrepancy function) is maximum like-
lihood (ML), which maximises the likelihood of the parameters given the sample. If the indi-
cators are not normally distributed, then ML with robust standard errors and mean adjusted
χ2 is to be preferred to correct for non-normality (χ2 is mean-adjusted via a Satorra-Bentler
scaling correction), or sandwich estimator with robust standard errors. Thus, the parameters
are estimated by minimizing following fitting function (minimum discrepancy function):
FML = ln | S | −ln |Σ | +tr ace[(S)(Σ−1)]−p (A.1.1)
where | S | is the determinant of the sample variance-covariance matrix, | Σ | is the deter-
minant of the predicted variance-covariance matrix, and p is the order of the sample matrix
(i.e., the number of indicators).
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Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC)
As CFA, Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) of latent variable is one form of
structural equation modelling that takes on a hypothesis driven approach. MIMIC consists
of a measurement part to measure the latent variable and a structural part to regress the la-
tent variable on covariates. For an example of a formal introduction of these, please refer to
Subsection 4.2.
As for CFA, the differences between the predicted-hypothesized variance-covariance matrix
Σ and the sample variance-covariance matrix S can be minimized via a maximum likelihood
fitting function (minimum discrepancy function) as specified as follows:
FML = ln | S | −ln |Σ | +tr ace[(S)(Σ−1)]− (p+q) (A.1.2)
where | S | is the determinant of the sample variance-covariance matrix, |Σ | is the determi-
nant of the predicted variance-covariance matrix, and (p+q) is the order of the sample matrix
(i.e., the number of observed variables in the model).
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Model Fit, Model Selection and Modification Indices
The aim of the SEM estimation, i.e. in the case of CFA and MIMIC, is to model parameters in
such a way that the discrepancy between the predicted/hypothesized variance-covariance
matrix Σ and the sample variance-covariance matrix S is minimized. Consequently, the
goodness-of-fit is evaluated based on the differences between Σ and S. A number of fit in-
dices have been suggested in the literature. For a as good as an exhaustive list and detailed
elaborations please refer to West et al. 2012. Here, the most commonly referred to fit in-
dices (χ2, RMSEA, CFI, TLI and SRMR) and selection indices (AIC, BIC) are mathematically
described in Table A.1.
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Table A.1.1: Fit Indices and Model Selection Indices
Fit or Selection∗Index Name of Index/Reference Criteria
χ2 = (N −1) f Chi-Square Test Statistic p < .05
Jöreskog (1969)
RMSE A =
√
max(χ2−d f ,0)
d f (N−1) Root Mean Square Error of Approximation < .06
Steiger and Lind (1980)
C F I = 1− max(χ
2
h −d fh)
max(χ20−d f0)
Comparative Fit Index > .90/.95
Bentler (1990) suggested cut of varies
T LI = χ
2
0/d f0−χ2h/d fh
χ20/d f0−1
Tucker-Lewis Index > .90/.95
Tucker and Lewis (1973) suggested cut of varies
SRMR = [p−1e′Wse]1/2 Standardized Root Mean Square Residual < .08
Bentler (1995)
AIC∗ = f +2q Akaike Information Criteria least expected discrepancy
the smaller the better
B IC∗ = f +ql n(N ) Bayesian Information Criteria most likely Bayesian sense
the smaller the better
Note: f - minimized discrepancy function; 0 - baseline model; h - tested or hypotehsized model; d f - degrees
of freedom; N - sample size; p - the number of nonduplicated elements in the covariance matrix; e - a vector of
residuals from a covariance matrix; Ws - a diagonal weight matrix used to standardize the elements in a sample
covariance matrix; q - number of free parameters of the model.
The Chi-Square Test with the null-hypothesis ’Σ is equal to S’ (broadly speaking) is a very
strict one and sensitive to sample size. Ideally the null is not to be rejected, but this often
occurs. Therefore the other listed indices, might provide further guidance. For their advan-
tages, disadvantages and shortcomings please refer to amongst others West et al. 2012.
Modification Indices as proposed by Sörbom (1989) provide guidance in whether single pa-
rameters should be freed. More technically, these indicate the decrease in the model’s χ2-
statistic with one d f if a parameter is relaxed from a constraint in the previous model. A
parameter can be relaxed by, e.g., allowing residuals of items to covary. If the relaxation con-
tributes to the improvement of the overall model fit and is substantively meaningful, then it
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is recommended to take on the modified model structure (as long as it does not lead to over
identification).
A.2 DATA: LIST OF COUNTRIES
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Table A.2.1: List of 114 Low and Mid-Income Countries and Islands
ID Country ID Country ID Country
1 Afghanistan 39 Georgia 77 Namibia
2 Albania 40 Ghana 78 Nepal
3 Algeria 41 Guatemala 79 Nicaragua
4 Angola 42 Guinea 80 Niger
5 Argentina 53 Guinea-Bissau 81 Nigeria
6 Armenia 44 Guyana 82 Pakistan
7 Azerbaijan 45 Haiti 83 Panama
8 Bangladesh 46 Honduras 84 Paraguay
9 Belarus 47 India 85 Peru
10 Belize 48 Indonesia 86 Philippines
11 Benin 49 Iran 87 Romania
12 Bhutan 50 Iraq 88 Rwanda
13 Bolivia 51 Jamaica 89 Samoa
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina 52 Jordan 90 Sao Tome Principe
15 Botswana 53 Kazakhstan 91 Senegal
16 Brazil 54 Kenya 92 Serbia
17 Bulgaria 55 Kiribati 93 Sierra Leone
18 Burkina Faso 56 Kyrgyzstan 94 Solomon Islands
19 Cambodia 57 Laos 95 South Africa
20 Cameroon 58 Lebanon 96 Sri Lanka
21 Cape (Cabo) Verde 59 Lesotho 97 Suriname
22 Central African Republic 60 Liberia 98 Swaziland
23 Chad 61 Macedonia 99 Tajikistan
24 China 62 Madagascar 100 Tanzania
25 Colombia 63 Malawi 101 Thailand
26 Congo 64 Malaysia 102 Timor-Leste
27 Costa Rica 65 Maldives 103 Togo
28 Cote d’Ivoire 66 Mali 104 Tonga
29 Cuba 67 Marshall Islands 105 Tunisia
30 Djibouti 68 Mauritania 106 Turkey
31 Dominican Republic 69 Mauritius 107 Tuvalu
32 Ecuador 70 Mexico 108 Uganda
33 Egypt 71 Micronesia 109 Ukraine
34 El Salvador 72 Moldova 110 Uzbekistan
35 Ethiopia 73 Mongolia 111 Vanuatu
36 Fiji 74 Montenegro 112 Vietnam
37 Gabon 75 Morocco 113 Yemen
38 Gambia 76 Mozambique 114 Zambia
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX CHAPTER 3
B.1 TRADE AGREEMENTS TERMINOLOGY
The applied terminology is distinct from the WTO terminology. Here, the term ’preferential
trade agreements’ refers to trade agreements which are preferential to the multilateral trade
agreements under the WTO, and are used as an umbrella term. Preferential trade agreements
can be differentiated into regional and bilateral agreements. Regional trade agreements in-
volve at least three trading partners in the same geographical (sub-)region (Josling 2009, Bese
et al. 2009). Bilateral trade agreements involve two trading partners in the same or not same
region. Non-reciprocal arrangement schemes are not considered in this paper.
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Figure B.1.1: Comparing WTO and Applied Terminology
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B.2 FOOD SECURITY CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
B.2.1 DEFINITION
The most commonly referred to definition of food security was introduced during the World
Food Summit 1996 and slightly modified in 20011. Accordingly, food security exists when all
people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutri-
tious food that meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.
Accordingly, the four pillars of food security are 1) availability, 2) access, 3) utilization and 4)
stability.2
B.2.2 FOUR PILLARS
The first pillar, food availability, the understanding of food security in the 1970s (Jones et
al.2013; Maxwell 1996), describes the sufficient aggregate supply of food (per capita) through
forms of domestic production (minus exports), imports, food stocks and food aid within a
country or area (WFP 2009; Burchi and De Muro 2012; Simon 2012).
In 1981 Sen drew attention to the second pillar (economic) access by highlighting the im-
portance of taking the economic conditions of people ’endowments’, the command over en-
titlements, and ’exchange entitlement’ into account (theory of entitlement). In detail, vari-
ables on households’ endowments, the bundle of resources people originally own and the
’exchange entitlements’, various alternative bundles that the person can acquire through the
use of trade and production starting with each initial endowment (Drèze and Sen 1989) are
essential in determining food security for individual households. Sen’s entitlement approach
is the underlying theoretical concept for the second pillar.
1By adding the wording ’social’ (Clapp 2015).
2Annex B. is mainly but not entirely based on Chapter 2.
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The third pillar, utilization, refers to an individual’s "ability to select, take in and absorb the
nutrients in food" (WFP 2009: p. 18). Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze refer in this context, in
their 1989 publication, to the capability of individuals "to avoid undernourishment and es-
cape deprivations associated with hunger" (Drèze and Sen 1989: p. 13).
The fourth pillar, stability and sustainability, is the requirement that the three pillars, avail-
ability, access and utilisation, are stable and also sustainable over time. In other words the
fourth pillar incorporates the notion of long-term availability, permanency of access/acces-
sibility (General Comment No. 12: para. 7) and some aspects of utilization (Frankenberger
1992; Barrett 2010; Burchi and De Muro 2012; Aurino 2013).
The first three concepts are hierarchically interdependent. Availability is conditional but not
sufficient to ensure access. Access, in turn, is conditional but not sufficient for utilization
(Barrett 2010). The fourth pillar adds the time dimension to the hierarchical interdependent
three pillars.
B.2.3 THREE CONCEPTUAL LEVELS
One way of operationalising the measurement of the complex food security concept is to
make use of indicators. A food (in-)security indicator depicts a quantitative or a qualitative
variable which measures a simplified version of one or some aspect of food (in-)security.
Indicators can be distinguished by whether they indicate levels of means or ends. The com-
monly referred to conceptual levels are input, process (activities), output (of these activi-
ties), outcome and impact. Input indicators refer to resources allocated to processes within
a larger project. Process indicators can be activities, designed to meet a project’s objectives,
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with which the allocated resources are transformed into immediate tangible or non-tangible
results, the output indicators. Process and output indicators describe the dynamics that lead
to the outcome, which is closely linked to the final aims of the project and quantified by out-
come indicators. Impact indicators depict the longer-term effects or higher-level goals to
which the project aims to contribute to.
In the context of food security, Aurino (2014) differentiates between 1) input indicators and
country structural conditions (indicators for in-depth country assessment), 2) output indi-
cators of underlying determinants of country food security (indicators for action and mod-
elling) and 3) outcome indicators (core food security indicators for global monitoring). Lin-
telo et al. (2014) identify indicators which reflect a government’s commitment to reduce
food insecurity to keep these separate from outcomes, which, according to the authors, can-
not be controlled by governments. I keep the original terminology of structural, process and
output, and outcome variables. Structural indicators are further distinguished into on the
one hand legal framework, policy and programme, and on the other hand ’other underly-
ing structural conditions’. Additionally, the idea of commitment indicators by Lintelo et al.
(2014) is integrated in the framework. All in all, the three levels are, similar to the pillars, ver-
tically interdependent. The structural indicators, condition the process indicators, and the
latter have an influence on the outcome indicators.
B.2.4 THE FRAMEWORK
To operationalise the concept food security, a conceptual framework is introduced in Figure
B.2.1. The framework syntheses information on theory, theory driven pillars and indicator
levels, further information on aggregation levels and conversion factors. This framework
facilitates the identification of potential variables; and a number of concrete indicators in-
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cluding their source (author and/or data compiler) are listed in Figure B.2.1 as suggestions.
In detail, the framework combines the three pillars (Availability, Access and Utilization) with
the three levels (Structural, Process and Outcome) into nine dimensions. Additionally, po-
tential commitment indicators as suggested by Lintelo et al. 2014 are indicated across the
dimensions (with preceding letter ’c’). As the introduction of the different pillars already in-
dicated, indicators can be measured on different levels of aggregation: macro, meso and mi-
cro levels. In theory food availability is a concept mainly on the macro to meso level (country,
region, community), access/accessibility on the macro (country) to micro (household) level,
and utilization/acceptability/adequacy mainly on the micro level (household and individ-
ual) (Aurino 2013).
Access/accessibility does not only depend on availability but can also depend on a set of
macro conversion factors (which condition and contextualise access) such as market struc-
ture including transparency, public goods and services and political freedoms.3 One proxy
for the macro conversion factors is the political stability variable - calculated by Brookings
Institution and WB agencies, and compiled by FAO and WB. Once access is given, utiliza-
tion depends on micro conversion factors such as age, gender, metabolism, pregnancy and
health (as previously outlined) which convert accessed and then consumed food into indi-
vidual nutritional outcomes (Drèze and Sen 1989; Aurino 2013).
Some of the indicators on the utilization outcome dimension, e.g., anaemia amongst preg-
nant women, have some of these micro conversion factors incorporated by definition and/or
construction. In light of the micro conversion factors, food security and the right to food are
in principle individual concepts. Disaggregation ideally allows an analysis of the variability
3See also Sen (1999) on instrumental freedoms: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities,
transparency guarantees, protective security (Aurino 2013).
206
of outcomes distributed within and between socio-economic groups (Devereux 2001; Had-
dad and Kanbur 1990; Pitt et al. 1990).
The selection of variables within each dimension is primarily based on the underlying com-
bined theory of each pillar and indicator level. Given the hierarchical structure of the first
three pillars and the vertical structure of the three levels, the utilization outcome indicators
have a pivotal function and can be interpreted as the variables measuring the actual real-
isation of food (in-)security. For that reason, I considered for the the dependent variable
measures of food security of that dimension only.
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Besides the substantial reasons, as outline above, a key criteria for selection is data com-
pleteness. Out of all listed utlisation-outcomes indicators, Child Mortality is the only vari-
able without missings for 93 middle and low income countries for 1990-2014.4 Further-
more, Child Mortality is highly correlated with all other utlisation-outcomes indicators as
presented in Figure B.2.2.5
Figure B.2.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix
4Missings per variable: Stunting (1728), Underweight (1706), Wasting (1730), Anaemia (279), Anaemia among
Pregnant Women (279), Prevalence of Undernourishment (441), Right to Food (1395).
5Yet, high correlation might not suggest interchangeability as Caspers and Tufis (2003) have shown in the
context of democracy measures.
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B.2.5 FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS (UTILISATION-OUTOCME)
This subsection provides further more detailed descriptions on the utilisation-outcome food
security indicators.
Anthropometric indicators: The most obvious indicators for indicating food insecurity are
anthropometric indicators such as stunting (height-for-age), underweight (weight-for-age),
and wasting (weight-for-height) (see also examples of undernourishment in subsection ’The-
oretical Foundations and Four Pillars’). Stunting is an indicator of the failure to reach the
growth potential and therefore it is often seen as an indicator for chronic hunger (Masset
2011). Some argue that the stunting indicator also reflects micronutrient deficiency (Walker
et al. 2007). Underweight can be due to long term failure to grow but also due to short term
weight loss and is, hence, not easily interpretable. Wasting is the consequence of acute star-
vation or disease, and portrays rather short term effects (Masset 2001).
These indicators are derived by comparing children under five years old (0-59 months) with
a reference population which is estimated by the World Health Organization (WHO) and last
reported in 2006 for children from different ethnicities and by gender (WHO Growth Refer-
ence Study Group 2006; Alkire et al. 2015). If children are below minus two standard de-
viations from median height-for-age, weight-for-age, or weight-for-height, of the reference
population, then they are counted as stunted, underweight or wasted, respectively.
Country-level data is from national surveys and harmonised by The United Nations Chil-
dren’s Rights and Emergency Relief Organization (UNICEF), WHO and World Bank (WB) (in
their harmonized global database on child growth and malnutrition), to make cross-country
comparison more feasible. It can be interpreted that anthropometric measures reflect not
only food intake conditioned by physical micro factors such as age and gender but also com-
plementary factors on the macro level such as, amongst others, access to sanitation and
health services (UNICEF 1990; Jones et al. 2013). Conclusively, anthropometric measures
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make good utilization outcome indicators.
Biochemical indicators: Indicators which directly measure micronutrient deficiencies are
biochemical indicators (also named biomarkers). Biochemical indicators indicating the con-
centration of amongst others iron, vitamin A and iodine deficiency, across countries are
compiled by the WHO’s Vitamin and Mineral Nutrition Information System (VMNIS)6. Yet,
compiled data is not all comparable across countries and lack of data coverage is an issue.
The indicator anaemia,7 which provides some indication on iron, vitamin A, folate vita-
min B12 deficiency amongst others might be the best indicator listed in terms of compa-
rability across countries and data availability; and is therefore focused on. The indicators
anaemia among children and anaemia among pregnant women measure the percentage of
children under age five (6-59 months) and pregnant women (15-49 years), respectively, hav-
ing anaemia. Anaemia is characterised by haemoglobin levels below 110 grams per litre at
sea level, which are based on haemoglobin distributions estimated via a Bayesian hierar-
chical mixture model by the Nutrition Impact Model Study Group (Anaemia) (Stevens et al.
2013). Sources of input data are national health, nutrition and household surveys, plus sum-
mary statistics amongst others from the WHO’s VMNIS. Conclusively, similar to anthropo-
metric indicators, biochemical indicators make great outcome utilization indicators.
Mortality rate: A relatively less commonly referred to food insecurity indicator is the mor-
tality rate amongst children which describes the probability per 1,000 that a newborn dies
before reaching year five (0-4 years). It is listed as one of the potential outcome indicators for
the right to food within the human rights indicator framework of the Office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner of Human Rights (2012), and is also included in the Global Hunger
Index described further below. Additionally, given the high correlation with anthropometric
6For a complete list of VMNIS indicators see online: http://www.who.int/vmnis/indicators/en/.
7Anaemia is a condition in which the number of red blood cells is insufficient (WHO 2011).
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and biochemical indicators, mortality rates are included in the review. Estimates are gener-
ated with a Bayesian B-spline bias-reduction model (Alkema and New 2014) by the United
Nations Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation with nationally representative
data sourced from vital registration systems, populations censuses, household surveys, and
sample registration systems (You et al. 2015). Similar to the indicators above, mortality rates
reflect besides individual outcomes complementary factors on the macro level. Further-
more, child mortality rates possibly indicate fatal consequences of food insecurity and cap-
ture thereby, if so, long-term outcomes under the utilization pillar.
Prevalence of undernourishment: The prevalence of undernourishment (or food inade-
quacy), "expressed as the share of people in a national population not meeting their mini-
mum food energy requirements" (de Haen et al. 2011: p. 761) is measured by the FAO. The
methodology for estimating the prevalence of undernourishment (or food inadequacy) is
based on the comparison of a probability distribution of the annual average of daily habitual
dietary energy intake of a representative (average) individual in the reference population and
a threshold level, called the minimum dietary energy requirement (MDER) for an active and
healthy life based on a physical activity level of 1.55 (prevalence of undernourishment) or
for an even higher physical activity level of 1.75 (prevalence of food inadequacy) (FAO 2013;
Moltedo et al. 2014).
The FAO estimates dietary energy consumption per capita in a country by calculating per
capita dietary energy supply based on FAO’s food balance sheets. Per capita dietary energy
supply is derived from data on production, trade, food stock changes, non-food uses and
food waste and losses (FAO 2013). Access to the calories is estimated by assuming a proba-
bility distribution of habitual energy consumption (adoption of the skew-normal and skew-
lognormal families of distributions introduced by Azzalini) defined by the mean dietary en-
ergy supply and the coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation is based on sample
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distributions of calorie consumption or food expenditures from available representative na-
tional household surveys (FAO 2013; de Haen et al. 2011). To calculate the MDER threshold,
FAO employs a normative energy requirement standards based on the result of the joint FAO,
WHO and UNU consultation of 2001 (FAO 2001; FAO 2013).
To summarize, the ’prevalence of undernourishment’ indicator is estimated based on the
quantity of calories available, the access to those calories among the population, and the
mean minimum amount of calories required by the population (de Haen et al. 2011: p. 761).
Therefore, in a strict sense, this indicator, even though it can represent substantively the
concept of an access or utilization outcome indicator, is technically an indicator combining
the availability and utilization pillar on the outcome level. FAO categorizes its measure as an
access indicator. Here, for the purposes of further analysis, prevalence of undernourishment
is based on its substantive interpretation categorized as an utilization outcome indicator.
SERF Right to Food Index: The SERF Right to Food Index by the Economic and Social Rights
Empowerment Initiative is calculated based on two variables: stunting of children (for non-
OECD countries) below five years and per capita GDP (PPP constant 2005 international dol-
lars). The latter functions as the proxy for resource capacity to reflect the economic and
social human rights concept of maximum available resources (see subsection ’Theoretical
Foundations and Four Pillars’). GDP per capita is plotted against the stunting variables
across non-OECD countries and time (1990-2006), resulting in a scatter plott. An achieve-
ment possibilities frontier (APF) is then fitted through the outer envelope of the scatter plot,
indicating the benchmark level of obligation at any given GDP per capita. A rescaled per-
formance indicator is calculated for each country and then compared with the relevant APF
benchmark level. The difference reveals the percentage of feasible level of the right to food
enjoyment achieved (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2011; Fukueda et al. 2015; see also Landman and
Kersten 2016). Whilst this indicator technically combines the access and utilization pillar, it
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is here categorized as an utilization outcome indicator adding in a human rights element by
capturing the progressive realisation of the right to food.
B.3 MULTIPLE MECHANISMS
The overview depicts three levels: 1) the trade agreement and further policy level (yellow
bar), 2) the (macro and micro) conversion factor level (white bar), and 3) the food secu-
rity level (blue bar). The arrows symbolize direction of effects. The conversion factor level
elements all interdependently affect the food security proxies under the three pillars avail-
ability, access and utilization. For graphical reasons effects between the conversation factor
level and food security level are not explicitly shown.
214
F
ig
u
re
B
.3
.1
:D
if
fe
re
n
ti
at
ed
A
p
p
ro
ac
h
to
a
P
TA
’s
Im
p
ac
to
n
Fo
o
d
Se
cu
ri
ty
Pr
ice
s 
Su
bs
id
ies
 
s 
Co
m
p.
 
s 
Co
m
p.
 
s 
Pr
ice
s 
Ex
po
rt 
Pr
oh
. R
es
tr.
  
s 
 
 
       
Sa
ni
ta
ry
 an
d 
Ph
yt
os
an
ita
ry
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
In
te
lle
ct
ua
l 
Pr
op
er
ty
 
Ri
gh
ts
 
Fo
re
ign
 
Di
re
ct
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
an
d 
Se
rv
ice
s 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
Pr
oc
ur
em
en
t 
Pr
ef
er
en
tia
l T
ra
de
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
Ta
rif
fs 
an
d 
No
n-
ta
rif
f 
Ba
rri
er
s t
o 
Tr
ad
e 
GD
P 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
Fo
od
 
Su
pp
ly 
So
cia
l 
Se
rv
ice
s 
Ho
us
eh
ol
d 
 
In
co
m
e 
Em
pl
oy
-
m
en
t 
Fo
od
 an
d 
o.
 P
ric
es
 
In
fra
-
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
He
alt
h&
 
Ed
u.
Se
rv
ice
s 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l G
oo
ds
 an
d 
Se
rv
ice
s M
ar
ke
t 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l L
ab
ou
r 
M
ar
ke
t  
M
ul
til
at
er
al 
re
gim
es
 su
ch
 as
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 (W
TO
) 
an
d 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l H
um
an
 R
igh
ts
 R
eg
im
e 
St
ru
ct
ur
al
    
    
 
    
    
    
  P
ro
ce
ss
    
    
    
  
  
  O
ut
co
m
e 
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
St
ru
ct
ur
al
    
    
 
    
    
    
  P
ro
ce
ss
    
    
    
  
  
  O
ut
co
m
e 
Ac
ce
ss
 
St
ru
ct
ur
al
    
    
 
    
    
    
  P
ro
ce
ss
    
    
    
  
  
  O
ut
co
m
e 
Ut
iliz
at
io
n 
Po
lit
ica
l F
re
ed
om
s 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t B
ud
ge
t 
Tr
ad
e 
Flo
w
s i
n 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l G
oo
ds
 
Fo
od
 
St
oc
ks
 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 
va
lu
e 
ad
d.
 
Na
tio
na
l P
ol
icy
 an
d 
Pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 Po
lic
y S
pa
ce
 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l 
Re
so
ur
ce
s 
Ex
p.
 R
&D
 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
  
Fo
od
 
W
as
te
 
GD
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
GI
NI
 
Ru
ra
l P
ov
er
ty
 
Ga
p 
Ru
ra
l P
op
. 
Gr
ow
th
 
Fo
od
 E
xp
. o
f 
Po
or
 
Ex
p.
 H
ea
lth
 
&E
du
ca
tio
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 W
at
er
 
&S
an
ita
tio
n 
Co
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
Su
pp
le
m
en
ts
 
Ad
eq
ua
cy
 o
f 
Fo
od
 
Ch
. M
or
ta
lit
y 
Ch
. S
tu
nt
in
g 
Ch
. W
as
tin
g 
Pr
. W
om
en
 
An
ae
m
ia 
Po
p.
 U
nd
er
- 
no
ur
ish
ed
 Cu
ltu
re
, 
so
cia
l n
or
m
s 
Ru
le
s o
f 
Or
igi
n 
Ge
o-
lo
ca
tio
n 
Cl
im
at
e 
 
In
di
vid
ua
l 
Ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
215
B.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DATASET WITH MAR
Figure B.4.1: Summary Statistics for Dataset MAR
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Figure B.4.2: Histograms I
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Figure B.4.3: Histograms II
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Figure B.4.4: Histograms III
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Figure B.4.5: Pearson Correlation Matrix
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Figure B.4.6: Scatter Plots
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B.5 MISSING AT RANDOM AND MULTIPLE IMPUTATION
The original dataset has about 4 percent missing observations (missing at random). In detail,
following variables have following number of missings, listed in descending order and pre-
sented in Figure B.5.1: Supply (386), Food Imports over Merchandise Exports (FoMe) (372),
GDP (149), Conflict (131), Land (129), GDP growth (116), Polity (84), Sanitation (73), Water
(61), Regime Durability (RegimeD) (36).
Figure B.5.1: Pattern of Missings in Original Dataset
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Figure B.5.2: Summary Statistics for Imputed Dataset
223
B.6 RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS
B.7 LIST OF COUNTRIES
224
Table B.6.1: Mixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
(1) (2) (3)
PTA Dummy −10.128∗∗∗
(1.009)
PTA 0.604∗∗∗
(0.234)
RTA −9.506∗∗∗
(0.731)
BTA 1.704∗∗∗
(0.237)
WTO 6.018∗∗∗ 3.499∗∗ 4.179∗∗∗
(1.489) (1.508) (1.445)
ICESCR 0.994 0.017 0.112
(0.734) (0.747) (0.715)
Polity −23.009∗∗∗ −27.412∗∗∗ −21.094∗∗∗
(2.404) (2.426) (2.364)
Reg. Durability −0.115∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Conflict 0.133 −0.177 0.196
(0.864) (0.881) (0.844)
Log(GDP) −6.698∗∗∗ −9.303∗∗∗ −11.455∗∗∗
(1.980) (2.061) (1.979)
GDP Growth −0.203∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.052)
Land −0.142∗∗ −0.158∗∗ −0.134∗∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.063)
Supply −0.145∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.058) (0.056)
Log(Food/Merchandise) −1.122∗ −1.015 −1.649∗∗∗
(0.634) (0.651) (0.625)
Rural Pop. Growth 0.865∗∗ 0.736∗ 0.611
(0.405) (0.413) (0.396)
Water −1.925∗∗∗ −2.015∗∗∗ −1.738∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
Sanitation −0.361∗∗∗ −0.407∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.064) (0.062)
Constant 340.826∗∗∗ 377.169∗∗∗ 375.796∗∗∗
(14.325) (15.235) (14.588)
Observations 2,325 2,325 2,325
Log Likelihood -9,764.937 -9,810.916 -9,710.314
Akaike Inf. Crit. 19,563.880 19,655.830 19,456.630
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 19,661.650 19,753.610 19,560.150
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.6.2: Fixed Effects and Lagged Dependent Variable Robust
Dependent Variable: Food Insecurity
(1) (2) (3)
Lag(Food Insec.) 0.351∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
PTA Dummy −9.829∗∗∗
(2.134)
PTA 0.395
(0.396)
RTA −8.677∗∗∗
(1.961)
BTA 1.296∗∗∗
(0.487)
WTO 2.107 0.178 0.493
(2.991) (3.225) (2.839)
ICESCR −0.151 −0.918 −0.940
(1.551) (1.644) (1.589)
Polity −22.304∗∗∗ −26.485∗∗∗ −20.584∗∗∗
(6.023) (6.661) (6.019)
Regime Durability −0.052 −0.054 −0.070
(0.071) (0.074) (0.068)
Conflict 0.287 −0.101 0.322
(1.227) (1.118) (1.146)
Log(GDP) 3.315 0.392 −1.408
(5.261) (5.616) (5.208)
GDP Growth −0.159∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.060) (0.054)
Land −0.042 −0.052 −0.038
(0.110) (0.118) (0.106)
Supply −0.141 −0.191 −0.154
(0.117) (0.124) (0.113)
Log(Food/Merchandise) −0.068 0.110 −0.489
(1.505) (1.570) (1.536)
Rural Pop. Growth 0.498 0.349 0.209
(0.658) (0.696) (0.631)
Water −1.465∗∗∗ −1.549∗∗∗ −1.301∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.300) (0.281)
Sanitation −0.240 −0.308 −0.330∗
(0.188) (0.215) (0.193)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.7.1: List of 93 Low and Middle Income Countries and Islands
ID Country ID Country ID Country
1 Afghanistan 39 Guinea-Bissau 77 Sierra Leone
2 Albania 40 Guyana 78 South Africa
3 Algeria 41 Honduras 79 Sri Lanka
4 Angola 42 India 80 Sudan
5 Argentina 53 Indonesia 81 Suriname
6 Bangladesh 44 Iran 82 Swaziland
7 Benin 45 Jamaica 83 Syria
8 Bhutan 46 Jordan 84 Tanzania
9 Bolivia 47 Kenya 85 Thailand
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina 48 Korea, Dem. Rep. 86 Togo
11 Botswana 49 Laos 87 Tunisia
12 Brazil 50 Lebanon 88 Turkey
13 Burkina Faso 51 Lesotho 89 Uganda
14 Burundi 52 Liberia 90 Vietnam
15 Cambodia 53 Libya 91 Yemen
16 Cameroon 54 Macedonia 92 Zambia
17 Cape (Cabo) Verde 55 Madagascar 93 Zimbabwe
18 Central African Republic 56 Malawi
19 Chad 57 Malaysia
20 China 58 Mali
21 Colombia 59 Mauritius
22 Comoros 60 Mexico
23 Congo, Dem. Rep. 61 Mongolia
24 Congo, Rep. 62 Montenegro
25 Costa Rica 63 Morocco
26 Cote d’Ivoire 64 Mozambique
27 Cuba 65 Myanmar/Burma
28 Djibouti 66 Namibia
29 Dominican Republic 67 Nepal
30 Ecuador 68 Nicaragua
31 Egypt 69 Nigeria
32 El Salvador 70 Pakistan
33 Ethiopia 71 Panama
34 Gabon 72 Paraguay
35 Gambia 73 Peru
36 Ghana 74 Philippines
37 Guatemala 75 Senegal
38 Guinea 76 Serbia
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX CHAPTER 4
C.1 TRADE AGREEMENTS TERMINOLOGY
The applied terminology is distinct from the WTO terminology. Here, the term ’preferential
trade agreements’ refers to trade agreements which are preferential to the multilateral trade
agreements under the WTO, and are used as an umbrella term. Preferential trade agreements
can be differentiated into regional and bilateral agreements. Regional trade agreements in-
volve at least three trading partners in the same geographical (sub-)region (Josling 2009).
Bilateral trade agreements involve two trading partners in the same or not same region. Non-
reciprocal arrangement schemes are not considered in this paper.
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Figure C.1.1: Comparing WTO and Applied Terminology
C.2 MULTIPLE MECHANISMS
The overview depicts three levels: 1) the trade agreement and further policy level (yellow
bar), 2) the (macro and micro) conversion factor level (white bar), and 3) the food secu-
rity level (blue bar). The arrows symbolize direction of effects. The conversion factor level
elements all interdependently affect the food security proxies under the three pillars avail-
ability, access and utilization. For graphical reasons effects between the conversation factor
level and food security level are not explicitly shown
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C.3 DETAILS ON RTAS
The first table, Table C.3.1 summarises key characteristics including the type of trade agree-
ment (implying the degree of liberalisation), the year of entry, number of member states
(breadth), the number of countries which were former colonies and/or occupied in any other
way (since the 19th century, i.e., excluding the United States which gained independence be-
fore), and whether a common official language is shared among member countries.
Table C.3.1: RTA Key Characteristics
Abbreviation Type Entry/Modified No of Members Former Colonies Common Language
Africa
EAC CU 2000 5 5 No
ECOWAS FTA 1975/1993 15 15 No
CEMAC CU 1998 6 6 Yes
COMESA FTA 1994 19 FTA 17 No
SACU CU 2004 5 5 Yes
SADC FTA 2000 15, 13 FTA 15 No
WAEMU CU 1994/2000 8 8 No
America
CAN CU 1969/1988 4 4 Yes
CAFTA FTA+EIA 2001 5 5 Yes
CACM CU 1961/1993 5 5 Yes
NT+C FTA 2009 4 4 Yes
MERCOSUR CU+EIA 1991/2005 5 5 No
NAFTA FTA+EIA 1994 3 2 No
Asia
AFTA FTA 1993 10 9 No
SAFTA FTA 2006 8 6 No
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The second table, Table C.3.2 lists the member states to each RTA.
Table C.3.2: RTA Member States
Abbreviation Member States
Africa
EAC Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda
ECOWAS Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
CEMAC Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Rep. of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea
COMESA Burundi, Comoros, Dem. Rep. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Rep. Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
SACU Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
SADC Botswana, Dem. Rep. Congo (not in FTA), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia Zimbabwe, Angola (not in FTA)
WAEMU Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo
America
CAN Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru
CAFTA Costa Rica, Dominican Republique, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua
CACM El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
NT+C Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, United States
Asia
AFTA Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
SAFTA Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
The following figures, Figure 3, presents the underlying data for the analysis as described
in the main text in the context of the QCA. Following RTA member state countries are not
included in the statistical analysis as these are not a low or middle income country, not
located in one of the three sub-regions, or have too many missing data and/or not ran-
dom pattern of missing data, or are an outlier: Brunei-Darussalam, Canada, Dominican Re-
public, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Maldives, Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Singapore, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
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Figure 3: Mean Food Insecurity 2014 by RTA
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C.4 DESCRIPTIVES BASED ON ORIGINAL DATA ( WITH MISSINGS AT
RANDOM)
Figure C.4.1: Summary Statistics for Dataset MAR
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Figure C.4.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix
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Figure C.4.3: Scatter Plots
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C.5 MISSING AT RANDOM AND MULTIPLE IMPUTATION
The original dataset has about 5 percent (786/1675) missing observations (missing at ran-
dom). In detail, following variables have following number of missings, listed in descend-
ing order and presented in Figure E.1: Supply (253), Food Imports overMerchandise Exports
(FoMe) (251), Land (68), GDP (66), GDP growth (44), Sanitation (34), Conflict (29), Water (23),
Polity (17), Regime Durability (RegimeD) (4).
Figure C.5.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix
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Figure C.5.2: Summary Statistics for Imputed Dataset
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Figure C.5.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix
Sanitation
Water
RuralPop
FoodMerch
Supply
Land
GDPgr
GDP
Conflict
RegimeD
Polity
ICESCR
WTO
BTA
RTA
PTA
PTAD
Childmortality
Childmortality BTA Polity GDP Land RuralPop
−0.8 −0.03 0.27−0.170.36 −0.06 0.05 0.15 0.31 −0.1 0.75 0.09−0.150.52−0.06−0.6 0.77 1
−0.790.07 0.28 −0.06 0.33 0.02 0.03 0.28 0.29−0.110.66 0.1 −0.090.55 0.01 −0.58 1 0.77
0.58 0.1 −0.170.21−0.27 −0.05 0.05 −0.19−0.250.08−0.56 −0.08 0.07−0.36 0.02 1 −0.58−0.6
0.07 0.03
−0.1 −0.01 −0.11−0.16 −0.03 0.04 −0.14−0.05−0.18 0.12 0.04 −0.09 1 0.02 0.01 −0.06
−0.450.09 0.34 0 0.37 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.11 −0.1 0.55 0.04 0.07 1 −0.09−0.360.55 0.52
0.09 0.01 −0.01 0.07 −0.05 0.14 −0.01 0.1 −0.09 −0.01 −0.18 −0.01 1 0.07 0.04 0.07−0.09−0.15
−0.17 0.03 0.05 −0.01 0.06 −0.04 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.01 0.08 1 −0.01 0.04 0.12 −0.08 0.1 0.09
−0.66 0.01 0.32−0.090.39 −0.02 −0.01 0.17 0.24−0.11 1 0.08 −0.180.55−0.18−0.560.66 0.75
0.09 −0.05 0.01 −0.12 0.05 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 0.08 1 −0.11 0.01 −0.01 −0.1−0.050.08−0.11−0.1
−0.31 0.01 0.22 0 0.24 0.04 −0.1−0.18 1 0.08 0.24 0.1 −0.090.11−0.14−0.250.29 0.31
−0.270.21 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.27 0.19 1 −0.18 −0.01 0.17 0.06 0.1 0.11 0.04 −0.190.28 0.15
−0.090.19 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.1 1 0.19 −0.1 −0.02 −0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.14 −0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
0.08 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.18 1 0.1 0.27 0.04 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 0.14 0.07 −0.16 −0.05 0.02 −0.06
−0.340.25 0.94 0.08 1 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.24 0.05 0.39 0.06 −0.05 0.37−0.11−0.270.33 0.36
0.03 0.74 0.43 1 0.08 0.31 0.18 0.11 0 −0.12−0.09 −0.01 0.07 0 −0.01 0.21 −0.06 −0.17
−0.3 0.49 1 0.43 0.94 0.27 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.01 0.32 0.05 −0.01 0.34 −0.1−0.170.28 0.27
−0.09 1 0.49 0.74 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.21 0.01 −0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.1 0.07 −0.03
1 −0.09−0.3 0.03 −0.340.08−0.09−0.27−0.310.09−0.66−0.170.09−0.45 0.07 0.58−0.79−0.8
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
239
C.6 LIST OF COUNTRIES
Table C.6.1: List of 67 Low and Middle Income Countries
ID Country ID Country
1 Afghanistan 39 Madagascar
2 Argentina 40 Malawi
3 Bangladesh 41 Malaysia
4 Benin 42 Mali
5 Bhutan 53 Mauritius
6 Bolivia 44 Mexico
7 Botswana 45 Mozambique
8 Brazil 46 Myanmar/Burma
9 Burkina Faso 47 Namibia
10 Burundi 48 Nepal
11 Cambodia 49 Nicaragua
12 Cameroon 50 Nigeria
13 Cape Verde 51 Pakistan
14 Central African Republic 52 Paraguay
15 Chad 53 Peru
16 Colombia 54 Philippines
17 Comoros 55 Senegal
18 Dem. Rep. Congo 56 Sierra Leone
19 Rep. Congo 57 South Africa
20 Costa Rica 58 Sri Lanka
21 Cote d’Ivoire 59 Sudan
22 Djibouti 60 Swaziland
23 Ecuador 61 Tanzania
24 El Salvador 62 Thailand
25 Ethiopia 63 Togo
26 Gabon 64 Uganda
27 Gambia 65 Vietnam
28 Ghana 66 Zambia
29 Guatemala 67 Zimbabwe
30 Guinea
31 Guinea-Bissau
32 Honduras
33 India
34 Indonesia
35 Kenya
36 Laos
37 Lesotho
38 Liberia
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